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PREFACE 
Nine years ago, a number of social scientists came together to present 
and discuss their work on "irrigation's impact on society." In the 
published proceedings, the two conveners summarized the conclusions of the 
group as follows: 
There seems to be a feeling that it is time to return to the 
data, do detailed studies of individual irrigation systems, work 
out the technical details of engineering, and assess how the 
system relates to the natural and social environments. (Downing
& Gibsoh 1974:x) 
This I took as my charge for a case study of historical and 
contemporary patterns of irrigation in a Japanese river basin that I began 
in 1975 as research for my dissertation. I was first attracted to a study 
of Japanese irrigation by the central role of irrigated rice cultivation 
in the country's agriculture for almost two thousand years, the depth of 
historical documentation, the quality of Japanese scholarship on rural 
Japan, and the paucity of information on Japanese irrigation in the 
Western language literature (with several exceptions: Eyre 1955, 
Beardsley et al. 1959, Befu 1962, Shimpo 1976, Waters 1981). As an 
anthropologist concerned broadly with agricultural development and 
sociocultural change, I have intended the study as a detailed historical 
and ethnographic account of the way people in one river basin setting have 
organized, over time, to use a resource critical to their political 
economy. As a specialist on Japan, I am interested here in the 
sociocultural construction of the countryside and in how water control and 
use has defined patterns of local cooperation and contention and lines of 
articulation between peasant and elite in rural Tokugawa society. 
This volume represents a substantial revision of my doctoral 
dissertation (Kelly 1980) and deals with irrigation in the Aka River basin 
of present-day Yamagata Prefecture during the Tokugawa centuries,
1600-1870.n1 The dissertation was based on fieldwork and archive/library 
research conducted in Japan for twenty months in 1975-77, including 
fifteen months in the Aka River basin, and on an additional twelve months 
in the US in further study of the collected documentary materials (see 
Although the Meiji state replaced the shogunate on the national level in 
1868, local administration in Shonai was not· formally abolished until 
1870; thus the period of 1600-1870 is used to.bound this study. 
Vl.1 
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Kelly 1978, 1980:xvi-xviii for details on research methods). A future 
work will treat irrigation and agricultural development in the basin in 
the modern period. 
It is necessary to insert at the outset a note of explanation and 
caution concerning the materials and sources available for basin 
irrigation in the Tokugawa period. I suspect this evidence and my use of 
it would not meet the strictest cannons of the historian's craft. 
Surviving documentary evidence is slim for many aspects of Tokugawa period 
irrigation, and my account is frankly conjectural at a number of points. 
The analysis remains tentative. Nonetheless, my attempt to trace Aka 
River irrigation through time is prompted by a compelling need for 
longitudinal studies of irrigation organization. I am guided here by 
Thorkild Jacobsen's dictum to fellow historians of the ancient 
Mesopotamian state faced with critical gaps in available. records: that we 
11must of a necessity relax the stringent claim of 'what the evidence 
obliges us to believe• and substitute for it a modest 'what the evidence 
makes it reasonable for us to believe111 (quoted in Fried 1978:35). 
This evidence has been drawn from unpublished documents of the period, 
published histories, and other secondary sources. I was able to locate in 
area archives and households a number of relevant primary documents which 
are listed in section a of the bibliography. For.the most part, though, I . 
haY,e relied on a number of published histories--of the prefecture, of the 
Shonai area, of towns and villages in the basin, of the river itself, and 
of the three largest twentieth century irrigation cooperatives. These are 
products of an unusually active circle of local historians who have 
diligently combed the Shonai area for any surviving records of possible 
historical value. Many of these documents are now preserved at the 
historical archives section of the city library in Tsuruoka, at several 
town education committee offices, and in the archives of area La.nd 
Improvement Districts (the irrigation cooperatives). The published 
histories have been of particular value for the rather lengthy and often 
complete citation of many of these records, including petitions and 
written testimony of individuals and villages, notebooks of village 
headmen, agreements among villages, and domain directives, accounts, and 
memoranda. My present account can no doubt be modified by future archival 
work on yet unpublished records, but the local histories have proven 
invaluable sources of a wide range of primary materials. 
I have also used a number of more focused studies by historians and 
social scientists of the political economy of Sh�nai Domain to supplement 
these local histories; more interpretive in nature, they can only be used 
with caution because they often have places in complex and arcane debates 
within their disciplines. In addition, technical studies by scientists 
· and engineers of universities and government agencies have proved 
essential for data on climate, river hydrology, the physical facilities of 
irrigation and other such topics. Fieldwork and interviews were conducted 
in Japanese, and all translations are my own •. · 
Vl.l.l. 
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Chapter Id. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Aka River drops from the mountains to the south of Shonai Plain in 
northeastern Japan and runs northward across the flat, coastal plain to 
the Sea of Japan (see Maps 1, 2, and 3). Until recent centuries, Shonai 
Plain was a poorly drained marshland, with only scattered settlements on 
its perimeter and on natural levees of river courses through the otherwise 
undeveloped expanse of brush and reed vegetation. The Aka River, running 
off the alluvial fan it had built up where it met the plain, shifted 
freely among the several channels it had traced across the center of the 
plain. 
Then, in 1605-6, a local domain official organized an embankment and 
diversion project that stabilized the course of the Aka River; immediately 
following this, cultivators started construction of several main canals on 
both sides of the river. Using the river as source, these canals began on 
the upper alluvial fan, and long sections were modifications of former 
river channels. Branch canals were dug from these main canals, and by 
1750, a total of ten elaborated, gravity-flow, dendritic canal networks 
covered the plain on both sides of the Aka River. Basin agriculture was 
almost exclusively rice cultivation, and these networks delivered and 
drained water for the rapidly expanding paddy lands. Paddy lands 
irrigated with Aka River water increased from about 5000 hectares in 1650 
to approximately 8000 hectares by 1750. There was a much smaller increase 
to 9600 hectares by 1870. This acreage embraced about 250 administrative 
villages with about 7500 cultiv.ating households. 
It was also in 1600 that several centuries of political instability at 
the national and local levels were ended by Tokugawa Ieyasu, who was able 
to establish a national hegemony that lasted, with varying degrees of 
vigor, until 1868. The shogunate which Ieyasu fashioned retained direct 
authority over about one-third of the country; the remainder was 
apportioned as regional domain-fiefs to over 250 vassal lords. Shonai 
Plain and the surrounding mountains composed one such domain of the 
Tokugawa agrarian state. From 1624 to 1868, Shonai Domain was held by a 
single line of domain lords, the Sakai. Like many other domains, the 
economic base of Shonai Domain was irrigated-rice agriculture, and the 
rice-monocropped Aka River basin, containing about one-third of the arable 
acreage of the domain, was central to the economic fortunes of the domain 
1 
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lord, to the livelihood of the thousands of peasant cultivators, and to 
the new wealth of landholding, tenanting merchants. 
It is the pattern of irrigation in the Aka River basin that is the 
subject of this monograph. As a case study, it is both a description of 
how the various tasks of basin irrigation were handled during the Tokugawa 
centuries and an analysis of the relative participation and authority 
among the domain officials, peasant cultivators, and large landholders who 
. . 
came to be involved in exploiting and using basin water resources. As 
such, the study raises the issue of who controlled the resource most 
critical to the agricultural base of this regional domain. To what 
extent, it asks, did the domain attempt to control water as it so 
attempted to control the other factors of rice production--land (e.g., 
through cadastres and land transfer prohibitions) and -labor (e.g., through 
population movement restrictions and institutionalization of a status 
hierarchy)? By the second half of the period, a second elite of towne. 
merchants and wealthy cultivators was accumulating large holdings of paddy 
lands; did it intervene in irrigation affairs and to what degree did 
irrigation become an arena of conflict between rival elites? And, to what 
extent were the peasant cultivators themselves, with heavy rice tax 
burdens and a household economy almost entirely dependent on rice 
cultivation, able to develop local and autonomous irrigation organization 
in the basin? 
We will see that in fact there was neither effective elite control nor 
strong local autonomy in Aka River irrigation. Domain officials tried to 
avoid exercising authority in irrigation matters, peasant cultivators 
remained rather unorganized as water users, and large landholders showed 
remarkable non-intervention. All came to fill some irrigation roles but 
no distinctive pattern of control resulted from their participation. Aka 
River irrigation remained decentralized, with performance of irrigation 
tasks fragmented among officials, peasant cultivators, and large 
landholders. 
It is remarkable that such a decentralized pattern continued throughout 
the Tokugawa centuries, and the monograph inquires into the reasons for 
this in hopes of shedding light on the determinants of irrigation 
organization--a central problem in the anthropological study of 
irrigation--and on the nature of state-peasant relations in the later 
Tokugawa state system--an important problem in Tokugawa studies. From the 
beginnings of the river-canal networks in the early 1600s, certain 
characteristics of basin topography, climate, and stream flow made water 
supply difficult and unpredictable; this was aggravated by the highly 
elastic water demand of japonica rice cultivation. Still, through the 
mid-seventeenth century, it appears that w.ater · demand was safely below 
· available water supply. Evidence suggests, however, that by about. 1750, 
water demand had increased as a result of substantial expansion of paddy 
land acreage to the point where supply was tight and there were shortages 
in the critical summer months. Furthermore, c.anal networks had elaborated 
3 
to the degree that accretion and overlapping were severely complicating 
water measurement and allocation. Not surprisingly, then, it was in the 
mid-1750s that petitions and records of conflicts and dislocations began 
to appear. 
I initially expected that at this point a shift towards either 
autonomous water user organization or elite control would have emerged to 
cope with these shortages and to improve irrigation efficiency. That is, 
I expected to find, in the second half of the period (1750-1870), 
technical improvements of the physical facilities and/or clarification and 
elaboration of irrigation procedures and roles as a result of either (a) 
domain officials or large landholders taking a more active, 
interventionist role in basin irrigation or (b) peasant cultivators 
mobilizing into a more effective and structured organization. Remarkably, 
there is little evidence that either occurred, despite a supply-demand 
balance that remained tight for the rest of the domain period. Shortages 
and conflicts continued, but there was neither water anarchy nor a 
breakdown of irrigation in the basin--merely a continued low level of 
water efficiency. 
In this light, the decentralized and dispersed irrigation organization 
of extensive, interconnected physical networks serving 9600 hectares in 
over 250 basin villages assumes a heightened significance. In spite of 
water shortages and dislocations, why was there no shift toward a 
centralization of irrigation task performance after the 1700s? This is 
the particular problem to be explored. What we will find is that there 
were several factors of political administration and land tenure that 
operated to discourage both elite control and autonomous water user 
organization. Domain officials were disinclined to intervene actively 
because of the administrative practice of delegating self-regulation to 
local groupings and because of a lack of financial incentive; in promoting 
paddy land expansion, the domain had allowed much basin acreage to slip 
from its tax base. The dispersion of holdings among several service 
areas, customary limits on rents to tenants, and the highly favorable land 
tenure arrangements they enjoyed discouraged the intervention of large 
landholders. And the effective associations of peasants were undermined 
by the weakening of the administrative village as an organizational locus 
due to a growing incongruence of village residency and the locations of 
lands cultivated and registered holdings. 
There are several necessary preliminaries to a description of patterns 
of Aka River irrigation. In the next section, I will briefly explain the 
analytic framework developed for this case and its place in the 
anthropological study of irrigation and irrigation organization. A 
following section will locate irrigation and water control among the 
significant issues in understanding the political economy of Tokugawa 
Japan. The chapter will close with a short sketch of the river project 
and initial canal construction in the early 1600s that formed the basis 
for Tokugawa canal networks and paddy land development. 
4 
The anthropological study� irrigation 
Irrigation is the controlled application of water to agricultural land 
and crops. Its complexity to users and its interest to social scientists 
derive from the multiple connotations of the adjective 'controlled.' 
Politically, it connotes the distribution of control over water resources 
among the state, other elites, cultivators, and non-agricultural users. 
Economically, it refers to the degree of control over water as a factor of 
production. Socially, it suggests that patterns of water control may 
imply broader patterns of cooperation and conflict among the 
cultivator-users. And technologically, it implies the degree and nature 
of technical control over available water resources. Of course, among 
settings and over time, there will be variation in the scarcity (or 
superabundancy) of water; in the difficulty with which it may be exploited 
and used; and in the degree to which it is critical for agricultural 
and/or other purposes. But where water is scarce or superabundant,_
difficult to exploit, and critical in one or several uses, water control 
in its multiple connotations will warrant a careful investigation by those 
who seek to understand the society in which it is found. Japan, for 
nearly two thousand years, has been such a society. 
· Anthropologists first became interested in irrigation for its possible
causal role in the origin of the state. Julian Steward, in his 
explorations of the dynamics of the early civilizations of the Old and New 
Worlds, noted among their common characteristics an intensive, irrigated 
cereal cultivation. On that basis he formulated a cross-cultural type, 
"irrigation society,n" as part of his theory of "multi-linear evolution" 
(Steward 1955a). It was he, too, who introduced into anthropology the 
ideas of Karl Wittfogel through the influential 1953 American 
Anthropological Association symposium on "irrigation civilizations" 
(Steward 1955b). As implied by the subtitle of his synthetic work, 
Oriental Despotism:� Comparative Study� Total Power (1957), Wittfogel's 
foremost concern has been with a cross-cultural political condition--what 
he saw to be a virulent and harsh form of despotism. It was in seeking to 
explain this form of despotism that he traced its origins to a particular 
"hydraulic setting." He was especially interested in the division of 
labor required by "hydraulic agriculture" and in the consequent rise of a 
highly centralized, bureaucratic elite, whose control over labor 
coordination, conflict resolution, and waterworks administration provide a 
base for generalized "total power.11 
Since the early 1950s, the debate on the role of irrigation in state 
origins has become quite ramified and sophisticated (see Adams 1966, Price 
1971, Cohen 1978, Redman 1978:220-37), but it has no direct bearing on 
this, a case study of irrigation in an existing state. Nor is Wittfogel's 
hydraulic hypothesis of any analytic utility. He himself specifically 
excluded Japan from the oriental despotic states; in his rather contorted 
typology, he relegated it to the "submarginal zone of the hydraulic world" 
(1957:195). His reason was topographical: 
5 
Tqe peculiarities of the country's water supply neither 
necessitated nor favored substantial government-directed works. 
Innumerable mountain ranges compartmentalized the great Far 
Eastern islands: and their broken relief encouraged a fragmented 
(hy.droagricultural) rather than the coordinated (hydraulic) 
pat,tern of irrigation _farming and flood control .•• Japan's 
·ir:rigation agriculture was managed by local rather than by 
x:e-gional or national leaders: and hydraulic trends were 
conspicuous only on a local scale and during the first phase of 
,the, country's documented history.(1957:197} 
-
More-importantly, there are fundamental problems with the structure of his 
argument that render it inapplicable to empirical investigations--an 
ambiguous concept of centralization, an undefined concept of scale, a 
shifting of levels between macro-social an.d micro-social, and an 
assignment of causal priority to topography and aridity.2 
Of more immediate relevance to the Aka River case has been the 'second 
generation' of research stimulated by this early work--the case studies 
(e.g., Gray 1963, Fernea 1970, Glick 1970), comparative studies (e.g., 
Millon 1962, Kappel 1974, Hunt & Hunt 1976}, and theoretical critiques 
(e.g., ·Adams 1966, Price 1971)--that have appeared in the last twenty 
years as interest has broadened to embrace historical and contemporary 
irrigation in pre-state and existing state settings. This growing body of 
res.earch is demonstrating a wide range in the complexity and organization 
of societies in which irrigation is practiced and much variation in the 
manner with which these societies have handled water control problems. 
However, as I have discussed elsewhere (Kelly 1982b}, there are recurring 
conceptual and methodological ambiguitites in this literature. In 
particular, I have identified four issues that require clarification: 
these are worth reviewing briefly here as this study is intended to 
illustrate a more useful specification of irrigation concepts. 
First, in describing the way people organize to manage water resources 
for agricultural uses, there is a tendency to focus exclusively on water 
delivery canals and the roles associated with them (e.g., Glick 1970, 
VanderMeer 1968}. In fact, exploiting water for crop growth is often a 
much more extensive problem. At least potentially, there are four 
separate phases: the control of a water source, the delivery of water, 
applic:ation to crops, and drainage. Of course, the importance and 
elaboration of each in a given setting will depend on crop needs and 
cultivation practices. It will also vary with the technical and 
organizational level of the irrigators. In all cases, though, one must 
determine empirically the extent of irrigation facilities and roles in all 
fou� phases. The Aka River case will prove to be an appropriate 
For further discussion of Wittfogel's hydraulic hypothesis, see Mitchell 
1973, Hunt & Hunt 1974:129-31, Steward 1978. 
2 
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illustration of this because all four phases of water control were both 
necessary and problematical. Chapter four will explore how the Aka River 
itself was controlled and managed both as water source and trunk drainage 
outlet for the basin paddy lands. Chapters five and six will focus on 
delivery, use, and drainage within the two largest of the eleven canal 
1 1networks spreading through the basin. Hence, irrigatione and 'irrigation 
and drainage' are throughout used as shorthande·eterms for a multi-phase 
process of water management� · -
It  is from irrigation broadly conceived in this way that I have 
proposed a formulation of 'irrigation organization• (Kelly 1982b). 
Briefly, one may observe that in each phase of water control and use there 
are certain tasks which are performed. These may be expressed in four 
categories: the landscape must be modified and facilities constructed; 
they must be maintained and operated; water must be allocated among users; 
and conflicts must in some way be resolved. Again the importance amd 
elaboration of these tasks will vary considerably with the setting, but 
that too is a matter for empirical determination. Analytically, though, I 
argue that our descriptions of the social organization of irrigation must 
be based on the performance of these four types of tasks in the four 
phases of irrigation: 
water conflictfacility operation/ 
maintenance allocation resolutionconstruction 
source control 
water delivery 
in-field use 
drainage 
Such task performance can be described in terms of roles, behavior, and 
norms. That is, one can identify the roles with rights and duties to 
perform these tasks--such as, in the Aka River case, the rural 
magistrates, district deputies, intake guards, canal guards, corvee 
laborers, etc. One can detail the actual practices of irrigation with 
descriptions of turntaking along a branch canal, repair of a diversion 
weir, conflict resolution cases, etc. And, one can explicate the 
normative principles which inform task performance--the body of rules, 
laws, and customary procedures by which irrigation tasks should be 
performed. To be sure, the concept of role and the relations of roles, 
behavior, and norms are disputatious issues of central importance in 
1social theory. In my own work, I use 1 rolee to refer to named social 
positions with identifiable rights and duties and I treat role behavior 
and normative expectations as complementary though seldom congruent 
features of role descriptions. 'Irrigation organization' is thus the 
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configuration of roles which perform the above four types of tasks in the 
four phases of irrigation,d.dand it is a primary object of this study to 
describe Aka River irrigation organization in these terms. 
One term I shall avoid using in my characterization of Aka River 
irrigation is 'irrigation system.• It is true that the frequency with 
which studies in the literature do refer to this would recommend 
'irrigation system• as one of our master analytic concepts; VanderMeer's 
definition is representative: 
An irrigation system is an arrangement by which water is 
conveyed from a source to an area needing water to facilitate 
the production of desired crops. As such a system involves four 
elements: (1) one or more sources of water; (2) fields; (3) 
physical structures such as canals and ditches which can carry
water from its source to the fieids; and (4) a functioning set 
of principles and techniques adopted by humans to create a 
water-flow pattern within the physical structures related to the 
amount of water available from the source, the characteristics 
and locations of the physical structures, and the varying needs 
of the fields. (VanderMeer 1968:720-721) 
The difficulty with ·such a postulated 11system11 of hydrology, topography, 
engineering, and management is that it introduces an unwarranted 
isomorphism of what are three analytically distinct and, more often than 
not, empirically incongruent 11 systems11 : natural water flow patterns, 
physical facilities, and irrigation role configurations. Thus, I shall 
differentiate the hydrological, technical, and social levels of irrigation 
with the respective concepts of drainage basin, physical network, and 
irrigation organization. 
To describe natural water flow in a landscape, I find most useful the 
geomorphologists• concept of the drainage basin--11 the area which 
contributes to a particular channel or set of channels •.. the •source area• 
of the precipitation eventually provided to the stream channel by various 
paths" (Leopold et al. 1964:131; see also Chorley 1969:78). The drainage 
basin of the Aka River was initially selected because it exemplified 
alluvial fan topography with extensive, dendritic canal networks (two 
features common in northeastern Japan) and because its paddy lands were 
central to the fortunes of a regional domain state (and thus its 
irrigation organization potentially attractive to state elite). I began 
my analysis by determining how the physical facilities and environmental 
modifications of source control, delivery, use, and drainage were 
distributed over the natural water flow of the basin and how the 
facilities were linked to one another. It was soon apparent that within 
the basin during the Tokugawa period, there were actually four water 
sources supplying four generally discrete service areas of paddy lands: 
the master stream, the Aka River itself; two tributary streams to its east 
and west; and a small pond network constructed on the western fringe of 
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the basin to capture and store water from hill-side run-off (see chapter 
3). Because paddy lands irrigated by the master stream constituted about 
85% of the total basin arable acreage, I chose to focus on that portion of 
the basin. In so far as they shared a common source and drainage outlet, 
I consider these paddy lands to have been the center of a loosely 
integrated physical network of irrigation. This included, conceptually, 
the headwaters forest, upstream and downstream riverworks, and the 
delivery and drainage canals that carried master stream water.3 The 
picture of Aka River irrigation this study presents was then derived from 
an inspection of task performance in each of the four phases of master 
stream irrigation� As we will see, however, some of the roles in master 
stream irrigation had rights and duties in other physical networks as 
well. Thus, just as the drainage basin (hydrological unit) and the 
physica� network of master stream-related facilities (technical unit) were 
not isomorphic, neither were the physical network and the configuration of 
irrigation roles (social unit). 
In addition to the tendency to focus on delivery canals and an 
unhelpful notion of 'irrigation system,• the irrigation literature also 
suffers from an ambiguous use of the term, •centralization.• A persisting 
issue in irrigation studies has been the relationship of irrigation to 
state authority and political power, and many of these studies tend toward 
bne of two polar positions. Some see a propensity for elite control of 
irrigation; water control is regarded as an important locus of political 
action and a dimension of elite control (e.g., Hunt & Hunt 1974, 1976). 
Other investigators have emphasized the frequency of local autonomy in 
irrigation management, the tendency of cultivator-water users to generate 
procedures and form associations for operating water works (e.g., Glick 
1970; Geertz 1959, 1973, 1980; Maass & Anderson 1978:336). This dichotomy 
is usually described in terms of I centralization 1: 1 decentralized'. local 
autonomy or •centralized' elite control. In these terms, the Aka River 
case would seem to be anomalous because there was for the duration of the 
Tokugawa period neither elite control nor local autonomy. 
Such a dichotomy, however, fails to make an important distinction 
between the internal configuration of authority among roles performing 
irrigation tasks and the external relationship or connection of these 
irrigation roles to those in other social systems, most notably the 
general political system (the state). These are, I would insist, 
independently variable features of irrigation organization. Elite and/or 
water users may participate in a centralized or decentralized 
configuration of irrigation roles. This is a separate question from 
whether this irrigation organization is effectively articulated to the 
3 Actually, •network' will be used in two contexts. In addition to the 
concept of physical network here described, I will also refer to the 
•canal networkse1 --the eleven networks of branching delivery-drainage 
canals that had separate intakes along the Aka River master stream. 
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state. Thus, I use centralization/decentralization as a variable of 
internal irrigation organization; it refers to the degree to which 
irrigation roles are hierarchically configured and authority in irrigation 
task performance is concentrated. Articulation/autonomy, by distinction, 
is the dimension of variation referring to the degree to which irrigation 
organization is articulated to or autonomous of the state. 
A judgment about the relative authority among irrigation roles in a 
setting suggests an initial, broad division into decentralized and 
centralized organization. In the former, there is a fragmentation of 
authority functionally and areally among many roles and a minimal body of 
regulations and customary procedure; there is no cumulation of authority 
into a pervasive pattern of control. With centralized irrigation 
organization, there is a concentration of authority through a nesting 
areal and functional hierarchy of irrigation roles, with explicit, 
codified procedures. 
However, irrigation organization may be centralized in one of two 
senses--by strong water user organization or through elite control. By 
the former, I mean that water users themselves mobilize and maintain an 
effective and independent organizational framework and generate a body of 
self-regulating procedures. Elite control is a pattern by which a 
political, economic, or social elite assumes those irrigation roles 
decisive enough to control irrigators and irrigation. The elite may 
themselves be irrigators (e .g . ,  Hunt & Hunt 1974) or they may be 
• outsiders• (e.g. ,  Fernea 1970}. 
Finally, although by definition self-regulating water user organization 
is autonomous of general political authority, where irrigation is elite 
controlled, the elite may be articulated to state authority by virtue of 
exercising formal or informal political rolese. Or it may be autonomous, 
independent of, and possibly competitive with state authority. 
Taken together, such distinctions yield four potential •states• of 
irrigation organization: decentralization; autonomous, local water user 
organization; control by an elite articulated to state authority; and 
control by an elite independent of state authority. The latter three are 
thus forms of centralized irrigation: 
articulated 
elite <: 
centralized < autonomous 
irrigation water users 
organization 
decentralized 
= 
Of course, as ideal types, these distinctions offer only a first-order 
framework to guide one's assessment of a particular situation, which will 
most likely fall somewhere between these state.s. It is in fact the 
, , 
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shifting tensions among local water users, among elites, and between water 
users and elites that should be at the center of our investigations. In 
analyzing irrigation organization in a setting, we need to identify the 
ethnographic referents of water users, state-articulated elite, and 
autonomous elite and then judge their relative participation and authority ..
in irrigation task performance. From this we can determine if and where 
concentrations of authority develop and what their consequences are for 
control of irrigation in its several phases. Finally; we can move to the 
central explanatory problem of irrigation organization, which is to 
discover the factors which give rise to one or another organizational form 
and to shifts from one form towards another. 
This formulation provides the framework of analysis used in this study. 
We will see that in these terms the configuration of irrigation roles in 
the Aka River basin remained decentralized throughout the Tokugawa period. 
Basin irrigation brought together warrior-stratum officials of the 
regional domain, peasant-stratum village officers and cultivator-water 
users, and a small elite of large landholders who accumulated tenanted 
holdings in the downstream plain from the mid-1700s on. Despite several 
reasons for expecting either a form of elite control or strong water user 
organization (or at least a sharp struggle for control), no decisive 
concentration of authority emerged among the. irrigation roles. . The domain 
officia-ls' stance remained passive and circumspect, the involvement of the 
large landholders was quite limited, and there was no appreciable 
organization of peasant water users. This is not to argue that among the 
tasks of irrigation performed by domain officials, peasant water users,
and large landholders, there was no differential authority or that there 
were not linkages between certain irrigation tasks and general political 
authority. But it is to argue that there was no systematic and decisive 
concentration of authority that might be identified as water user autonomy
or elite control as the terms have been discussed here. 
It is in seeking to explain this persisting decentralized configuration 
of irrigation roles that I came against a fourth difficulty in the 
irrigation literature--the frequent tendency to posit certain ' natural 
factsd' of water or a certain ' scale' of physical facilities as operating 
directly and mechanically to determine the form of irrigation organization
(see Kelly 1982b for further discussion of this point). That is, many 
investigators (e.g., Maass & Anderson 1978 :2, Leach 1961:9, Netting 
1974:33, Spooner 1974, Bennett 1976:399) trace a simple and direct 
connection between certain ' facts' of water--shortages, stochasticity,
unpredictability--or 'large scale' facilities and a centralized irrigation 
organization often articulated to the state. 
By this reasoning, there should have been a shift towards elite control 
or strong water user organization in the Aka River basin after the 
mid-1700s. There was not, and I will argue that the reasons can be found 
in features of the sociocultural context of irrigation, the domain 
political economy. To be sure, cultivator/irrigator behavior is always 
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limited, as Leach (1961 :9) puts it, "by such crude nursery facts as that 
water evaporates and flows downhill"; but however self-evident such 
11 facts11 may appear, their meaning and significance--their- status as 
11factsd1 1  --derive from a cultur-al frame and a social matrix. The Aka River 
case demonstrates this. The broad constraints of aridity and gravity are 
insufficient to explain usefully the variety of organizational forms 
irrigation may assume. It is only by treating irrigation in its 
socio-cultural context that we can hope to understand how and why it 
assumes these forms. This case study shows how, in one setting, 'factsd' 
of hydrology and engineering are given meaning by cultural distinctions 
and given form through social action. 
The significance of irrigation in Tokugawa Japan 
The Tokugawa state apparatus was forged by Tokugawa Ieyasu, who emerged 
in 1600 with control over the whole country after several centuries of 
weak central authority and strong but unstable regional warrior powers. 
It was composed of a central shogunate and several hundred semi-autonomous 
regional domains. Although often described as "centralized feudalism," it 
was more accurately a durable but shifting amalgam of centripetal and 
centrifugal forces. It was r-eplaced in 1868 with a new central authority 
which adopted explicit goals of political modernization, social reform, 
and industrialization. 
I would describe this. Tokugawa political system of a national shogunate 
and regional domains as an agrarian state. I use this term in a way 
similar to Lenski's (1966 : 189-295) "agrarian society,d" Greenwood' s  (1974) 
"peasant state,d1 1 and Bendix's (1978) "traditional state.d" It is a state 
whose political economy was divided essentially into a small, privileged,
ruling elite which expropriated the surplus production of a vast majority
of non-privileged peasant cultivators. This elite rule was usually
legitimated ideologically as a natural hierarchy of status 
differentiation. Bendix (1978) has characterized this societal type (a) 
by the linkage of superordinate rights to agricultural produce (the locus 
of wealth), privileged social status, and the exercise of political 
authority and (b) by the nee'd of the sovereign, who r-uled with divine 
sanction, to supplement personal command by delegating authority. Given 
these two characteristics, any study of the agrarian state must consider 
the management of elite claims on agricultural production and producers 
and the competition among elites for wealth, status, and authority. Where 
the production base of the state was irrigated agriculture and where water 
was a problematical factor of production, it becomes cr-itical to ask to 
what extent and under what conditions water control was an important 
· element of state-peasant articulation and/or an arena of elite 
competition. This is the significance of irrigation in Tokugawa Japan. 
· ,  
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The importance of water control and of irrigation organization in 
Tokugawa Japan has of course long been recognized by both Japanese and 
Western scholars. Yet irrigation has usually been examined in the context 
of village studies, in which it is typically assessed for its functional 
contribution to the village as a community. The axiom most frequently
expressed (though differentially evaluated) in Marxist, non-Marxist, and, 
most recently, populist (minshushi) Tokugawa village studies is that land 
was held individually by competing households while water was controlled 
communally by the solidary village. That is, the village is viewed as a 
closed, self-sufficient, and corporate unit, drawing its power over member 
households from its administrative responsibiliti�s delegated by higher 
authorities (assessment and collection of taxes, etc.); from its role in 
bounding important social, ritual, and ceremonial activities; and from 
communal control over certain key resources (water, grasslands, and 
forest). Analysts who disagree at other points are in general agreement 
he.re: 
Each village was an autonomous administrative and economic unit, 
represented by its headman and managed by a village council. 
The internal economy of the village was practically 
self-supporting. Thus, the village represented a fairly closed 
political, economic, and social unit. (Nakane 1967:46) 
Since the economic life of the village depends on irrigation, 
the function of the mura has great significance both as the 
residential and also in many cases as the water-controlling 
unit. (ibid. :43) 
In Japanese villages land was already individually owned, and 
the individual farming of .individual holdings was already the 
predominant form, even in the Tokugawa period. However, it was 
extremely rare for an individual family's holding to be in the 
form of a consolidated block of land. It was generally split up 
into many parcels scattered over a wide area. Moreover, the 
irrigation system was not sufficiently developed to provide 
separate channels to each parcel of land and it was common for 
many fields to be irrigated by water which flowed off the field 
of another owner. Consequently, an individual farmer was in no 
position to flood his own fields freely whenever he wanted to. 
And irrigation control by the community consequently had to be 
strict. (Fukutake 1967:83; see also ibid.:81-87, Smith 1959, 
Beardsley 1964, Johnson 1963:220, Yoneyama 1967:341) 
Village water control is believed to have derived from aspects of water 
delivery to the fields and from allocation among parcels. Smith 
emphasizes the former: 
•.. (T)here was need in nearly every village for an extensive 
system of ditches, dams, dikes, ponds, tunnels, and water gates. 
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Since these could be constructed and maintained only by 
community effort , their use was subject to community control. 
(1959:209) 
Nakane and Fukutake assert the latter. A household received its water by 
the position of its parcels within the field grid; the volume and exact 
timing of water availability depended on village-generated rules and was 
administered by village roles . 
. . .  (T)here is no great difference between a larger landowner 
and a small one, or a tenant. Both owner and tenant remain on 
the same level as cultivators, and aligned according to the 
order of the water flow . • . Further, the decisive factor in this 
system is the manner in which water is allocated.. Even though a 
cultivator may own a large amount of land, the water, without 
which cultivation is impossible, is out of his control. 
Therefore , as Oishi emphasizes , whether one is an 
•owner-cultivator or tenant-cultivator, farming management is 
completely subject to the control of the water flow; that is , to 
village control.d(Nakane 1967:75-6) 
Such a village perspective on irrigation can be quite limiting and even 
seriously distorted. General claims of village "communal" control of 
water use are distorting when used as fuel for the highly polemical 
"village community" debate (the sonraku kyodotai ron). This is a 
long-standing, diffuse debate in Japanese scholarship (and politics) 
revolving around the idealization of the rural settlement as a kyodotai or 
1 1community11 (the German Dorfgemeide is sometimes used). It has taken 
place in a highly charged atmosphere of larger issues that are cultural 
(the impact of Westernization), economic (the necessity for 
industrialization), and polit.ical (the persistence of "feudalism" and the 
possibilities for democracy). That the countryside was composed of such 
"communities" is largely accepted; the deep divisions surround the meaning 
of "community" and how it is to be evaluated. Marxist-influenced scholars 
evaluate it very negatively; the ky�d�tai was a pattern of feudal control 
which had to be overthrown and eradicated to reach the stage of capitalist 
society. The village community was seen in a much more favorable light by
Yanagita Kunio and other folklorists, a view that is again receiving much 
attention in Japanese scholarly circles now that it has been resurrected 
by the advocates of "people ' s  history" (minshushi; see Gluck 1978:36-7). 
Irokawa Daikichi among others stresses the horizontal ties of the "natural 
village" community as the potential for collective and positive action 
(see the English translation, Irokawa 1975 , but also Irokawa 1970 for a 
more measured analysis). 
Even when it avoids the polemics of the "village communityd1 1  debate 
(e.g.d, Nakamura 1977), a village perspective can prove limiting because 
most cultivators and most paddy lands in Tokugawa Japan were actually part 
of multi-village, multi-level networks of irrigation and drainage. The 
• "  
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structures of water roles and rules represented an important
supra-village, regional level of organization. Hall {1974), Bolitho 
(1974), and others have drawn our attention to the contradictory
.
centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in the Tokugawa political order, to 
the inherent tension between measures to consolidate and concentrate 
authority and the preference for a delegated and cellular mode of 
administration. Irrigation in many parts of the countryside was ad· 
significant interface between shogunate and domain officials, peasant 
cultivators, and, where it emerged, the rural elite of tenanting large 
landholders. To understand fully the political and economic significance 
of irrigation, it is necessary to focus on the networks themselves and to 
trace out in them the roles and procedures of water source control,
delivery, in-field use, and drainage that constituted the social 
organization of irrigation.d1 This is what the present study seeks to do 
for the Aka River basin area. 
One must quickly add that there was considerable regional variation 
that demands further study before any broad generalizations about 
Tokugawa irrigation can be properly formed. There were several thousands 
of irrigation networks in Tokugawa Japan. Some, like the Junikago network 
in the Takahashi River basin (Fujii & Kahara 1976) and the Nikary6 network 
in the Tama River basin {Waters 1 981), had highly codified procedures and 
strong autonomous water user organizations. Other networks, suchd. as that 
of Shiozawa in the Shinshu mountain basin of Kitasaku (Hatate 
1970:123-153) were under the rather tight, hereditary control of wealthy, 
resident gono households. And there were networks, for example in the 
middle Tone River basin on Kanto Plain, in which shogunate officials 
closely supervised source control, delivery, .and drainage tasks (Kikuchi 
1966:70-71). Finally, there were networks such as the case at hand, 
operated by dispersed and decentralized configurations of roles. 
The beginnings of the Aka River canal networks 
4 There are of course a number of Japanese scholars whose irrigation work 
avoids an exclusive focus on the village including Tamaki Akira, Hatate 
Isao, Furushima Toshia, Horiuchi Yoshitaka, and, foremost, Kitamura 
Toshio (see Kelly 1982a). Kitamura ' s. case studies, most of which have 
been collected together {-Kitamura 1973a), remain the starting point for 
this Japanese irrigation resarch. Even his cases, however, seldom 
provide a comprehensive picture of a network or basin because he was 
usually drawn to what he saw to be the special or distinctive aspects of 
a particular local setting. On the other hand, his general conclusions 
{Kitamura 1973b) present more of a composite of Tokugawa irrigation than 
an explanation of the variations of basin and network technology and 
organization 
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The first inhabitants in the Shonai area were hunting and gathering 
groups in small temporary settlements in the hills surrounding a partially 
submerged plain. There was no contact with the Yayoi culture core in the 
south. Then, from 700 AD to 900 AD, the area came under the military 
subjugation of the imperial court at Nara. The first agricultural 
settlements on the plain were stockades, around which rice cultivation was 
introduced by peasants brought in by the state. This initial direct state 
control waned after 900, and Shonai came to reflect the common pattern of 
weak central authority, private estate expansion, and increasingly
powerful local proprietary lords and warriors. Between 900-1600, Shonai 
passed through phases of warfare and peace, local autonomy and outside 
control, unified administration of the plain and fragmentation (see Kelly 
1980:d101-113 for details). Throughout these centuries, however, 
settlements remained scattered and restricted to the perimeter of the 
plain and to high land such as natural levees. Rivers like the Aka River 
were unstable and uncontrolled, and supplemental water for the rice grown 
in the wet backswamps of villages was drawn from naturally ponded water 
and by short channels from streams. Irrigation matters were probably
handled within single settlements. 
By the late 1500s, Shonai found itself between two major regional 
lords, Uesugi in Echigo and Mogami in the Yamagata basin; in the 1580s, 
the plain was a battlefield for the two forces. Uesugi emerged victorious 
in 1588, but after joining the forces against Tokugawa Ieyasu, he lost 
most of his lands in 1600. Control of Shonai was given to Mogami, whose 
stature rose considerably to that of a major daimyo lord, with fief lands 
officially assessed at 520,000 koku.d5 
The largely unexploited land and water resources of Shonai Plain must 
have appeared attractive to Mogami ... He immediately placed senior 
retainers at the existing fortified settlements of Sakata (along the coast 
at the most promising port site), Oyama (in the coastal dunes on the 
western edge of the Aka River basin), and at Fujishima (on the plain 
within the Aka River basin), and he granted them the lands around these 
settlements as fiefs. For Fujishima, he chose Niizeki Inaba-no-kami Kusho 
and awarded him 7000 koku in lands. When he inspected his new Shonai 
lands in 1601, Mogami was sufficiently impressed with the strategic 
location of the old fortified settlement of DaihOji, in the middle of the 
Aka River basin a few kilometers from Fujishima, that he selected it as 
the location for his 11 retirement castle" (inkyo shiro). The castle to be 
built at Daihoji was renamed Tsuru-ga-oka (later, Tsuruoka), and Niizeki 
was ordered to double as the castle deputy for Tsuruoka. He was given a 
Of which Shonai composed 141,d874.458 koku. This official assessment was 
derived from the cadastre carried out by Uesugi in 1590-91, under orders 
from Hideyoshi. The distribution of this total across the plain 
confirms that most settlement was on the higher ground on the perimeter 
of the plain. 
'. 
... 
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force of 100-150 cavalry and 200 foot soldiers and moved from Fujishima to 
the Tsuruoka settlement which had a population at the time estimated at no 
more than 4000 persons {OA 1974 :175}.  Mogami returned to his home base in 
the Yamagata basin. 
The initial problem facing Inaba was. the river, which at that time ran 
. .
from Kumaide { where it entered the plain} in a northwesterly course before 
turning north to flow through Daihoji itself. Flood discharges had eroded 
the Daihoji fortification walls in the past, forcing abandonment of the 
settlement, so Inaba ' s  first concern was to provide a modicum of 
protection for the new construction. 
There are no surviving accounts of Inaba ' s  project, and references in 
two nineteenth century histories are brief (the passages appear in OA 
1974 :172). Apparently he had a short revetment built along the west bank 
of the river at Kumaide, using boulders and timbers to redirect the flow 
into a more northerly channel, roughly similar to its present-day course. 
Although the term "cut-off" {shimari-kiru) was used, this was most 
certainly not a complete diversion but rather a regulation of small 
volumes into the existing channel with the maind.flow redirected into the 
new channel. 
It is interesting to note that by 1600, rather sophisticated river 
training and revetment techniques had been developed in other Japanese 
basins of similar topographies {see Aki 1972:481-509, Tamaki & Hatate
1974 :176-211 ) .  If applied along the Aka river, they would have 
significantly increased the degree of control over the river, but judging
from such projects elsewhere, they would also have required specially
skilled engineers and a much higher level of investment in labor and 
materials. Aka River control, though initiated by domain elite and ,-
modestly supported with its resources, represented a minimal 
investment--and returned a minimal protection, to judge from the record of 
periodic flooding. 
Inaba ' s  embankment project, done in 1605-6, had important implications
for agricultural expansion as well as castle defense; in a more central 
channel off the alluvial fan, the river was at once more accessible to 
east bank cultivators and less threatening to west bank cultivators. 
Indeed, the project was followed by a decade of canal construction, which 
in turn led to a century of paddy land development throughout the basin. 
Of the three 'd1argest main canals, work on Shoryujigawa and Inaba seems to
have begun around 1607. In 1615 or so, work commenced on the third,
Nakagawaa. 
Underlying the three projects was a common pattern of local initiative 
and resources sanctioned by, or at least encouraged by, domain officials. .
The Shoryiijigawa Main Canal was apparently initiated by the Kudo 
household, headman of a village near Tsuruoka, with approval from Niizeki;
the project was directed in collaboration withd• village leaders along the 
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prospective channel line. Cultivator support could be mobilized because 
all villages were surrounded by undeveloped areas into which they could 
expand with the new delivery-drainage flow. Stratification within 
villages and sizeable land holdings by some households may have lent a 
degree of compulsion to labor mobilization. In the case of Inaba Main 
Canal, it was Niizeki as fief holder rather than as domain official who 
encouraged canal construction to relieve water shortages in the area of 
his fief holdings.e6 The origins of the Nakagawa Main Canal are less clear, 
but several Shonai historians agree it was dug around 1615 through the 
collaboration of a district deputy under Niizeki and local peasant leaders 
(Maeta Teruhiko, personal communication). 
These three majo_r main canals came to serve over 85% of the paddy lands 
irrigated with Aka River water, but there were also eight other small main 
canals with intakes along the river (see Table 1). · They served areas 
ranging from about 40 hectares to just over 500 hectares in 2 to perhaps 
12 villages ; most were at the small end of this range. Tenpo and EtchO 
Main Canals had intakes along the Bonji River in the master stream 
headwaters, but all of the other intakes were in the alluvial fan section 
like the large three. Little, unfortunately, is known of their origins or 
later organization (see Kelly 1980: 128-31). 
Like the Kumaide embankment work, none of these main canal projects was 
as technically demanding or as technologically sophisticated as canal 
1projects elsewhere in Mogamies domain and in other parts of northeast 
Japan. Except for the two later short canals from the headwaters (Tenp� 
and Etchu), all were essentially modifications of old river courses off 
the alluvial fan across the plain. Labor was recruited from existing 
villages in the potential main canal service areas; cultivators• tools and 
straw mats and baskets would have sufficed for earth-moving. Except for 
Inaba, completion of which was delayed by political events, both 
Shoryujigawa and Nakagawa and the other smaller main canals that were also 
dug from the river were completed at once in their entire lengths, rather 
than progressively extended. This was to allow return drainage to. the 
river; it was the branch canals dug from the main canals that were 
subsequently elaborated as land was brought into rice cultivation. 
6 Unlike Shoryujigawa and Nakagawa, though, the Inaba Main Canal was 
unfinished when Mogami lost control of Shonai in 1622 and his officials 
withdrew. The project was not renewed until 1689, apparently through 
the initiative of two prominent cultivator households. It was completed 
in 1692 (see Kelly 1980:125-127). I will not deal in detail with Inaba 
in this study, but a recent work by a local historian, Naganuma Gensaku, 
supports the contention that its organizational features were quite 
similar to the other two major canal networ_kse- (Naganuma 1978:1-76). 
. . . 
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Table 1 
Main canals along the Aka River master stream in the Tokugawa period 
period of est. acreage intake number
main canal construction served (1870) position Map 
on
3 
-
left bank1661? 40 ha 
Tenpo _j: ,,%_. 1831-38 50 ha right bank 1 
-
Etchu �- f 1703-14 40 ha right bank 2 
3Kumaide !.'� �\ 
unknown 40 ha left bank 4Sankason 
Shoryuj igawa ff il� 1' l c. 1609 4100 haa· left bank 5 
-
Ogawa � P l 1706 260 ha
. right bank 6 
Shida ,& Ee c. 1610? 510 ha  left bank 7 
Inaba ® 1'� 1607-22;
1689-92 
1150 ha  right bank 8 
Gokamura 
Ji_..Jr 11 unknown ha  left bank 9 
,-t 
II INakagawa
Daihoji 
c. 1615 
A 'i'.· � unknown 
3000 ha right bank 10 
left bank 40 haa 11· 
Notes : Main canals are listed in order of intake position, from 
upstream to downstream. The acreage figures for 1870 are 
estimates calculated from domain cadastral surveys and from 
the 187�-76 Land Tax Reform survey registers. Total service 
area acreage in 1870 is estimated to have been 9430 hectares, 
of which 8250 hectares (87%) were within the three largest 
canal networks-- Shoryujigawa, Nakagawa, and Inaba. 
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In sum, then, there was little irrigation and rice cultivation on the 
plain prior to the opening of the 1600s, when what became main canals of 
extensive branching networks were dug as modifications of old river 
courses. Construction was simple and locally organized, with domain elite 
sanction but little direct control and only minor investment. The impetus 
was not new technology, available elsewhere but not evident here. Rather,
it was changed political circumstances, the imposition of an administered 
peace, although I believe the explanation to lie more with the 
'administration' than with the 'peace.' That is, it may be tempting to see 
this flurry of local initiative as encouraged by the prospect of continued 
peace after such prolonged turmoil; indeed, from hindsight we can see 1600 
as the beginning of two and a half centuries of peace throughout Japan and 
as the moment when a new central authority emerged after several centuries 
of virtually no strong political center. But in 1600, to Tokugawa Ieyasu, 
to the regional lords, and to the local village leaders, the future of the 
new central and regional arrangements must have seemed hardly assured. 
Perhaps more compelling to those cultivator-leaders like Kamon who 
coordinated and promoted the canal construction were such measures as the 
cadastres of Uesugi (in 1590) and then Mogami (in 1611-12), which 
tightened controls and raised domain claims on local production, and the 
lords' halting but increasingly successful efforts to demilitarize the 
countryside and drive a wedge between warrior and cultivator. Such 
trends, more than the prospects of peace, may have convinced those who 
returned to or remained in the villages that agricultural expansion was a 
necessary, viable and preferred response to the threat of a more effective 
regional power. 
Mogami's attempts to consolidate his administration in Shonai, however, 
were suspended several years after the cadastre by political events. In 
1614, Mogami Yoshiaki died, and his death touched off a succession 
struggle that extended even to lesser retainers. The troubles provedd· 
intolerable to the shogunate, and in 1622, the Mogami family was removed 
by Tokugawa Iemitsu for its inability to rule properly, and its lands 
divided. The 138,000 koku Shonai fief was given to Sakai Tadakatsu, who 
was moved from a smaller domain in Shinshu (Matsushiro). His arrival in 
Tsuruoka in 1622 marked the end of 21 years of Mogami rule and the 
beginning of 250 years of Sakai rule in Shonai and the Aka River basin. 
Chapter II 
SHONA! DOMAIN 
Shonai Domain was but a small regional unit in the larger Tokugawa 
state. 11Centralized feudalism11 is a term often used to describe this 
state, but more accurately it was a peculiar mix of feudal and 
bureaucratic structures, held together in a tenuous balance of central 
control and regional autonomy. The shogun exercised direct authority over 
about one-third of the country as his personal holdings (including most of 
the major cities and precious metal mines as well as lands assessed at 
over six million koku). He had only indirect control of the rest of the 
country, principally divided into over 250 territorial domains and granted 
to domain lords personally subordinate and responsible to the shogun. As 
Hall has observed, ties of personal subordination shaded into bureaucratic 
relations at the lower levels of administration: 
The force of authority which united the system was at the top
feudal, particularly as it applied to the relationship between 
Shogun and daimyo. Yet within the administrative subparts, 
within the direct jurisdictions of the Shogun or daimyo, 
authority was increasingly exerted through bureaucratic means. 
(Hall 1970:165) 
If relations within the state administration ranged from feudalistic to 
bureaucratic, there was also a continuous tension between centralizing and 
decentralizing forces. Initially, in the first century of Tokugawa 
administration, the political center exerted strong controls over the 
regional domains. The power of the shogun to give and take away lands was 
perhaps the most potent of his powers over the domain lords, and in the 
seventeenth century, it was used frequently to reward and punish. Control 
over the domain lords was also maintained through a country-wide system of 
inspector-spies, restrictions on castle contruction in the domains,
commercial monopolies, forced contributions to shogunate public works 
projects, the requirement that all domain lords alternate residence in 
their home castles with regular attendance at Edo, and other measures. 
Yet, by the mid-1700s, the Japanese state was once again sliding back 
into the condition of weakening central authority and growing regional 
autonomy as, one by one, shogunate perogatives were lost to the domain 
lords. To Bolitho (1974), this movement towar.d decentralization in the 
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Tokugawa state owed much to the behavior of the fudai daimyo, the "house 
domain lords.d11 As the original vassals of the Tokugawa family, they were 
the most closely bound to its fortunes. After Ieyasu came to power, they 
were frequently positioned between the territories of the tozama daimyo, 
the "outside domain lords,d11 whose loyalties were questionable. Bolitho 
has argued that the house domain lords increasingly came to see their 
postion as territorial barons to be the more promising and the more 
pressing. By the eighteenth century, distinctions between fudai and 
tozama daimyo blurred as the fudai daimyo came to behave more and more as 
domain administrators and less and less as loyal Tokugawa vassals. It was 
the cumulative effect of the shift from vassal to domain lord on an 
individual level that contributed mightily to tipping the institutional 
balance from the centralism of the seventeenth century to increasing 
regional autonomy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
These matters are raised here because they suggest something of the 
position of Shonai Domain within the broader Tokugawa state. Sakai 
Tadakatsu, whose line continuously controlled Shonai Domain for eleven 
generations from 1622 to 1868, was just such a fudai daimyo.d7 Despite the 
vassalage ties to the shogun, even the fudai daimyo enjoyed considerable 
independence in the exercise of authority within their domains. While 
admitting of important influences emanating from the larger political 
culture (for example, the neo-Confucianist moral philosophy which underlay 
the division of society into four estates), the above discussion supports
the claim that Shonai Domain may be fairly treated as the 
political-economic context for Aka River irrigation. 
The administrative framework of Shonai Domain 
Like the larger Tokugawa state system, the administrative strategy of 
the early Sakai lords embodied contradictory centripetal and centrifugal 
tendencies.d8 On the one hand, they moved decisively to draw into the 
castle town the warrior retainers, to cut their ties to the land, and to 
insure that their political and economic fortunes would be bound up with 
the prosperity of the domain. They were used to staff a comprehensive, 
hierarchical administration that linked lord and peasant. 
7 Sakai Tadakatsu headed one of the three lines of the Sakai family, which 
was one of the monbatsu (pedigreed vassal families), those families from 
around Mikawa Province which were the earliest Tokugawa vassals in the 
fifteenth century. 
8 This section is primarily drawn from descriptions of Sh�nai Domain 
administration in OA 1�74 :244-72, 502-21, Naganuma 1964:407-19, OB 
1974 :92-100, and Maeta Teruhiko, personal �ommunication. 
' . 
. : . _.;. . 
22 
On the other hand, this tightening of control over warrior and peasant 
was balanced by a cellular mode of administration, a preference for 
segmenting the horizontal strata of society into vertica.l groups which 
were delegated self-regulating responsibility. These groups were 
themselves of several levels; the most local were the warriors' group 
(kumi), the agriculturalists' village (mura), and the townspeoples' ward 
(machi). This pattern of horizontal status stratum and vertical local 
group was in distinct contrast to the exercise of authority through a 
network of personal ties that had characterized the several previous 
centuries. It was a "rule by status" in Hall's terms: 11 • .• .•  a new and 
more bureaucratic system of administration in which authority was 
exercised impersonally toward legaliy defined groups and classes rather 
than through links of paternalistic subordination" (Hall 1974:44). With 
its hierarchy of officials and its several levels of local groups, the 
administrative framework of Shonai Domain reflected this tension between 
concentration and delegation of authority. 
Shonai Domain was approximately 2000 sq. km. in area and composed 
roughly the plain, the surrounding mountains, and the coast. For 
administrative purposes, it was divided into town (murakata) and 
countryside (jigata). The towns in this sense were Tsuruoka, the castle 
town, and Sakata, the principal port of the domain at the mouth of the 
Mogami River. There were four levels of units in the countryside: the 
gun (county), t�ri ore� (district), kumi (village group), and mura 
(village). The old gun or kori (county) boundaries were retained but had 
no administrative significance in the Tokugawa period; the Mogami River 
served as boundary between Akumi-gun to the north and Tagawa-gun to the 
south. 
Each of the two counties was divided into districts; Akumi-gun was 
divided into three districts (called go), while Tagawa-gun, a larger area, 
was divided into five districts (called by a different term, tori, for 
reasons unknown). At the third level, these districts were each 
subdivided into three to seven village groups (kumi), groupings of roughly 
contiguous villages. It was the village (mura) which constituted the 
fourth and lowest level of domain administration; from two to forty-nine 
villages composed a single village group. 
. 
It is necessary to distinguish analytically the domain administrative 
village (the mura) from the village as a spatial settlement unit and the 
village as a social community; the latter two are often referred to by 
residents and analysts alike as the buraku. For the moment, .it will 
suffice to note that the settlement pattern on Shonai Plain was typically 
a nucleated cluster of houses surrounded by arable fields and that in the 
Tokugawa period, the administrative village generally coincided with this 
nucleated settlement. Thus, the administrative mura usually was 
isomorphic with the spatial buraku; I will leave for later consideration 
the extent to which this was also a social community, a buraku in the 
, " 
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social sense.d9 
According to an 1861 map of Shonai Domain (Tsuruoka City n.d.), there 
were by that year 747 domain administrative villages organized in 35 
village groups, which in turn composed the 8 districts of the 2 counties. 
While comparison with other records exposes minor inaccuracies with the 
map (these will be noted for the drainage basin later), it provides useful 
data on the geography of domain administration. It illustrates, first, 
that although the eight districts remained fixed in number andd· in 
boundaries through the period, the founding of new villages had led to 
reorganization of and an increase in the number of village groups. This 
reorganization does not explain, however, the wide range in number of 
villages per village group and number of village groups per district; it 
is unclear why these varied so greatly. The map confirms that the 
principle of spatial contiguity was generally used to demarcate 
administrative units. More importantly, though, the map also illustrates 
the very low degree of correspondence between administrative divisions and 
either the natural hydrological divisions of the domain or the canal 
networks of water delivery and drainage. 
Finally, the map indicates that there was some land within the 
boundaries of Shonai Domain which did not fall under the official 
jurisdiction of the domain, thus somewhat complicating administrative 
procedure. In 1632, Sakai Tadakatsu had made a small, 10,000 koku fief 
grant to a former domain lord, Kat� Tadahir6, whom the shogunate had 
placed under his supervision (the grant included some land in the Nakagawa 
service area). In 1647, Sakai also made fief grants to two sons;
Tadatsune was given 20,000 koku in lands around Matsuyama, north of the 
Mogami River, and Tadahiro was given 10,000 koku of lands around Oyama,
including some villages in the Sh5ryujdigawa Main Canal service area. 
While the line of Tadatsune continued to control the Matsuyama fief as a 
"branch domain" little distinguished from the main Sh�nai Domain, both 
Kato Tadahiro and Sakai Tadahir6 died without issue. By shogunal law,
their fiefs did not revert to the domain but rather to the shogunate. 
Thus, within the Aka River basin, there were a small number of villages in 
shogunal territory, but I will argue that in irrigation this was not a 
significant administrative distinction.d1 0  
9 This pattern contrasted with, for instance, the area around Niiike in 
western Japan, studied by Beardsley, Hall, and Ward ( 1 959).  There, in 
the Tokugawa period, several named, nucleated settlements (generally
termed buraku and translated as "hamlet") constituted a single 
administrative village; thus Niiike was one of five hamlets which 
composed the administrative village of Shinjo-kami (Kakizaki 1964). 
1 0  Actual administration of these shogunal lands alternated throughout the 
period. At times,· a small office of two or three shogunal officials 
was maintained in the town of Oyama, responsible to the northeast Japan 
·. . ,. . . . ,. . ; ·. . 
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.Very little demographic research has beend. done for the Shonai area, and 
population levels for the domain period can be estimated only in gross
terms. Local historians have made several calculations from domain 
documents, which suggest that towards the end of the eighteenth. century
the total domain population was in the range of 135 ,000 , with perhaps 
19,000 persons resident in the castle town of Tsuruoka and 1 5 , 000 in the 
port of Sakata (see Kelly 1980 : 156 ) .  If we add the approximately 30,000 
persons in the shogunate-controlled territory and the Matsuyama branch 
domain lands, both within the boundaries of the domain, we obtain a total 
figure of roughly 165 ,000 . By status strata, there were on the order of
127 , 000 peasants, 25 ,000 townspeople (artisans and merchants), and 13 ,000 
warriors and their dependents. 
It is more difficult to estimate the population within the Aka River 
drainage basin because surviving documents seldom provide district and/or
village breakdowns. Bringing together scattered figures for the number of 
households in 77 villages of the 142 villages in the Shoryujigawa and 
Nakagawa Main Canal service areas yields a mean value of 30 . 3  households 
per mura (and a range of 4 to 138 households per mura). This would 
suggest approximately 2700 cultivator households in Shoryujigawa and about 
1600 cultivator households in Nakagawa. On the basis of relative service 
area acreages, I would estimate that there were on the order of 7000-7500 
cultivator households served by Aka River water in all eleven main canal 
areas. Without any reliable estimates of persons per household, it is 
impossible to determine the total population within the service areas.1 1 
The warrior stratum in Shonai was composed of all retainers of the 
domain lord and was sub-divided into upper rank warriors (termed gokachO) 
and lower rank warriors (okyunin). The former, from whose numbers were 
drawn the senior domain officials, held hereditary fief allotments from 
the domain lord. The latter, who served as bodyguards, foot soldiers, 
attendants, and minor officials, received fixed annual stipend allotments. 
In 1675, upper rank warriors numbered 445 •. By 1840, their numbers had 
increased to about 500; this same year, there were 192� lower rank 
warriors (OA 1974 : 510) .  
regional shogunate office in Obanazawa. For much of the period, 
however, administrative responsibilities were delegated to Shonai 
Domain (in 1749-50, 1769-1814, 1815-41, 1844-63; see Naganuma 
1964 :170- 1 ,  OB 1974 : 90-2 ) .  
Village numbers are from OB 1974 :110,  Naganuma 1964:437�42, and YKS 
1968:670-5. These and total population figures cited in OA 1974 are 
all from official domain documents; see YKS 1980 :409-431 for a 
selection. Hanley & Yamamura 1977 : 38-68 discuss the problems of using 
such population data. 
1 1  
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The enfeoffment of the upper rank warriors was only a nominal land 
grant (e.g., YKS 1980:57-58). More properly, it was a hereditary grant of 
certain rights to the produce of a territory of a fixed registered yield; 
this territory was dispersed among many villages and the produce (rice and 
some secondary goods) was delivered by the villages to the domain granary. 
The retainer later received a share equal to his fief value times the 
official mean tax rate for that year. He exercised no jurisdiction over 
the territory of the fief grant. 
What began as a garrisoned body of warrior vassals developed soon into 
an elaborated domain administration as civil duties proliferated and peace 
continued (the network of offices and procedures may also be seen as a way 
of insuring control and supervision over the retainers). It was from this 
warrior stratum that the officials of the domain were chosen.d· At the top, 
of course, was the domain lord himself (see Sato 1975 for biographies of 
the Sakai line). The domain lord had a residence in Edo as well as the 
castle at Tsuruoka, and OA 1974 estimate that by the nineteenth century, 
he came to spend about 16-17 months in Edo for every 8-10 months in 
Tsuruoka. 
Under the· domain lord were the karo, who formed his senior advisory 
group, the council of elders responsible for all domain matters. These 
usually numbered between four and six and were drawn from those upper rank 
retainers with fiefs of over 1000 koku. That is, while one ' s  status, 
expressed in terms of fief or stipend, was fixed and hereditary, official 
positions were filled by appointment. Often, in fact, several persons 
were appointed to the same position and served in one-month rotationd •
periods. Assisting the karo and serving as apprentices to the position 
were several officials known as chur5. 
Below the council of elders was a panoply of officials composing the 
administrative structure of the domain. It is not necessary to detail 
here the entire structure (see OA 1974:d244-250 for a more complete
listing); rather, we will be concerned with the three positions in the 
administration with j urisdiction over agricultural and rural matters. 
These were the domain rural affairs officer (gundai), the rural magistrate 
(gun-bugya), and the district deputy (daikan). The post of rural affairs 
officer was a senior one, directly below the council of elders; it 
involved both agricultural policy and general domain fiscal policy, based 
as it was on the appropriation, distribution, and marketing of rice. It 
was usually filled by 2-3 persons at a time, drawn from retainers above 
300 koku. 
The rural magistrates, the gun-bugyO, were charged with matters of land 
ownership, crime and public order outside the towns, public works 
construction, and the rural populace. Drawn from upper rank retainers 
above 100 koku, there were four magistrates for the eight districts of the 
domain--each was assigned two districts. 
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The third position, the district deputy or daikan, was a post 
complementary to that of the rural magistrate; the two both reported to 
the domain rural affairs officer (gundai). The. duties of the district 
deputy included crop inspection, collection of taxes, and promotion of 
agriculture. There were sixteen district deputies, two for each of the 
eight districts; like the rural magistrate post, it was filled by upper 
rank retainers with fiefs above 100 koku. On important matters, the 
district deputy would collaborate with the rural magistrate in the 
district--for example, in the compilation of population registers, the 
replacement of village headmen, and so forth. Attached to all three of 
these positions were various assistants, who conducted many of the actual 
inquiries, projects and duties. There were subordinate posts named 
shitayaku, tedai, and tori-kakari mentioned in documents of different 
eras; the distinctions among these posts, if any, are not clear, but they 
were generally, though not always, filled by persons from the lower 
warrior ranks. 
Below the domain-wide rural affairs officer and the district-level 
magistrates and district deputies were the village group headmen, the-
ojoya; these were the officials placed in general administrative control 
over each village group within the districts. The ojoya were in an 
anomalous position, an interface between the domain warrior stratum 
administrators above and the purely peasant village officers below. In 
status they were of the peasant stratum, but for salary purposes, they 
were treated as lower-rank warrior retainers, drawing a stipend of, 
typically, 50 koku per year (cf. YKS 1980 :62) . They were also accorded 
the privileges of surname, sword, and certain embellishments of front gate 
and house design. At the same time, they were resident in the local area 
and served at the convenience of the domain officials above them, all 
resident in the castle town. Though the post was appointive, it was in 
fact often hereditary; even so, village headmen were frequently shifted 
around among different village group assignments and on occasion lost 
their position entirely. The difference, then, between the lower-rank 
warrior retainer and the village group headman was that the former
received a perpetual and hereditary stipend while the latter's was a 
stipend attached to the post; if the occupant was removed or if his son 
did not succeed to the post, he did not continue to receive the stipend.e12 
12 This anomalous character is due in part to the beginnings of local 
domain administration in the area. When Sakai Tadakatsu moved to 
Shonai in 1622 , he brought with him only a small vassal band. Their 
numbers were supplemented by r�nin warriors from the disintegrating 
Mogami Domain. Furthermore, in appointing the initial village group 
headmen, he selected not from the warrior retainers but rather from 
among local peasant chiefs and gentry (see OA 1974:270 and Naganuma 
1964:411 for examples within the Aka River drainage basin). 
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Finally, at the lowest rung of the administrative structure were the 
administrative villages (mura) and their headmen. The administrative 
village was a device for the extraction of agricultual production and the 
maintenance of public order in the countryside, and it was a creation of 
the early cadastres using the existing nucleated settlement pattern. The 
approximately 750 administrative villages of the domain were at once the 
terminal units of a hierarchy of domain officials and also the most local 
cells, the smallest official ' containers' of peasant cultivators. They
were the object of concern of higher officials but also the subject of 
broad delegated authority: 
. . .  the village was charged by the regieme with the 
obligation to service its own needs including internal 
governance and adjustment of civil disputes. Or, stated in 
legal (and artificial) terms, this was a profoundly pervasive 
delegation of authority to the village to get it to attend to 
its own business. As a matter of jurisdiction, the Tokugawa 
village was empowered and obligated by the feudal authorities to 
manage its own internal affairs, in accordance with its 
customary law with minimum intrusions from the law of the 
overlord (hatto) so long as the tax was paid.(Henderson 
1975:12) 
• . .  Rather than cherish the right to adjudicate, the 
prevailing official attitude at all levels of feudal authority 
was that civil disputes should be settled by the villagers
themselves; they were only officially noticed as a matter of 
grace, not right. (ibid.:18-9; cf. Befu 1967) 
One found in these villages the same status distinctions common in 
rural Tokugawa Japan: (a) those peasants with registered proprietary 
rights and tax duties to arable land (honbyakusho); (b) peasants without 
such rights and duties to arable land but who nonetheless maintained 
themselves as separate residential households and worked land holdings 
through various tenancy and sharecropping arrangements (mizunomibyakusho); 
and (c) agricultural laborers who worked as fieldhands and servants for 
peasants with land rights (nago) or who did wage labor in the towns. 
Villages contained peasant households of all three types in proportions 
varying with ecological and historical circumstances. 
There was also some variety in the administrative structure of basin 
villages. The most important postion was that of village headman, a role 
charged by the domain with overall responsibility for such matters as 
collection and delivery of the village tax, preparation of population 
registers, organization of public works, and communication of directives 
from higher officials. This position, known as kimoiri in domain villages 
and nanushi in shogunate villages within the domain, was most often held 
by a single person, though occasionally in a large village there might be 
two headmen. In some villages, the. headmanship was hereditary; in others, 
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it was filled in rotation by all or some of the registered cultivator 
households. In addition to expenses (travel money, writing paper, etc.), 
the headman received a salary equal to about 1% of the village assessed 
yield, either taken from the collected tax or subtracted as an exemption 
on the headman ' s  liable holdings (see Befu 1966 for a general study of the 
headman role). 
In many villages there was a second position known as the soeyaku (or 
kumigashira in shogunate villages), which was an assistant to the headman. 
Then there were the otona · (or otonabyakusho in shogunate villages), the 
elders of the village, whose advice and consent was sought by the headman 
in matters of importance. In some cases, the otona elders seem to have 
been all of the registered cultivator household heads; in other villages,
they were the heads of the leading households--the old peasant chiefs, the 
first families, the more wealthy registered cultivator households. In 
either case, some matters were occasionally discussed and decided at a 
general village assembly (yoriai) of all households. 
The role of the village 'containerd' of peasant cultivators in 
irrigation affairs will arise frequently in later chapters. Here it will 
suffice to emphasize that there was a tension between hierarchical control 
and self-regulation in the administrative structure that related domain 
lord, warrior-retainer, and peasant cultivator. In the early seventeenth 
century, many domain lords like Sakai Tadakatsu consolidated control of 
land and people in their domains by establishing a permanent, impersonal, 
and bureaucratic hierarchy of officials; administering the countryside was 
a four-tiered structure of domain rural affairs officer, district deputy
and rural magistrate, village group headman, and village headman. At the 
same time, actual management of affairs was accomplished through 
considerable delegation of responsibility; consequently the village as the 
designated local group of peasant cultivators was an important
administrative unit (although its effectiveness in particular contexts 
such as irrigation is a matter for empirical determination). This tension 
characterized domain administration throughout the period. 
Land tenure and taxation in the domain 
Primary objectives of domain administration included the protection of 
agricultural production through social control measures and the extraction 
for redistribution of the production surplus through taxation measures. 
It was the genius of the shogunal-domain (bakuhan) state system that, at 
least initially, it so successfully created a structure that achieved 
both. As we have seen in the previous section, Sakai Tadakatsu was able 
· to undermine intermediate claims by a landed gentry by removing the 
warrior retainers from bases in the countryside to the castle town, where 
they were used to staff a domain administrative hierarchy. He established 
direct control over production and producers with a comprehensive on-site 
... -· 
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survey, assessment, and registration of land and with the collection by 
officials of a series of taxes based on that registration. 
One of Sakai Tadakatsu's first acts was to order a new cadastral 
survey. This was conducted in 1623-24 and registered 53, 000 koku in lands 
above the existing assessment (YKS 1980 :3-23 ) .  This 38% increase was due 
to the discovery of old but unregistered lands, the actual expansion of 
paddy land acreage following canal construction, and the imposition of 
stricter, more uniform methods. In the cadastre, the old karidaka method 
of measuring productivity and acreage by harvested sheaves of rice, which 
had been used by Mogami in 1611-12, was replaced with the kokudaka method 
of volumetric measure of threshed and hulled grain. First, the area of 
each parcel was measured13 and then classified according to land use. In 
the countryside three categories of land were taxed: paddy fields, 
dry-crop fields, and housesites. Certain lands of designated shrines and 
temples were surveyed but exempted from taxes. Roads, pathse, water 
channels, and channel banks were not registered; in this sense, 
proprietary rights were not delegated by the domain. Undeveloped land 
(gen'ya, a valuable source of firewood, grass for compost, earth for 
construction, and so forth) was not measured but its boundaries were 
noted; some undeveloped land was reserved for domain use (e.g., castle 
repair materials, thatch for warrior homes), but usufruct rights to most 
were alloted to peasant cultivators by village unit. 
The measured paddy field and dry-crop field parcels were next graded as 
to soil quality, water retention capacity, drainage, and other factors 
into one of four grades ( housesites were a single grade). The putative 
yield of each parcel was then calculated from a standard formula, the 
kokumori.1 4 For example, by this formula, 1 tan of #1 grade paddy land had 
13 The units of areal measurement were:
1 cho = 10 tan (= 0 . 992 ha}
1 tane= 10 se-
1 se = 30 bu
1 bue
-
= 6 square shaku 
These units had long been in use, but their relative values were adjusted 
first by Hideyoshi and later by Ieyasu. Although not un�form, generally 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 1 tane= 360 bu and 1 bue= 6 . 3  or-
6.5 sq. shaku. Hideyoshi in his cadastre reduced the former to 1 tane= .
300 bu, and then Ieyasu reduced the latter to 1 bue= 6 sq. shaku. These 
adjustments amounted to indirect methods of increasing claims on the land; 
the tax rate per tan of the kokumori could be held constant while 
increasing the actual acreage that composed an official tan. 
14 In Shonai Domain, this kokumori formula was as follows: 
#1 grade paddy filed (jo) = 15 
#2 grade paddy field (chu) = 13 
#1 
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a rated yield of 3 koku of unhulled rice grain ( or 1 . 5  koku of hulled and 
semi-polished grain) ; thus, a parcel that was measured to be 1.5 tan in 
area and was - rated as #1 grade would be registered with an official yield 
(known as bunrnai) of 4.5 koku. These surveying and registering standards 
were applied uniformly throughout the domain, unlike previous cadastres. 
Land registers were compiled which listed each parcel of land, its 
classification, measured area, grade, and assessed yield as well as the 
name of the cultivator.e15 
In addition to its uniformity of application, the cadastre was intended 
to strengthen lord-peasant ties in two ways. First, the parcel cultivator 
whose name appeared in the land register was accorded cultivator rights 
and tax responsibility for that parcel. This had the effect of cancelling 
existing tenancy arrangements; however, because many large holdings were 
apparently worked by owners with nago servant-laborers, it did not result 
in a fully 'independent' peasantry. 
Also, it was the cadastre which in effect created the administrative 
village, the mura. An attempt was made to register to residents of a 
settlement all arable land surrounding the settlement, even if this meant 
occasional exchanges of parcels with cultivators in other settlements. 
Cadastral registers (kenchi-cho) were then compiled by village unit, and 
the last step of the process was to sum up all of the assessed yields of 
the parcels within a village unit to obtain a total figure, the village 
assessed yield (muradaka). It was this figure that became the basis of 
-#3 grade paddy field (ge) 11
-#4 grade paddy field (ge-ge) - 9 
grade dry-crop fielde(�) - 10
-#2 grade dry-crop field (chu) 8
-#3 grade dry-crop field (ge) 6
-#4 grade dry-crop field (ge-ge) - 4 
All housesite land was 10. 
These numbers represented the expected yield of 1 tan of that grade of 
land expressed as a volume of semi-polished rice (so-called 'brown rice,' 
gogo-suri genrnai), which equalled about half the volume of threshed but 
1 1unhulled grain. Thus, 15e for #1 grade paddy (the top grade) meant that 
1 tan of top quality paddy land was expected to produce 1 . 5  koku of 
semi-polished rice or 3 koku of unhulled graine. As the formula suggests, 
all taxable land was assessed (and taxed) in term� of rice; even the tax 
on housesites was payable in rice. 
· 1 s  One must distinguish between this registered parcel of land (termed a 
hitsu, which was also the counter for such parcels) and a parcel of 
land in terms of cultivation (termed an osa, the counter for which was 
mai). The former was a bunded parcel of la_nd registered to a single 
household, but for cultivation and water flow purposes, that parcel was 
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domain tax levies and domain enfeoffment grants, and the village so 
defined was assigned the collective responsibility for gathering the 
annual tax from each resident household and for meeting the full tax 
amount. 
Such was the cadastre conducted in 1623-4 by the new lord Sakai 
Tadakatsu. Astonishingly, this survey remained the basis of domain 
holdings and land taxation for the entire 250 years of Sakai control of 
Shonai. That is to say, the reclassification of land (most commonly, the 
conversion of dry-crop fields to paddy fields) and the bringing into 
cultivation of undeveloped gen•ya land required permission of domain 
authorities and entailed on-site surveying and registration. Because of 
this, there were periodical up-datings of the land registers and thus a 
gradual increase in the total registered holdings of the domain (its 
naidaka) and in the registered holdings (muradaka) of those villages with 
such changes and additions to arable land (YKS 1980 : 95-96). But Sakai' s  
initial 1623-4 cadastre was never followed by a subsequent, comprehensive 
on-site cadastral survey of the domain. Furthermore, adjustments were 
never made in the kokumori formula to reflect rising land productivity
through the centuries; the putative yield of l tan of grade #1 paddy land, 
for example, continued to be rated at 15 (or 3 koku of threshed, unhulled 
grain) throughout the domain period. Either a re-survey or an adjustment 
in the kokumori formula could have substantially raised domain revenues. 
Why neither was attempted is an issue returned to later in this chapter. 
Domain taxation of the peasant cultivators consisted principally of the 
annual land tax (known as the honmononari, hont� nengu, or hont5 torika)
and secondarily of a number of ancillary taxes, surcharges, and corvee. 
The annual land tax, as noted above, was payable in rice by administrative 
village unit. It was determined by , the application of a tax rate (men) to 
the village assessed yield (muradaka). Thus if a village with a muradaka 
of 400 koku had, for instance, a tax rate of 35%, its annual principal 
land tax would be 140 koku. 
This tax rate (men) was determined annually by one of two methods. By
the fixed rate method or jomen-sei (also termed jomen-tori), a constant 
rate was applied each year for a period of years (usually ten); the land 
tax was the simple calculation of this fixed rate times the village 
assessed yield. By the second method, the inspection method (kenmi-sei or 
kenmi-tori), adjustments were made to this fixed rate on the basis of a 
field inspection by assistants of the district deputy before harvest. A 
often sub-divided into a number of fragments (osa) by smaller,
temporary bunds. I will return to this point again in chapter six 
because I believe that the rigidity of land registration tended to fix 
the field and ditching pattern, which grew more complicated with paddy 
land expansion. The only margin that cultivators had for 
reorganization was within the fixed hitsu. 
. ' 
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reduction (nengu waribiki) could be granted if weather, disease, insects, 
or other factors threatened a below-average harvest .e1 6  
The former, fixed rate method was adopted by Sakai Tadakatsu in the 
1620s, and by the 1660s, it was in use throughout the domain. The obvious 
advantage of this method was the fiscal stability of a fixed tax revenue 
from year to year. By the following century, however, the kenmi method of 
annual crop inspection was widely used, and still later, villages were 
permitted to petition the district deputy in the. seventh month of the year 
for the application of either the fixed rate or a rate determined by crop 
inspection. This represented a further compromise of domain taxation 
procedures in favor of localities; from the village standpoint, the 
inspection method was of advantage in years of crop damage, while the 
fixed rate method prevented unnecessary inspections in other years. 
Local historians (OA 1974:510) have calculated the mean domain-wide 
village tax rate for the years 1660-1866 to be 44.272%, with the highest 
mean of 48e.e517% in 1685 and the lowest mean of 31.091% in the following 
year, 1686. Such a mean is deceptive, however, because there was wide 
variation in the tax rate between land parcels and between villages. 
Although a tax rate per parcel was not fixed in the 1623-4 cadastre, it 
appears that some notation was made of the existing and customary levy on 
each parcel--and that this continued to serve as a guide for future annual
tax rate. Old inequalities were preserved; furthermore, one form of 
promotion of acreage expansion was the fixing of a low tax rate on newly 
developed land. Thus, newer lands within villages and (downstream) 
villages with all or a majority of newly-developed paddy lands had much 
lower rates. As the tables of villages in the Nakagawa Main Canal and 
Shoryujigawa Main Canal service areas indicate, village tax rates could 
range from about 30% to as much as 70%. 
The application of the tax rate to the village assessed yield 
determined, then, the annual land tax due the domain, but domain 
adminiestration had delegated to the village the task. of producing this, 
that is, of assessing and collecting from its households. Unfortunately, 
here as elsewhere in Tokugawa Japan (Smith 1958:e10-11), thi� internal 
process of distributing the village land tax is very poorly understood 
because few records remain which describe the decision-making. Formally, 
there was a simple way to subdivide the village tax among households. The 
These reductions were governed by a formula (sashibiki ritsu) that 
considered both the grade of the paddy land and the extent of damage. 
There were three categories of the latter: widespread, extreme, and 
total, but even in the last event (kaisai), only a 72% reduction in tax 
was granted. Even with the jomen system, it was possible for a village 
to apply to the district deputy for a tax reduction in the event of a 
particularly poor harvest, a reduction known as teatebiki or yaburemen 
(OB 1974:e110-11). 
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village land register (omizucho)e1 7  listed each parcel of land with its 
assesseg yield (bunmai); the bunmai of a household's holdings could be 
totalled and multiplied by the village tax rate to determine its share of 
the village tax. At the same time, it is easy to imagine several 
potential complications. Even within a village in any given year there 
would be harvest differentials due to differences in crop damage; we might 
also expect differences in the amount of under-taxed or non-registered 
land holdings among village households; and it is fair to assume that
increases in land productivity (which with a fairly constant tax rate 
effectively reduced the formal tax claim) were realized differently 
through the village depending on land quality, irrigation-drainage 
conditions, cultivation techniques, and so on. Furthermore, whether--and 
how--these variables were factored into assessments to households depended 
primarily on the village headman, as the designated executive officer. It 
was he who possessed the village records and through him all communication 
with the domain had to pass .e18  His exercise of power would obviously 
depend on his relation to other registered cultivator households, the 
relative numbers of unregistered (non-land holding) households, selection 
procedures, personal characteristics, and other factors. We may expect, 
however, there to have been considerable variation among basin villages, 
given the divergence of actual circumstances from the land register 
figures and the range in the control exercised by the headman and/or a 
number of households in a village. Producing the village tax--the most 
important responsibility delegated it by the domain--could be a collective 
or elite process and could engender cooperation or conflict within the 
village unit. It is regretable that there are no examples of how this was 
actually handled. 
The discussion of taxation to this point has referred specifically to 
the principal land tax, payable annually in rice before the last day of 
the year. In addition to the land tax, there were six other categories of 
levies due the domain by peasant cultivators. They are here briefly 
17 Land registers (omizucha) were prepared for each administrative village 
on the basis of the cadastral registers (kenchi-ch�); the former were 
maintained by the headman of the village while the latter were retained 
by domain officials. 
18  His personal seal was required on all documents and petitions to higher 
officials and all directives from above were transmitted to him. The 
importance of record-keeping and access to the records is illustrated 
by the fact that a major demand in a widespread peasante.emovement in 
Shonai just after the abolition of the domain in the early 1870s was 
the right of villagers to inspect the official records kept by the 
village and village group headmen. See Makabe 1971 :207-8 for a list of 
the many registers, maps, and notebooks held by the village headman in 
an alluvial fan village; the occasion for the listing was to 
acknowledge their receipt by the new headm. an from the former headman. 
. . .. ' 
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summarized: 
(a) a surcharge (agemai) that might be added to the principal rice 
tax in certain years (agemai also referred to a sum subtracted by 
the domain from the fief income or stipend of the warrior 
retainers in times of domain financial distress) •d. 
(b) miscellaneous taxes (uke-yaku). These included itemized levies 
for the salaries and administrative expenses of the village
headman and other village officers; the expenses of the village
group headman and the district deputy; for the upkeep of stables 
and road way-stations of the domain; for irrigation channel 
maintenance and personnel expenses; for certain domain public 
works projects; etc. These were generally payable in rice. One•
might also include here the several types of forced rice 
contributions (known as yonai mai). These first appeared in 1796 
with the overt function of assisting distressed villages in 
meeting their tax obligations by building up a general reserve 
from which they might draw. In fact, it was a way by which the 
domain insured that shortfalls in tax payments by some villages
could be covered by a reserve to which all villages had made 
forced contributions. One such forced contribution was a 
surcharge on the muradaka; another was a special levy on 
non-resident land holders. 
(c) corvee. This category included labor requisitions for public 
works projects, for work in domain woodlands, for irrigation 
channel maintenance and repair, etc. By the mid-eighteenth 
century, most labor duties were in fact converted either to 
currency or rice equivalents and became additional miscellaneous 
taxes. 
(d) miscellaneous commodities (komononari). As noted above, villages 
also had the obligation to deliver certain goods and commodities 
to the district deputy for distribution to certain domain 
retainers ;  a domain-wide formula scaled the quantities to the 
village muradaka. However, by the mid-eighteenth century, these 
too were converted to a cash equivalency and paid in metal coin. 
(e) forced rice borrowings (tanebujiki-mai, "seed and food rice"). 
These were, officially, advances of rice made in the early spring 
by the domain to villages to meet shortfalls so that cultivators 
would have seeds for spring planting and food until harvest. 
They were payable after harvest at about 30% interest. in fact, 
these amounted to forced borrowings ; apparently, often the spring 
advance was not even actually made--only the 30% interest charge 
(payabl� before all other taxes) was collected in the fall (see 
Naganuma 1964:164-5 for an example). 
, 
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(f) inspection rice (kuchi-mai). The taxes payable in rice were 
delivered in woven straw bags made by the cultivator to domain 
specifications. The standard volume in Shonai was 4.dto (known as 
yonto iri ) , d1 9  but the cultivator was obliged to add an additional 
volume to cover rice taken out for inspection, in-transit 
leakage, and warehouse loss (rats, etc.). This was the 
kuchi-mai, and thus each bag was required to contain 0.4878 koku. 
Furthermore, because of extortion by warehousemen and the heavy 
penalty in the event of undervolume,.2 0  cultivators typically
prepared bags of 0.53 koku (known as goto iri). The difference 
between 0.53 and 0.4878 koku was known as ashimai (Maeta,
personal communication; Kamagata 1953:41 ).2 1  
Given the numerous ancillary levies of the domain, it is difficult to 
calculate the total tax burden on villages and cultivators, but Maeta 
Teruhiko, a local historian of the Tokugawa period, has calculated total 
taxes in eight villages in the lower part of the Nakagawa Main Canal 
service area at the end of the domain period (see Table 2). Except for 
the anomalous case of Oshikiri-shimogumi, these totals are between 30% and 
40% above the principal land tax and amount to 60-85% of village 
registered yield. They recommend the conclusion that the tax demands on 
registered lands were quite onerous. 
The rice due from each village was delivered to a warehouse in each 
village group by the cultivators and there inspected by assistants of the 
district deputy. These warehouses were constructed and maintained at the 
expense of each village group; any fire, theft, and insect damage to the 
stored rice was also the responsibility of the village group. From there, 
the rice was transported either to the domain warehouses beside the castle 
at Tsuruoka or to the ports of Sakata and Kamo for shipment to and sale at 
1 9  The measure box used in rice tax matters was the Edo-masu or 
osame-masu, which actually held more than the standard miyako-masu or 
harai-masu. 
2 0  Each bag had to contain the name of the cultivator and that of the 
district deputy assistant who inspected it at the village group 
warehouse. Volume was measured by special metal measure boxes 
(osame-masu), distributed by the district deputy. Bags were inspected
randomly at several points. If a bag was found to be under volume, the 
entire village was assessed the shortfall times the total number of 
bags that the village delivered (Sato 1967). 
Sources for the categories of taxes include documents published in Sato 
1967 and OB 1974:100-31. For examples of the documents from particular 
villages to the village group headman (such as the nengu-wari 
motokimecho) see OB 1974 : 110-3 and Nagan�a 1968:164ff. 
2 1  
47.3% 
47.3% 
47 . 3% 
47.3% 
36 
Table 2 
Domain tax burdens on Oshikiri area villages (1850) 
village village registered tax rate for est. sum of 
yield (koku) principal land tax all taxes 
Oshikiri-kamigumi 413.7038 47.3% 78.3% 
Oshikiri-nakagumi 365.1025 78.3% 
Oshikiri-shimogumi 362.d0327 61. 5%* 
Sanbongi 208.d3547 80.5% 
Tsushima 477.1962 77.7% 
Kami-doguchi 58.0887 49 . 0% 84.8% 
Shimo-doguchi 639.4039 29.0% 62.0% 
Yokogawa-shinden 139.d6815 44.0% 84.4% 
*As part of an agreement reached when a new village
was founded below Oshikiri-shimogumi, the new village 
assumed the burden of about one-half of Oshikiri­
shimogumi's ancillary taxes. 
Note: The estimated sum of all taxes does not include 
requisitioned corvee lanor or the extra .03 koku added 
to each bag of tax rice as ashi-mai. 
Source: OB 1974:112 
'.• 
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Osaka and Edo ( further details in OB 1974:14, 114-21). 
One final feature of the administration and taxation system of the 
domain of relevance here was the rice voucher (bei-satsu) system that 
Sakai Tadakatsu introduced in 1624. Under this system, the tax rice was 
delivered to the domain granary warehouses, and retainers were issued 
vouchers for rice equivalent to their fief or stipend. Furthermore, if an 
individual cultivator household or village delivered extra rice, it would 
be issued vouchers for that.22 The retainers would generally redeem the 
voucher only to the extent of his household needs and would sell the 
remainder of the voucher to rice merchants or other tradesmen to whom he 
owed money. The use of the rice voucher system greatly facilitated 
commercial transactions within the domain. 
Developments in domain political economy 
The chapter thus far has demonstrated that the thrust of early domain 
lord actions was to create a peasant stratum independent of all 
intermediate claims, organized into self-regulating village units, taxed 
by uniform and fairly onerous standards, and administered by a hierarchy 
of officials recr�ited from among the warrior-retainers. However close 
the first Sakai lords may have come to attaining this ideal (and given the 
turbulent times that preceded them, they were remarkably successful),
there were important developments in the domain political economy which 
came to controvert it. This section briefly introduces three such 
dimensions of change: 
(i) Beginning in the early seventeenth century with canal 
construction in the Aka River basin and continuing through the 
eighteenth century, there was a major expansion of irrigated paddy 
land into the formerly undeveloped downstream section of the drainage 
basin (that is, the central portion of Shonai Plain). Although it 
was domain policy to encourage this expansion, the domain was never 
able to impose fully effective tax claims on this acreage. 
(ii) Throughout the domain period, there was an increasing
commercialization of agricultural (i.e., rice) production and 
distribution. Buying and selling of land, the use of commercial 
fertilizers, tenant farming, conversion of some tax levies from kind 
to cash, and greater prominence of merchants in rice marketing were 
Conversely, in the case of tax delinquency, the household was forced to 
borrow from relatives, fellow villagers, or the district deputy. 
Payment in extra corvee labor (with the tax due treated as 
pre-garnisheed wages) or contracting a son or daughter as a servant to 
a warrior household were also common. 
. ·"· 
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features of this commercialization. 
(iii) Finally, there were the growing financial difficulties of 
the domain lord and warrior retainers on the one hand and of many of 
the peasant cultivators on the other. The obverse of this was the 
emergence of wealthy merchants and a few fortunate cultivators; their 
investments in paddy land led to increasing landholding 
concentrations in certain areas of the basin. 
By the mid-1700s, these three mutually reinforcing dimensions of change 
had disrupted the original patterns of domain administration and tenure, 
significantly revising the political-economic context of Aka River 
irrigation. 
Until the opening of the canal networks in the first decades of the 
seventeenth century ,  settlements in the Aka River drainage basin had been 
concentrated in the alluvial fan section; they were found in the 
downstream plain only along the high ground (e .g., the Kyoden area 
villages in the Shoryujigawa service area and Yokoyama in the Nakagawa 
service area} .  In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, 
there was rapid expansion of paddy land throughout the drainage basin. 
Generally, this was of two kinds: (a) increasing the acreage of paddy 
lands within an existing village through conversion of dry fields 
(hatake-kaeshi) or previously undeveloped lands (kirizoe); or (b} the 
founding of new villages and the opening up of new lands primarily in the 
undeveloped wetlands in the center of the plain (shinden}. 
It is difficult to compute accurate figures for this expansion. Sakai 
Tadakatsu' s  1623 cadastre registered over 53,000 koku of lands above the 
earlier domain total, reflecting both stricter procedures and expansion 
stimulated by the canal construction. Between 1623-1684, another 28,000 
koku were added to official domain land registers, for a 1684 total of 
219,000 koku, 1.59 times the 1611 figure. In the eighteenth century, 
expansion slowed, with much of the plain settled; between 1684-1758, the 
official domain total increased only 7,000 koku, with even more modest 
increases after that (OA 1974:295-6). 
These figures, however, underrepresented actual expansion, in part 
because the domain employed several generous surveying and registration 
techniques to promote such development. These i.nclude the following� 
(i) An initial tax-free period of three years was given all new paddy
lands before first surveying and registration, which was done by officials 
of the district deputy's office. 
(ii) New paddy fields were often deliberately undersurveyed. That is, 
based on the new equivalencies among land units promulgated by Hideyoshi
and modified again by Ieyasu, Sakai Tadakatsu initially surveyed with the 
following scale: 
- -
- -
- -
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1 bu - 1 tsubo - 1 ken X 1 ken (about 3.31 sq. meters)
1 se - 30 bu - 5 ken X 6 ken -
1 tan - 300 bu 5 ken X 60 ken --1 cho 3000 bu - 50 ken X 60 ken (about .992 hectares) 
One of the surveying instruments was a calibrated 1-ken pole (about 1.82 
meters), and 5 lengths by 6 lengths of the pole would equal 1 � of land 
(for surveying techniques, see Iinuma 1974 :11-15). For new paddy lands,
however, the domain would measure with what was known. as a "6-7 pole" 
(roku-shichi sao) or occasionally a 11 7-7 pole." A 1 16-7 pole" meant that 6 
lengths by 7 lengths of the 1-ken pole would be measured as 1 �; that is,
1 se was in effect equal to 42 sq. ken rather than the official 30 sq. 
ken. This represented a 20% undermeasurement. Thus, for example, a small 
parcel of land surveyed with a 1 16-7 pole" and registered as 4 se in area 
would have an actual area of 4.8 se, 1.2 times the taxable figure 
appearing in the land register. 
(iii) New paddy fields were also often undergraded. The same four 
grade system was used, but new fields were much more often rated the lower 
#3 or #4 than the higher #1 or #2 (see Kelly 1980: 182). Of course, when 
developing wetlands, field conditions (such as a hard pan) may in fact 
have been inferio� to older paddy lands, but they improved with 
cultivation; theredwas almost never any subsequent re-grading. 
(iv) Finally, the newly-developed paddy lands might also be given lower 
tax rates than those on older paddy lands. As we will see later, within 
Kakuda-futakuchi Village, a downstream village in the Shoryujigawa Main 
Canal service area, old (pre-1611) paddy fields had a tax rate of 41% 
while paddy fields opened in the 1600s were given a very low 20% rate (OB
1974:110). 
Such concessions were used by the domain to encourage paddy land 
expansion and so maximize land resources in the domain in a way judged 
most lucrative and appropriate to domain . revenues, rice production.d23 At 
the same time, it never directly underwrote such development, maintaining
a strict distinction between encouraging agriculture, a proper duty of 
warrior-rank officials, and actually doing agriculture, the cultivators' 
obligation. It was also fearful of personal investment by officials in 
particular projects, which might dilute their dependency on the domain. 
See YKS 1961:124-7 for the 1726 instructions for new paddy land 
surveying and registration and OA 1974:280-2 for the 1648 domain 
directive encouraging paddy land development. Occasionally, domain 
officials became alarmed at the pace at which development was taking
place, however. As early as 1659, it issued orders declaring 22 yachi
wetlands off-limits to development, fearing that the vital sources of 
animal feed grass and compost materials were threatened. The frequency 
of such orders suggests they were less than entirely effective.d• 
, 
,
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Expansion within existing villages was typically the initiative of some 
or all of the registered farmers, jointly opening up some yachi wetlands24 
or extending existing paddy lands into dry fields. In the Watamae area of 
the Nakagawa service area in 1717, twenty-three cultivators from 
Higashi-watamae Village and an equal number from Nishi-watamae Village 
developed an area of yachi shared by the two adjacent villages. In 1720, 
it was surveyed with a 6-7 pole to be 2 hectares in area (of which 0.15 
hectares was dry field). A document attesting to the survey and signed by 
all forty-six participant cultivators contained two clauses common to such 
projectse: (a) that they themselves would divide the parcels among 
themselves (as opposed to the district deputy officials who conducted the 
survey) and (b) that they promised that all existing paddy lands 
downstream of these new parcels would be accorded prior irrigation rights 
(in this case, the only downstream fields were within the same two 
villages) (Naganuma 1965e:155-7). As we shall see later, this was a 
promise more often made than kept. 
The format for the founding of new villages was somewhat different. 
Most commonly in the Aka River basin, village group headmen, village 
officers, and other peasant households with above-average holdings would 
initiate a petition to the rural magistrate's office. They would recruit 
potential settlers from existing villages (e.g., second and third sons of 
households with small or no holdings) who would exchange labor on common 
facility tasks (roads, temple, water channels, embankments, etc.) for an 
opportunity to develop parcels alloted to them by the shinden-gashira (the
11new fields boss11 ). The project initiator would also recruit Tsuruoka or 
Sakata town merchants as financial backers (kane moto), who would supply 
funds, rice, and tools for initial development. Merchants themselves 
might initiate such projects but in much of the downstream areas of 
Shoryujigawa and Nakagawa Main Canal service areas, the new villages were 
founded by large-holding cultivators from villages in the midstream areas. 
In the Nakagawa area, the Oshikiri villages were founded in the 1620s by 
the Yokoyama Village Group headman in Yokoyama Village (see the memorandum 
of permission in YKS 1980:546). His grandson in the 1660s organized 
Fukuoka Village downstream from Oshikiri, and in the 1710s, four 
cultivators from one of the Yokoyama villages founded Hirono-shinden 
Village. 
2 4 Yachi or 11marshlande11 was a common term for undeveloped land (gen•ya) on 
the plain. Their general boundaries were noted in domain registers and 
various usufruct rights assigned to villages (apparently following 
pre-domain period customary divisions in areas of older villages). 
Because these rights were limited to particular uses (such as grass 
cutting, firewood, earth collection), permission from the domain was 
necessary for development into arable land., 
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Hirano Yachi was a large tract of wetla�ds downriver from the 
Oshikiri-Yokoyama area on the east bank of the Aka River (see Map 8). In 
the fall of 1713, four cultivators from Yokoyama petitioned and received 
permission from the domain to found a new village in that section of the 
yachi land for which Yokoyama had usufruct rights. They- claimed it was 
land capable of producing 3000 koku of rice. They secured financial 
backing fron two Sakata merchants, began work in 1714, and by 1718 had 
completed a canal from the tailend of Nakagawa Main Canal which became 
Hirono-shinden Branch Canal. A 1753 document listed total expenses of the 
development project at j ust over 3000 ryo in gold coin; calculated at 1 
ryo = 0.6 koku, the mean 1714-18 rice price, this was equivalent to 1800 
koku of rice (unpublished source #3). The document noted that channel 
construction and related expenses totalled about 100 ryo; the balance was 
used for building materials for 150 cultivator houses, expenses relating 
to two surveys, and "miscellaneous expenses.d" It is unfortunate that a 
further breakdown was not given; it would be quite valuable to know just 
how ' expensive '  were the surveys and registrations conducted by the 
district deputy officials--to know, that is, to what extent bribes were 
necessary to receive generous concessions. 
Narita-shinden Village, founded across the Aka River at the tailend of 
the Shoryujigawa Main Canal service area in the triangle of yachi land 
where the Aka River was joined by its Oyama tributary, is a better 
documented example of new villages (see Map 4).d2 5  This settlement was 
planned by Narita Heizaemon, who was the Kyoden Village Group headman, 
living in Naka-ky�den Village_ in the 1650s. His background was a common .
one for early village group headmen. He was the third son of a minor 
warrior vassal of Hideyoshi; his father committed suicide with the final 
defeat of his master and entrusted the three-year old Heizaemon to a 
retainer, Narita Sanzaemon. Narita fled Osaka to Shonai and was allowed 
to settle in Naka-kyoden. While not retaining his warrior status, he was 
made village group headman, a post Heizaemon succeeded to. 
In founding Narita-shinden, Heizaemon was joined by at least nine other 
farmers from Kyoden area villages, including at least one village headman;
documents indicate that backing was secured from at least five domain 
warrior-rank persons, including Koriki Kuhei, who was soon to become 
domain rural affairs officer (gundai). This support suggests that domain 
fears of officials' personal involvement in projects had some substance, 
although little other evidence is available. 
The new village was opened in 1658, and Narita Heizaemon lived there 
until his death 29 years later in 1687. Both his son, who continued as 
village group headman, and his grandson remained influential in 
2 5  Documents about Narita-shinden have been collected in a volume of 
village history compiled by Ose in 1952. 
,,· 
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Narita-shinden until 1718 when the household line died out.26 The son 
married a woman from the founding household of Aoyama Village; Heizaemon 
negotiated with Aoyama for an extension of the Aoyama Branch Canal, though 
the relation between these negotiations and the marriage of his son, 
however tantalizing, remains without proof. The grandson married a woman 
from the Kudo household in Hongo Village; this was the Kudo household 
which organized original construction of the Shoryujigawa Main Canal. 
Table 3 presents material from the Narita-shinden land register on 
annual increases in the village registered yield. It indicates that in 
the first twelve years about 97 hectares of land assessed at 630 koku were 
opened up. Thereafter, development slowed, with only an additional 75 
koku added between 1670-1700 and only minimal amounts later. This pace 
further illustrates the point that most expansion in the Aka River basin 
apparently occurred in the first hundred years following main canal 
construction. A 6-7 pole was generally used, and most of the paddy lands 
were given the lowest #4 grade. Some me.asure of the extent to which land 
in Narita-shinden was undersurveyed is gained by comparing the acreage 
figure of about 110 hectares at the end of the domain period with the 1875 
figure (following the Meiji land tax cadastre) of 160 hectares, the latter 
being 145% of the former. 
The Narita-shinden records also illustrate that the two essential 
preliminary tasks of new village settlement were flood protection and 
irrigation-drainage. Narita-shinden was particularly vulnerable to 
flooding as the Aka River tended to back up where it met the coastal dunes 
at Kuromori and was deflected to the north. The initial project of the 
villagers was to construct two earth embankments along the river banks. 
The first was a 2730 meter embankment along the Aka River from Inoko 
Village to the confluence point; the second was a 3276 meter embankment 
along the Oyama River from Obana Village to the Aka-Oyama confluence. 
Furthermore, an agreement was negotiated with Obana about the maintenance 
of a lateral embankment perpendicular to the Oyama River embankment and 
mid-way between the two villages. We will see below that this became the 
source of considerable inter-village discor.d. 
26 Actually, the story told by the village records is that the grandson 
was sentenced to die and was executed (or allowed to commit suicide) 
following a financial scandal. He had borrowed 100 ry� from a Tsuruoka 
merchant who in turn had borrowed a large sum of money from a warrior 
of the Matsuyama Branch Domain--and then defaulted. After an appeal to 
sh;nai Domain officials, both the merchant �nd Narita were arrested, 
the latter accused as an accomplice. The grandson had two sons, both 
of whom held minor posts in the domain administration (perhaps they had 
been adopted out). They quarreled over succession to their father's . 
household line; the eventual result was that.ethe line was discontinued. 
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Table 3 
Arable land development in Narita-shinden Village 
year 
1660
1661
1662
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
1669
1670
1670* 
(1660-70 total) 
1671
1673
1674
1675
1676
1677
1679
1680
1686
1692
1695 
(1671-1700 total) 
1724 
1749 
(c. 1860 total) 
registered yield 
11.1970 koku
84.4635
203.9521
40.2582
35.3910
57 . 5936 
23.7897
2. 8800 
18.9300
0.3840 
10.5300
141.4786 
(630.8477) (approx. 97 . 3  hectares) 
1.297
4.131
8.025
2.4264 
0. 8700 
13.0794
7. 0600 
13.6540 
2. 1378 
2 . 1060 
7. 9710 
(703 .3990) (approx. 109.4 hectares) 
3.9600 
1. 0869 
(708.4459) 
*This amount of 141.4786 koku refers to land previously 
developed but newly registered in 1670 following 
a survey in the village. 
Source: Ose 1952 
. ,. .:. . .,. . 
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Second, irrigation-drainage ditching was necessary. The first attempt 
was to draw water directly from the Aka River, but this failed. 
Construction was not difficult but the intake washed out easily in high 
water, and there was no flow in the dry summer months. So negotiations 
were concluded with the three villages along the Aoyama Branch Canal to 
extend the canal and use its water. Details of Narita irrigation are 
taken up in a later chapter, but its unsuccessful efforts to tap directly 
into the Aka River are a reminder that almost al.l paddy l.and development 
in the Aka River basin had to be integrated into the existing main canal 
networks. 
There was, in sum, significant expansion of paddy land acreage in the 
drainage basin, and throughout the domain, particularly in the years 
between 1600 and roughly 1750. Paddy land development was actively 
promoted by the domain to increase domain land tax revenues as an 
alternative to increasing the tax burden on developed paddy lands. Yet 
the very techniques of promotion undermined the ability of the domain to 
appropriate fully the surplus production of the new lands. Rather, the 
new areas were attractive opportunities for private gain, both in the 
initial development and in later years. Moreover, the generous 
concessions granted by the domain established a clear differential between 
the tax burdens of old and new paddy lands. As the example of the Watamae 
villages illustrates, most development within existing villages was 
undertaken by some or all of the registered cultivator households joining 
together to expand their paddy field areas. In contrast, in thee. 
downstream plain where new settlements were founded within the undeveloped 
yachi lands, initiative was generally taken by a small group of well-to-do 
peasant cultivators, including village group headmen and village officers 
from surrounding villages. As seen in the cases of Hirono-shinden 
(Nakagawa) and Narita-shinden (Shoryujeigawa), they were able to attract 
both the necessary cultivator-settlers and needed capital investment in 
the form of loans from merchants, and they could secure the required 
domain permission. 
Along with the extension of paddy land acreage throughout the Aka River 
basin, a second dimension of change in .the domain political economy was a 
growing commercialization of agricultural production and distribution. 
This, of course, is an often noted characteristic of the entire Tokugawa 
agrarian state, though the nature and degree of commercialization varied 
regionally. In the Kanta and Kinki areas, near the urban centers of Edo, 
Kyoto, Osaka, etc., commercialization often meant a shift from irrigated 
rice to more lucrative cash crops such as cotton, rape-seed, beans and 
other vegetables--or at least, a more intensive double cropping of these 
cash crops in paddy fields (see Hauser 1974). Even in northeast Japan, in 
domains like Morioka, gold mining, horse breeding, fishing, and timber 
· generated much commercial activity (Hanley & Yamamura 1978e:126-37). In 
Shonai, however, distant from the primary markets, without mineral 
resources in its mountains and unable to compete with inland areas in 
sericulture, rice remained the only marketablee'ecommodity. With the 
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exception of vegetable gardens for home use and some dry-crop fields to 
supply the domain town population, the plain was monocropped with 
irrigated rice. Here, commercialization only increased attention on rice 
cultivation. 
It was an unintended consequence of the domain 's  centralized collection 
and warehousing facilities and its use of rice vouchers that the 
commercial marketing of rice was expedited. Official domain surpluses 
(collected rice above domain lord household consumption, retainerd· 
stipends, and other expenses) were consigned to merchants and ship
chandlers in Sakata and Kamo, who marketed them in Osaka and Edo. These 
port merchants also handled marketing for the inland domains as it was
easier to ship rice down the Mogami River to Sakata than to transport it 
overland to Edo. Domain warrior retainers received their fief stipends in 
rice vouchers, only part of which they redeemed for rice for household 
consumption; the rest would either be used to pay off debts to town 
merchants or sold to the port rice merchants for cash. 
The basic rice tax was always paid in kind, but increasingly other 
duties came to be collected in cash--miscellaneous commodities -
(komonorari), miscellaneous duties (ukeyaku), even corvee duties were 
sometimes paid by cash equivalent. The system occasionally used by the 
domain by which public works projects were handled by contracts let to 
Tsuruoka townspeople rather than conventional domain supervision ofd.dcorvee 
laborers is further indication of a shift towards a cash economy. 
Domain directives constantly reflected concern with this growing
commercial activity and its destabilizing effect on collection of taxes 
and duties. There were orders against merchants going to villages, 
against any rice sales before payment of taxes at the end of the year, and 
against taking time off from cultivation activities beyond the official 
domain holidays to seek temporary work in the towns, among other 
examples.d27 Of course the repeated issuance of such directives only 
underscores their ineffectiveness. 
The domain ' s  lack of success in restricting the commercialization of 
rice agriculture was related to a third dimension of change in the 
political economy, the mounting financial difficulties of both the domain 
(its official accounts and the private household economies of 
warrior-retainers) and many peasant cultivators. By the 1700s, the domain 
lord and the warrior elite collectively were drawn into heavy debt, 
committed to a life-style and level of expenditure that was economically
unsustainable and mortgaged to the increasingly merchant-centered economy 
27 For strictures against town-village contacts, see for example the 1661 
order in OA 1974:292. In 1818, the domain announced a 300 mon penalty
for any field hand (wakaze) reported for quiting before 3 pm (haya-age) 
or for taking an unauthorized holiday (oshi-yasumi) (OB 1974:96}.  
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that was undermining its agrarian base and political authority. At the 
same time, the system of administration and land tenure implemented by the 
first Sakai lord to centralize political authority and to stabilize 
extraction of peasant surplus at a maximum level by creating an 
independent peasant cultivator stratum contained features which could 
.trigger a downward cycle of impoverishment from which many peasante
households could not escape. 
Historians of the domain have found that its finances took a serious 
turn for the worse in the mid-1700s during the rule of the seventh lord,
Sakai Tadayori, in 1731-66. There had been a prolonged slump in the rice 
price during the Kyoho era (1716-36). Tadayori's marriage, just after 
assuming the lordship, to the adopted daughter of Maeda Tsunanori, lord of 
the largest domain, Kaga, was very costly. This was followed by a 
particularly heavy levy by the shogunate for repairs to the Tokugawa 
family shrine, Nikko Toshogu Shrine, in 1739.2 8  In 1749, Tadayori was 
named to the shogun's Senior Council (roja), which entailed numerous 
ceremonial expenses, and in 1760, he served a high (and thus costly) role 
in the installation of the new shogun. There were, moreover, major crop 
failures in 1755 and 1763, and in 1751, there was an extensive fire in the 
port of Sakata which destroyed 2450 houses and 41,e000 koku of rice. By 
1774, the domain debt was between 80,000-90,000 ry6; debt servicing alone 
amounted to 15,000 ryo annually, and that year the domain ran a total 
deficit of 27,e100 ryo, or roughly half the value of its total rice income 
for the year (Table 4; see Honma & Yokoyama 1975:187ff. and Sato 
1975:184-94 for these and other details of Tadayori's fiscal problems). 
The domain lord--or perhaps more properly, the council of senior 
advisors--attempted to meet these problems by turning to the 
warrior-retainers and to the merchants. In 1741-42, all retainer stipends 
were suspended and replaced with smaller "allowances" (onmakai), and in 
1760, all stipends were reduced 18% for that year (a reduction termed 
age-mai). Thereafter, such temporary suspensions or reductions were 
intermittently reimposed. Increasingly, however, the domain came to rely 
on the financial resources of  the merchants. It secured loans at 
commercial interest rates from large traders and rice dealers in Osaka and 
Edo and continuously sought a variety of "contributions" (daikenkin) and 
11 loans" (saikakukin) from merchants in Tsuruoka and Sakata. The. practice 
developed of soliciting these 'voluntary' donations in return for 
warrior-rank privileges such as use of surnames, sword, and certain gate 
embellishments and for honorary official posts. At times these postings 
were more than honorary; in 1776, Honma Mitsuoka, the leading Sakata 
merchant and by then the largest landholder in the domain, was appointed 
honorary domain financial officer (omotojime-kaku) and was asked to devise 
2 8  Domain lords were not taxed directly by the shogun, but they were 
expected to make 'contributions' to shogunate projects when requested 
or assessed. 
• • 
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Table 4 
A sununary of domain finances for the year 1774 
INCOME EXPENDITURES 
rice income* rice expenditures 
10-yr. annual mean, domain lord house-
basic land tax 210,000 hold, retainers' 172,000 bags
miscell. taxes 27, 000 
bags
bags stipends, etc. 
TOTAL 237,000 bags TOTAL 172,000 bags 
•cash income cash expenditures 
miscell. taxes 8, 900 ryo interest on debts** 15, 000 ryo
forced surcharge on miscell. expenses,
retainer stipends 11, 000 ryo Edo -& domain 48,000 rro.
TOTAL 19, 900 r:yo TOTAL 63, 000 ryo 
Notes: The 65,000 bag rice surplus was marketed to help meet the
cash deficit. S�ld at 10 ryo = about 40 bags, this raised
about 16, 000 r:yo. Thus, t�e total deficit for the domain
in this year was 27,100 ryo (or roughly one-half of the
domain' s  rice income for the year} . 
*This is based on a total domain registered yield of 191,a000
koku (converted to bags of rice, this equals 477,500 bags } .
* *  This is interest on a total outstanding debt of 80, 000--
90, 000 ryo. 
Source: This summary has been compiled from a table in OA 1974:a346.
Professor Robert J. Smith has noted a discrepancy in dating
between this table and Tsukahira 1966:a84-85. Tsukahira cites 
a report written "by an official of the Sakai han" at the
"beginning of the eighteenth century" which contains the 
same bugetary figures as the above table. Tsukahira' s  source
is a 1935 article by Date Kenji. Date, in turn, had taken
the report from a late eighteenth century collection of
domain documents known as the Oizumi hyakudan, compiled by
Matsuyama Gien ( 1738-1811; see OZ 1974: 752) . Date believed
the report (which he termed a memorandum) to be from the-
Hoei era (1704-1711; see Date 1935:391).
-
$se et al. , citing only the budgetary figures and not
the full text, attribute them specifically to a 1774 petition 
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Table 4 (continued) 
(kenpakusho) by the domain elder, Mizuno Kageyu, in which 
he noted the very poor state of domain financ�s. The most 
recent setback had been the special 29 ,000 ryo assessment 
for the 1772 rebuilding of the domain lord' s  Edo residence. 
The petition proposed that the personal allowance for the 
domain lord be reduced by half for a period of seven years
to stem the mounting debt (ibid. : 345)a. Without the full 
text of the document, the difference between Date' s  surmise 
and Ose et al.a' s  dating cannot b e  resolved, but I give 
more credence to the latter • 
• 
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a three-year budgetary program for eliminating the domain debt. As he had 
contributed over 5000 ryo and 8000 koku of rice in the previous decade, he 
would appear to have had a more than impersonal interest in improving 
domain finances. There was apparently some improvement in the domain 
position, but as a result of several poor harvests and a shogunate 
• request• for 22,000 ryo in the 1780s, domain debt was up again to 100,000 
ryo by 1793 (see Sato 1975:198-212; 1976:68-91; OA 1974:342-64). 
In view of these mounting financial problems and the wide expansion in 
paddy lands that had occurred in the previous one hundred years, it is 
striking that the domain did not attempt to restructure its claims on 
agricultural production and producers. As I have pointed out above, the 
1623-4 cadastre was never followed by another such on-site survey, there 
were no revisions in the kokumori formula, and the basic tax rate remained 
fairly constant throughout the period. The only record of such a move 
being contemplated dates from the early 1750s, when one of the domain 
rural affairs officers (gundai) proposed a new cadastral survey to 
eliminate the promotional concessions that had been granted the new paddy 
lands (shin-sao uchinaoshi were the words used). This plan was approved 
by one of the domain elders but was opposed by the other rural affairs 
officer, who feared it would overburden the peasants and lead to more tax 
delinquency and non-payment, which district-level officials would have to 
cover by private lending. No action was taken on the proposal (Sato 
1975:189-90). 
The reluctance to undertake new land surveys, to revise registration 
standards, and to raise substantially land tax rates is a common 
characteristic of Tokugawa period domains, and one that remains puzzling 
to historians. Smith (1958e:5) and others tentatively suggest it was due 
to a fear of peasant resistance. This was certainly true in ate.least some 
circumstances; Hanley and Yamamura recount the massive uprisings that 
followed attempts by Morioka Domain to raise levies on several 
commercially profitable commodities of the domain (1977:137-44). 
It is difficult to evaluate the degree to which there was a fear of 
general resistance to such action in Shonai. Ironically, one of the few 
recorded cases of widespread collective (and successful) resistance came 
in 1840 in support of the domain lord and in opposition to a shogunal 
order removing the Sakai lord from Shonai to a smaller domain (Nagaoka) 
and installing a new lord.e2g I do believe, though, that in the case of 
zg The order met with vigorous, sustained resistance not only from peasant 
cultivators but also from lower-rank retainers, who feared the move to 
a smaller domain would mean losing their position, and from merchants, 
who not only feared that the new domain lord would conduct a new land 
survey but also that he would hardly feel bound to honor the 
substantial debts of the former Sakai lords (see Saito & Sato 
1957:105-16; YKS 1980:935-1019). 
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Shonai a more compelling reason for not conducting a new cadastral survey 
and raising tax standards was to be found in the reliance on merchants for 
financial aid in moments of particular need. As we will see, these same 
merchants in the mid-1700s began investing in paddy lands, especially the 
new, lightly taxed paddy lands, and they would have been particularlye· 
affected by such changes. In a sense, staying afloat fiscally by periodic 
'contributions' from domain merchants was simply an alternative to 
overhauling the survey and taxation methods; once the former method became 
habitual it was most difficult to attempt the latter as well.3 0  There is 
no direct evidence that the 'contributions' were actually seen as the
price for a continuation of relaxed taxation levels on newer paddy lands, 
nor have I the evidence to conclude that one or the other was more 
profitable and/or preferable to domain officials or the merchants. It is 
clear that the domain reliance on merchant money and merchant investment 
in lightly-taxed paddy lands were two features of the latter half of the 
domain period, and I will hypothesize _ethat the resulting configuration of 
peasant cultivators, domain officials, and such large landholders was
decisive in accounting for the peculiar pattern of decentralized 
irrigation in the domain's major river basin. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, economic difficulties came to plague 
peasant cultivators as well as the domain and domain retainers. Here it 
must be noted that the general issue of peasant indigence and prosperity 
is currently a subject of much debate among scholars of the Tokugawa 
period. Until recently, the orthodox view among Japanese and foreign 
scholars was that both the Tokugawa rural economy and population stagnated 
in the second half of the period; onerous taxes and frequent famine_ 
brought unrelieved peasant desperation. However, the thrust of much 
current research is to demonstrate that the rural economy was actually 
steadily improving throughout the period. Hanley and Yamamura (1977,), 
representative of this new scholarship, marshal considerable evidence to 
argue that by the early 1700s, population growth declined while the 
economy continued to grow through rising agricultural productivity, 
commercial expansion, technological improvements, and so forth. There 
was, they and others now believe, a general rise in the standard of living 
in the countryside which continued through the Tokugawa period and 
presaged the successful modernization of the Meiji era. 
3° Chambliss, too, in his study of Chiaraijima Village in the northwest 
corner of Kanto Plain, has advanced a similar argument. He estimated 
that the extraordinary taxes on peasant commercial activities and the 
forced loans from peasant traders totalled three times the domain's 
income from the basic land tax. He concluded that 11 • • • this heavy 
financial reliance on peasant traders may go a long way in explaining 
why the domain permitted the land tax to remain so low during the late 
Tokugawa period" (1965:60). 
51 
It is beyond my purview and intention here to place Shonai Domain in 
this new model of the Tokugawa economy, but it is necessary to caution 
against drawing too rosy a picture of the Shonai countryside. To be sure, 
there is little evidence of a general, unrelieved impoverishment among 
Shonai--and more directly to the point of the this study, Aka 
River--cultivators. During years of famine, there were vague claims of 
11 several thousand'' deaths from starvation,e3 1  but little support can be 
found for waves of famine regularly decimating the population. Given the 
undersurveying and undergrading of newer paddy lands, it is of course very 
difficult to determine whether there were significant increases in land 
productivity, as proposed by the new model of the economic historians. 
The only data which can be cited with any confidence are mixed. Sato 
(1965:69) has used internal village records (the bugari cho) for three 
villages in the downstream area of Shoryujigawa (Kakuda-futakuchi, 
Shin-koya, and Harima-kyoden Villages) together with records of a local 
large landholder to estimate the following yields per 1 tan (about 0.1 
hectare)--that is, per one actual tan: 
1780-1800 1.3 to 1.5 koku 
1800-1830 2.1 to 2.2 koku 
1830-1850 1.6 to 1.7 koku 
1850-1870 1 . 7  koku 
These figures suggest significant fluctuation within an overall rise in . 
land productivity. �till, if we recall that the official domain 
assessment throughout the period ranged from 1.5 koku per tan for #1 grade 
paddy land to 0.9 koku per tan for the lowest #4 grade, it is obvious that 
a #3 or #4 graded parcel that was measured with a 6-7 pole would yield a 
considerable margin above domain tax duties. 
On the other hand, if general poverty and stagnation is an inaccurate 
description, there is much to suggest that basin peasants did not benefit 
uniformly from an improving standard of living. Unlike even other domains 
in the less developed northeast, there were no significant commercial 
opportunities other than rice in Shonai, and while we do not have many 
quantitative data on annual harvest fluctuations, the nature of basin 
climate, soil, and water discussed in chapter three provide strong 
circumstantial evidence for yield instability.32 This was compounded bye: 
3 1  For example, a 1708 petition from eight village groups claimed that 
11several thousands young and old, men and womene1 1  had died of starvation 
following several years of continued poor harvests (Makabe 1971:202). 
32 Uno•s analysis of the bugari-ch� of Toyohara Village (Toyohara 
kenkyukai 1978:533-544) from late Tokugawa and early Meiji suggests 
that in better years, yields averaged around 2 koku per 0.1 ha, and in 
poor years, around 1 . 5  koku per 0.1 ha. A report by a prefectural 
official in early Meiji assessed the yield of what appears to have been 
the predominant rice variety group of thee,late domain period in the 
., 
• 
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the numerous tax duties themselves, which could reach an onerous 80-90% of 
registered yield in some areas; implementation of the fixed tax rate 
method (jomensei), which permitted much more niggard reductions in bad 
years than the inspection method; forced borrowings of seed rice from the 
domain, which were then payable with 30% interest before the next autumn 
taxes were due; and heavy penalties for tax delinquency. As a result, 
there was considerable peasant borrowing and indebtedness. By means of 
private arrangements with other villagers, pawning of land to towne· ·  
merchants, and outright sales, land transfers became common as peasant 
debt increased. 
Contributing to the severity of such a downward spiral of increasing 
debt and eventual loss of all land was the differential in the 
desirability of land, especially between old paddy lands and newly 
developed and more lightly taxed paddy lands. A household might have 
parcels of each within its village, but if it were forced to seek a loan, 
it would have to put up its lightly taxed new paddy lands as collateral. 
If it were unable to redeem and lost this land, it would be in an even 
worse position to maintain itself in later misfortunes and would have more 
difficulty in finding a lender for its more heavily taxed lands. In the 
latter case, or where all lands were highly taxed, a household might 
transfer its tax duties on one parcel to another parcel to make the first 
parcel (known as a takanuki-ta) more attractive as collateral. The 
strategy, however necessary at the moment, was usually sef-defeating as 
the duties on the second parcel (a takabari-ta) were only more onerous. 
We know that peasant debt and consequent land transfers were serious 
problems but we do not know just how widespread they were. One solution 
to hopeless indebtedness was simply to leave one's village (a 
tsuburebyakusho) and migrate elsewhere. Migration to towns and cities 
within and even outside the domain was increasingly attractive with rises 
in wages, and we may presume that at least in the first part of the period 
the settlement of the downstream areas of the basin offered an escape for 
distressed and heavily indebted households to start afresh. In either 
case, the responsibility for meeting the taxes on such abandoned land 
reverted to the village collectively (as mura-age chi), and it was 
necessary to delegate cultivation responsibility to another villager. By 
the mid-1700s in Hayashizaki Village in the Shoryujigawa Main Canal 
service area, 43% of village lands had reverted to the village; in 
Yokoyama-shimogumi Village in the Nakagawa Main Canal service area, the 
comparable figure was 42%, and in Fujishima Village in the Inaba Main 
Canal service area it reached 50% the same year (OB 1974:95). As a 
measure to prevent this trend from undermining tax payments, the domain 
rural affairs officer in 1795 ordered that all villages reassign full 
center of Sh5nai Plain in the following terms: of five harvests, these 
varieties produced below-average yields thr.ee years, an average yield 
one year, and above average yields one year
/ 
; (Igawa 1967). 
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proprietorship of these reverted lands to individual households (these are 
so designated in the land registers by the notation nushi�tsuke after the 
cultivator's name; see the 1800 record of assignments in Hayashizaki 
Village in YKS 1980:395-409 ) .  This no doubt led to much maneuvering 
within villages to avoid particularly heavily taxed plots ; the overall 
effect was to increase the potential for indebtedness of the remaining 
households. 
Thus, while a rising standard of living may have characterized the 
overall Tokugawa economy, the situation in Shonai Domain and in its Aka 
River basin was more complex. Peasant difficulties in meeting domain 
levies in the face of unpredictable harvests led to rather serious 
cumulative peasant debt, but these difficulties were differentially 
experienced. There was no general impoverishment but still only selective 
and, in many cases, tenuous prosperity. 
For our purposes, there are two consequences of the mixed and 
fluctuating fortunes of the basin peasantry that need to be 
underscored--the continuous land transfers that followed the borrowing and 
lending upset the congruence of residence, cultivation rightse, and tax 
liability upon which the domain system rested and they resulted in 
concentrations of large land holdings in certain parts of the basin. Both 
consequences had important implications for the relations among domain 
officials, peasant water users, and large landholders in irrigation 
organization. 
Domain contro1 of production and producers was predicated on 
independent peasant households, cultivating and paying taxes on land 
within their village of residence. Thus land transfers in any form 
(except impartible inheritance) ande.ethe fragmentation and dissolution of 
holdings threatened the very stability of the domain system. It is not 
surprising then that all such transfers (pawning, sales, division among 
children, etc.) were prohibited by domain decree; in 1643, the shogunate 
had issued its first order prohibiting land sales (the eitai baibai kinshi 
rei) and in 1678, the domain issued the .efirst of a series of such orders. 
Predictably, these did little to actually prevent land sales and 
transfers, and eventually there was even some administrative relaxation 
which officially countenanced certain fixed term loans with land 
collateral to pay land taxes. 
The congruence of residence, cultivation rights, and tax liability was 
upset in several ways by land transfers. We have seen how land abandoned 
by fleeing peasants amounted to over 50% of a village's registered yield 
in some cases; the domain was finally forced to reassign formal liability 
for these parcels to remaining households. A household that lost its land 
holdings but remained in the village could lose its registered cultivator 
status (as honbyakusho). This contributed to the growing number of 
untitled households (mizunomibyakusho) and dependent agricultural laborer 
households (nago). 
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Land transfers also led to an increase in the number .of cultivators 
, 
working parcels in villages other than their own. As early as 1689 in 
Kakuda-futakuchi Village, almost one-quarter of the village land was 
cultivated by a total of fourteen persons (irisakunin) from six 
surrounding villages; at the same time, seven Kakuda-futakuchi residents 
cultivated about 110 koku (12 hectares) of land in six villages ( four of 
these villages were the same as irisakunin villages)e; The proportion of 
Kakuda-futakuchi lands cultivated by non-residents jumped to over SO% in 
1734 and remained there for most of the domain period (OB 1974:132). 
Transfers of land through sales and loan defaulting not only disrupted 
the ideal congruence of residente= tax payere= cultivator but also led to 
concentrations of land holdings in some areas of the basin. In the 
seventeenth century, even many of the larger holdings were cultivated by 
the owner with hired labor from land-poor households, but rising wages 
combined with a prolonged slump in the rice price in the Kyoho era 
(1716-35) made it increasingly difficult to attract and support sufficient 
labor. By the mid-1700s, therefore, self-cultivation of large holdings 
was replaced by tenancy and sharecropping, particularly in the downstream 
new paddy lands. It was also at this time that merchants from Tsuruoka 
and the ports of Sakata and Kamo began to accumulate large land holdings 
through lending to peasants, outright purchase, and contributions to land 
development. 
Most research on t.hese merchant landlords has focused on the Honmas, 
originally ship chandlers, money lenders, and rice traders in Sakata. 
Their first land purchase was made in 1736 by the third generation Honma 
Mitsuoka; by 1800, they had holdings of about 600 (actual) hectares 
producing a rent of almost 6000 koku (Honma & Yokoyama 1975:190)e. By 
then, Honma was not only the largest landholder but also the richest 
merchant in the domain, and his 'donations' of money and fiscal advice 
were repeatedly sought by the domain lord. The Honma holdings, though, 
were concentrated in lands north of the Mogami River, and the family's 
influence in the Aka River basin was only indirect.33 
33 Igawa (1967) has studied the distribution of Honma holdings in the mid­
to late domain period, showing that they were concentrated at the very 
downstream section of the Nikko River alluvial fan and in the 
downstream floodplain between the Arase and Aizawa Rivers. These were 
areas of newer paddy lands, threatened by both flooding of only 
partially controlled rivers and water shortages; still they were 
attractive because of their low tax burdens. Many of the voluminous 
Honma family records have been published as the Honma-ke Shozo 
Shiry�-shn, available at the Shinjo branch of the MAF's Agricultural 
Research Institute. There is a large literature on "landlordism" 
{jinushi-sei) in the Shonai area, but it must be used with caution. 
Most works are by economics-oriented agricultural and rural historians 
and agricultural economists; they are frequently addressed to the 
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South of the Mogami River in the Aka River basin, there was no single, 
dominant landholder like Honma. Instead, there were smaller accumulations 
by a number of both wealthy peasants and merchants from Tsuruoka and Kama. 
Unfortunately, with the present evidence it is difficult to determine 
their total holdings and numbers, although I estimate from an 1829 list of 
wealthy commoners in the domain (the choja banzuke; OA 1974:384, Tawara 
1972) that there were at least sixteen persons with several hundred koku 
in paddy land in the Aka River basin. These included four peasants in the 
Shoryujigawa service area, three in the Nakagawa service area, and one in 
the Inaba sevice area, plus seven merchants in Tsuruoka, Oyama, Kamo, and 
Sakata. There were probably tens more of merchants and peasants with 
lesser amounts of tenanted land which had been purchased or collected as 
the collateral on unpaid loans, but there are no data on this at the 
moment. 
There are a few details known about three of these landholders: Akino,
a merchant and trader of the port of Kama; Sato Tozo, the headman of 
Kakuda-futakuchi Village in the Shoryujigawa area; and Abe Tokusaburo, a 
peasant cultivator in Sanbongi Village in the Nakagawa area. Together
they suggest some of the characteristics of large landholders in the Aka 
River basin. 
The Akinos maintained warehouses and ships at the port of Kama, trading
Shonai rice for salt, cloth, and pottery at Osaka arid Kyoto. They made 
their first land purchase in 1745, and by the end of the 1700s, they were 
the largest landholders in the basin--indeed, they were second only to 
Honma in the entire domain (see Table 5). Even so, Akino holdings, which . .
totalled about 117 hectares in 1845, did not exceed 3%-4% of the basin 
acreage. The villages in whi�h they accumulated large holdings were 
generally around the town of Oyama, .both to the north along the west bank 
of the Oyama River, which was an area of major paddy land expansions in 
the late 1600s and 1700s, and to the south in that small corner of the 
basin irrigated by the upper Oyama River (see Table 6). Only 6.3 
hectares, or 5% of their holdings, were within the Shoryijjigawa service 
area (see Mori 1975 and Kudo & Akino 1966:99-135 for further details). 
Most of the lands of the Abe household of Sanbongi Village were 
accumulated in the period 1775-95; in 1797, the household had 193 tenants 
in 29 villages from which it was collecting just over 1000 koku of rice 
per year.3 1  The Abe holdings illustrate two important features of large 
rather polemical Japanese Marxist concern with whether the Meij i 
Restoration was or was not a bourgeois revolution (see Nagai & Kudo 
1951, Sato 1965, Igawa 1967, Tawara 1972, and Baba 1965). 
A typical tenancy agreement would assign cultivation rights for a 
parcel (known as a hyota) to a household, which would supply all labor, 
seed rice, tools, etc., in return for paying tod·dthe landholder a rent 
31 
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Table 5 
Increases in Akino paddy land holdings expressed as rent rice 
1749 36.0 koku
1754 66.8
1759 168.0
1764 189.6
1769 193.6
1774 203 . 6  
1779 288.8
1784 310.0
1789 359.6
1794 423.6
1799 474 .0  
1804 547.2  
1809 686 . 8  
1814 917.2
1819 1039.2
1824 1262 . 0  
1829 1373.2
1833 1435.2
1838 1477 .2  
1845 1520 .4  
Note : Figures represent total paddy land holdings in the 
above years, expressed as koku o f  rental rice. That is, when 
purchasing a parcel of land and assigning it to a tenant ,  Akino ' s  
agent would measure the parcel and assess its productivity; this
would be based on an on-site survey and thus might bear little 
resemblance to the entries for the parcel in the domain land register. 
A rental rice figure would thus be determined--the amount of rice in
0.4 koku bags due from the tenant; the rent included both owner 
profit and domain taxes. 
Source : YKS 1968 :645 
34 . 1  
Main 
0 . 1  
0 . 1  
3.3 
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Table 6 
Distribution of Akino holdings, 1845 
villages along west bank of Oyama River (12)
Oyama 3.6  hectares 
Tomoe 2.0  
Nakadate 1 . 9  
Umach� 21 .3  
Shimogawa 10.2  
Chiyasu-kyoden 5 . 0  
Omotenoyama 3 . 2  
Tsuji-koya
Nagasaki 12.7 
Ibara-shinden 5 . 4  
Nishi-nonuma 5 . 8  
Hirooka-shinden 4.1  
villages within Shoryujigawa
Inoko 
Canal service area (8)
hectares 
Obana/Tenshindo
Narita-shinden 
Higashi-nonumad_
Zennami 
1 . 1
1 . 1
0 . 3  
0 . 3
Kakuda-futakuchi 
Arai-kyoden 
Total land holdingsd= 116.6  hectares 
Number of villages in which holdings. were distributedd= 19 
Source: Kudo and Akino 1966 :110-111, 121 
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landholders in the basin area (see Table 7). First, they were 
concentrated in those areas that were lightly taxed, that is, they 
consisted largely of parcels of newly developed paddy land. Of the 1000 
koku in rent which Abe collected in 1797, only about 15% (150 koku) was 
due to the domain as tax; the remaining 85% (850 koku) was income to the 
household. Parcels in 17 villages let to 69 tenants had no tax duties at 
all.d3 5  Abe's holdings also indicate that the paddy lands of such large 
landholders tended to be distributed across a number of water .dcourse 
service areas. Abe had parcels in four main canal service areas in 
addition to several Oyama west bank villages. This is a critical point 
because I will argue that this dispersal of holdings diluted the influence 
and concern of these large holders in irrigation affairs. 
The third basin landholder about which some details are known is Sato 
Tozo of Kakuda-futakuchi .  The head of this peasant household was 
hereditary headman of the village, but household holdings were much 
smaller in scale that Akino or Abe. In 1794, Tozo held 11.8 hectares of 
land with an assessed value of 134 koku. Even so, the holdings were 
distributed through several villages. They had 38 paddy land parcels, 8 
dry field parcels, and 4 rice nursery parcels in Kakuda-futakuchi (5.3
hectares), Zennami (2.9 hectares), Naka-ky5den (1.6 hectares), and 
Higashi-nonuma (1.2 hectares), with very small plots in five other 
villages. The household cultivated 1.6 hectares of this total, mostly 
within Kakuda-futakuchi, and let out the remaining 10.2 hectares (the 1794 
Tozo register is in YKS 1980:d605-615). 
(known as kosakuryo, watarikuchi-mai, or hyotawatari). A standard rent 
was 3 bags of rent per 100 sheaves of harvest grain (about 1 tan or 0. 1 
ha) . From the rent, the registered landholder was responsible for all 
taxes; what remained after these payments was his income, known as 
sakutoku-mai. In practice, however, because taxes were collected in 
the village in which the parcel was registered, the tenant often paid
the taxes and delivered the remainder of the rent, the sakutoku-mai, to 
the landholder (Sat� 1967 : 248ff., Maeta, personal communication). It 
should be noted that before buying a parcel or accepting it as 
collateral on a loan, the prospective receiver surveyed and assessed 
it ; the figures in the domain registers were never trusted. 
3 5  This was common among large landholders; an 1825 Akino family document 
outlining investment practices ford. future household heads enjoined 
against buying or accepting for collateral any parcel for which the tax 
owed amounted to over halfd·dthe possible rent (Kudo & Akino 1966 : 123-4). 
The differential in the attractiveness of paddy lands is illustrated in 
the contrast between Naka-kyoden and Kakuda-futakuchi Villages along 
the same branch canal of the Shoryujigawa Main Canal. Naka-ky�den
paddy lands had a high principal land tax rate of 56% and a total tax 
burden of 73.6% (of registered yield). It Mas hardly a desirable area 
for land purchases, and in 1804, outside owners accounted for just 30 
39 
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Table 7 
Distribution of Abe holdings in 1797 
Rent retained Portion paid Number of 
by Abe (koku) as taxes to tenants in 
domain (koku) village 
Nakagawa Main Canal 
#13 Hirano Branch Canal 
Hirono-shinden 0 30. 11 
#12 Oshikiri Branch Canal 
Sanbongi 164.4 9 . 6  
Tsushima 38.0 11.6 12 
Oshikiri 
Fukuoka- .Ofuchi 
#10 Yokoyama Branch Canal 
Yokoyama
Yokouchi 
Tsutsumino 
Doguchi
Hishinonuma 
58.0 
16.8 
19.6 
2.8 
18.0 
63.6 
49.3 
0.8 
Shoshaku 21.2 
14.8 
1.2 
1.2 
0 
0 
0 
54.0 
0.4 
14 
1 
1 
2 
2 
15 
20 
1 
5 
#9 Wanagawa Branch Canal 
Wanagawa 
#7 Yokogawa Branch Canal 
Yokogawa 
#6 Gokamura Branch Canal 
Arayashiki 
#4 Hosoya Branch Canal 
Osaeguchi 
Shoryujigawa Main Canal 
#26 Aoyama Branch Canal 
Aoyama
TenshindO' 
Inoko 
Narita-shinden 
Inaba Main Canal 
22.9 
47. 2  
95.7 
10.8 
0.9 
48.0 
61.3 
11.2 
0 
14.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
14 
2 
1 
1 
26 
8 
2 
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Naganuma 17.0 4. 1 6- . .JumonJ1. 6.8 4.8 2 
Oyama River left bank 
4 villages 64 .1. 0 4 
other villages (3) 16.9 0 3 
TOTALS: 855.0 koku 151.5 koku 195 households 
Note: These figures represent the amount of rice to be 
delivered by the tenants to Abe (hyota-watari) and do not include the 
amount kept by the tenante. 
Source: OB 1974:134 
, 
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Sato Shigero• s (1965) analysis of the Tozo household suggests that at 
least in that case, tenancy was not as severe as the cycle of 
impoverishment that might lead to it would imply. Computing from -Tozo 
records, he discovered that rent (i . e . ,  the landlord's portion plus the 
domain taxes) amounted to about 60% of actual harvest per unit of area ind. 
the years, 1780-1800, but after that dropped to around 50%: 
year koku per actual 1 tan 
1780-1800 1.344 koku 
rent 
0.809 koku 
rent/yield 
60.2% 
1800-1830 2.238 koku 0. 934 koku 41. 7% 
1830-1850 1.639 koku 0.821 koku so .1% 
1850-1870 1.758 koku 0.942 koku 53.6% 
Source: Sato 1965:69, 71 
Calculated differently, if we take his estimate that in the period, 
1780-1800, paddy land in the Kakuda-futakuchi area actually produced 2.230 
koku for every 1 registered koku ( i.e., a parcel which had a registered 
yield of 1 koku would yield on the average 2.230 koku), this actual 
production figure of 2 .230 koku was divided in the following proportions: 
domain taxes .494 koku 22% 
landlord share .627 koku 28% 
tenant share 1.109 koku 50% 
This second method of calculation provides further evidence of another 
characteristic of paddy lands in the downstream areas--the very low 
proportion of production that the domain was able to lay claim to. Only
22% of the actual production from Tozo ' s  tenanted lands was going to the 
domain, only slightly higher than the comparable figure of 15% for Abe ' s  
tenanted lands across the Aka River. 
koku of the village ' s  949 koku registered yield. It consequently had a 
very high proportion of abandoned land which had reverted to the 
village. Just downstream in Kakuda-futakuchi in 1807, 24% of the 
older, pre-1624 paddy lands (with a principal land tax rate of 44.8%)
were owned by non-residents, while 78% of the village ' s  new paddy lands 
(taxed at 20. 8%) were registered to non-residents (Sato 1957 :119). 
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Conclusions 
Subsequent chapters will detail how peasant cultivators, domain 
officials, and large landholders were all involved in var�ous irrigation 
tasks; at the same time, all three categories of persons were mutually 
engaged in matters of administration and land tenure. To what extent and 
in what ways these relations of domain administration and land tenure can 
be said to have determined patterns of irrigation organization is the 
crucial question in hypothesizing why the particular form of decentralized 
irrigation organization emerged in the basin during the domain period. 
In working towards this, we must remember to distinguish between the 
original thrust of domain policy, which was never fully realized, and the 
later pattern of administration and tenure that resulted from then. 
developments of the late 1600s and 1700s which have been sketched here. 
Early domain lord policy aimed to establish a politically secure and 
economically stable regieme by creating a countryside of demilitarized, 
landholding, and tax-paying peasant households, organized into 
self-regulating residential settlement units and administered by a 
hierarchy of officials recruited from among the warrior-retainers of the 
domain lord. Implicit in th.is order, then, was a tension between 
hierarchical control and self-regulating autonomy. It raised two 
possibilities for irrigation task performance: the village unit as a locus 
for water user mobilization and the exercise .of authority by domain 
officials at the several levels of administration. At the same time,
there were several features which qualified these possibilities: 
potential threats to village coordination posed by the village headmanship
and the internal allocation of tax levies; the lack of congruence between 
·nadministrative and hydrological boundaries; and an apparent lack of 
attention to irrigation by the domain hierarchy. That is, significantly,
rice production and rice producers were rather carefully controlled by the 
domain from the standpoints of the production inputs of land and labor and 
of the production output (the rice) but there was seemingly little concern 
with the water input. 
But whether this political-economic framework would have fostered water 
user autonomy or state-articulated elite control or some form of divided 
control is a moot issue because the Sakai lords were never \.1holly 
successful in imposing this order. As described in this chapter, they . .
were prevented by the particular ways in which new paddy lands weren.nopened
up, production became commercialized, and land holdings fluctuated. . These .
created a rather different social context 
. 
for Aka River irrigation from 
the early 1700s on. The effectiveness of the village as a locus of water 
user mobilization was reduced as the congruence between residency, land 
ownership, and cultivation was disrupted. Domain officials had less cause 
to exercise authority in irrigation task performance as domain claims on 
agricultural production declined, particularly in the downstream new paddy 
lands. To be sure, large landholders, emerging in the 1700s, concentrated 
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their holdings in the newly developed downstream areas, which were the 
areas most susceptible to both water shortages and poor drainage. But
their influence in and concern with irrigation affairs was diluted because 
these holdings were usually dispersed over a hurnber of water course 
service areas and because they enjoyed considerable income from their 
·lightly-taxed lands. These points will be further elaborated in 
subsequent chapters as we now turn to basin irrigation itself. 
Chapter III 
RICE CULTIVATION AND THE AKA RIVER BASIN ENVIRONMENT 
As the administration and land tenture of the domain were central
elements of the sociocultural context of Aka River irrigation, so too the 
drainage basin formed its natural environment. In describing that 
environment in this chapter, I will consider the hypothesis that 
irrigation organization in the basin attracted neither elite intervention 
nor peasant cultivator mobilization simply because the water supply was 
abundant and easily exploited or because water itself was not critical in 
agricultural production. In dismissing these possibilities, we will see 
that irrigation water served several essential though not easily 
quantifiable functions in Tokugawa rice cultivation, that there were a 
number of features of the basin environment that rendered water control 
highly problematical, and that estimates of supply and demand point to 
regular shortages appearing by at least 1750. 
Water use in basin rice cultivation 
Throughout the Tokugawa period (and indeed to the present day), 
irrigation in the Aka River basin served almost exclusively the 
cultivation of rice. Judging from surviving land registers, rice occupied
80-95% of the cultivated acreage in the basin, the remainder being 
vegetable gardens and small orchards. Water needs for these "dry field" 
(hatake) crops were generally satisfied by rainfall, althoughd.doccasionally
water from irrigation canals might have been applied. The gardens and 
orchards, however, did not have direct access to the canal networks, and 
it was rice that overwhelmingly defined irrigation water demand.d36 
The only other consumptive uses of irrigation water from the delivery 
canals were domestic uses and firefighting; each village maintained 
several small ponds in the settlement for fire-fighting use. 
Non-consumptive uses included washing, fishing, and curing wood. The 
rivers, though not the canals, served as transportation arteries. The 
other significant demand for Aka River water besides irrigation was in 
the castle town of Tsuruoka; water was used for various municipal uses 
and to replenish the castle moat. Aka River water was delivered to the 
- 64 
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Rice grown in thee- basin was largely non-glutinous paddy rice. There 
have been through much of history two cultivated species of rice, one 
grown exclusively in West Africa and the other'ecommon to the rest ot the 
world. Within the latter species (Oryza sativa) are two groups of natural 
varieties, the indicas and the japonicas. The japonicas have always been 
the only group grown in Japan, although within the variety group there are 
a number of further distinctions. One is between upland rice or 
non-irrigated rice (rikuto) and paddy rice or irrigated rice (suito)e; most 
japonica varieties are the latter type. There are also uruchi mai 
varieties, non-glutinous rice, and mochi mai varieties, or glutinous rice. 
A small amount of mochi mai was grown in the Aka River basin to make the 
rice cakes used for ceremonial and festive occasions (perhaps 2% of the 
total acreage to judge from several village planting reports to the 
domain), but uruchi mai was overwhelmingly cultivated. 
More importantly, uruchi mai varieties were further distinguished by 
length of growing season. There were wase or early ripening varieties 
requiring about 80 days, chute or medium ripening varieties requiring 
about 120 days, and okute or late ripening varieties requiring as much as 
140 days.37 Late ripening varieties, with the longest generative growth 
period, usually produce the highest yields, and so were the preferred 
varieties. However, cultivators of late ripening varieties in a northern 
area like Shonai risked damage from late summer and autumn cold 
temperatures, wind, and rain. For this reason, domain authorities 
prohibited planting of late ripening varieties (e.g., YKS 1980:664-665); 
the ban was apparently widely ignored, and cultivators tended to mix early 
and late varieties according to their forecasts of the year's weather 
(Toyohara kenkyukai 1978:530). 
Application of water in japonica paddy rice cultivation is perhaps more 
complex than irrigation and drainage in any other cropping system. Small 
bunded field parcels are built and maintained to pond water around the 
rice plants, but in fact an optimal water strategy combines periods of 
standing water with periods of running water through the parcels and 
periods of draining and drying the parcels. This is done because in 
japonica cultivation, water is not only essential for direct cultigen 
growth (taken in by the plant and used in photosynthesis), but it also 
serves a whole range of additional functions in field preparation and 
plant growth. These include: 
castle town by the Shoryujigawa Main Canal; by a proportional 
allocation formula discussed below, the town received about 15% of the 
master stream volume in times of low water. 
37 This is the period from transplanting to harvest. The period from 
germination to transplanting is roughly the. same for all three {about 
40-50 days in the domain period). 
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1. to prepare the soil for transplanting by wet tilling with large 
volumes of water; 
2. to raise ground temperature and to protect the rice plant from 
extreme temperature damage; 
3. to supply various nutrients to the plant and soil, including oxygen 
through ion exchange andd-suspended silt, renewing soil fertility; 
4. to promote rooting and regulate stalk length; 
5. to control weed growth, disease, and insect damage; 
6. to swell the soil and thus promote oxygen release from the water; 
7. to remove noxious gases and toxic elements; 
8. to slow denitrification; and 
9. to promote fixing of nitrogen by supporting blue-green algae. 
It is this multi-functional role of water that greatly increases the 
elasticity of water demand and thus complicates computations of minimal 
water demand through the plant growth cycle. To appreciate the 
complexities of irrigation and drainage that Aka River basin cultivators 
faced, it is necessary to understand both the basic features of rice 
cultivation methods in the basin and the water demands of the rice plant
through its life cycle. We can first summarize the general cultivation 
regieme followed by basin cultivators as follows.d3 8  
1.  composting and transport of compost to fields (koyashi hakobi or 
taihi biki). The primary fertilizer for paddy fields was compost, 
applied in the spring (as motogoe or negoe); after transplanting, a 
second fertilization (oigoe) was done with freshly-cut grasses 
(kari shiki). In advanced areas of the country such as Kinai, 
commercial fertilizers (principally dried fish and oil cakes) had 
become widespread by the mid-Tokugawa period, especially for cotton 
and other marketed dry-field crops. In Shonai, too, by the 1830s,
oil cakes and dried fish were purchased and applied, but this was 
not widespread. Composting was a year-round activity, using straw 
and manure from the horse stall, mixed with other straw and 
grasses, ashes, household manure, night soil collected from 
households in Tsuruoka, and mud from water channel beds. About 
March first, the compost was carried out to the fields by sled and 
as This brief portrait is compiled from several sources : oc 1975d:296-301; 
Toyohara kenkyukai 1977:74-5, 1978:528-533; • rinuma & Horio 1976; Inami 
1977; and Furushima 1967. 
• 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
dumped in piles on a household's various plots. The sleds were 
pulled by the men over the snow because it was thought unhealthy to 
take the horses outside in the cold air of winter. 
seed selection. Seeds were selected by visual inspection and by 
soaking in water. This was done about March 20th (at Higan, the 
vernal equinox). The seeds were then soaked in water for about 30 
days. Germination followed about 6-10 days afterd·dremoval from 
soaking. 
initial field preparation (takoshirae). Field work began in the 
last part of March, while the snow had not quite melted but after 
the soil began to soften. A first task was preparing the bunds 
(takuro kiri or kuromawashi). They were shaped, beaten and 
hardened with a mallet, breaks were repaired, and then they were 
plastered with fresh mud to improve water retention. This work 
lasted through mid-April. 
seed bed preparation (naedoko koshirae). The seed beds were 
prepared for use in April. Apparently in Shonai, they were only
used in the spring and not as paddy fields in the growing season. 
They were fields of particularly good soil close to home because of 
the constant attention they required. Preparation procedures were 
the same as regular paddy fields although the seed beds were tilled 
· more finely and were more heavily fertilized with compost. Aboutd
May 1st, the sprouted seeds were scattered loosely (noppera maki) 
on top of the smooth and fine mud-soil more thickly than in the 
present day (about .8-i.O sho per tsubo compared to .2-.3 sho per 
tsubo in recent times). The most important job after seeding was 
water management; the water level was continually adjusted for 
temperature and cloud cover. Standing water was also useful to 
prevent the birds from eating the new buds. 
dry tilling (tauchi or kOki). There were two tilling phases: dry 
tilling broke up the ground and loosened the soil while wet tilling 
was a fine tilling done after water had been ponded on the field. 
Dry tilling was itself of three stages. In the first (arakoshi), a 
shovel-like nodachi was used to dig around the edges of the field 
next to the bund (a procedure known as kuro banashi); using this 
tool and a three-pronged hoe-like implement (the Bitchu kuwa), the 
soil was broken up, working towards the middle of the parcel. In a 
second stage (kama kiri), a long-handled sickle (nagae kama) was 
used to cut up the stalks from the previous year's crop. Then,
using a kuwa, these stalks were further broken into smaller pieces 
(kokiri, kowari, or kotekiri). Finally, in saido, the large soild• 
clods were broken up with the kuwa, fertilizer was spread about and 
worked in, etc. 
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6. wet tilling (shirokaki or takaki). Wet tilling began in the second 
week of May and required three or four weeks. It was necessary to 
start soon after water was let on to the field; otherwise the soil 
would solidify. The quantity of water was also important; too much 
or too little would prevent. one from getting the soil to a fine 
texture (it would either remain too clumpy or become too 
compacted), which would in turn affect seedling rooting and 
fertilizer efficacy. The timing and quantity of water was 
particularly crucial in cold years, when the spil had to be 
provided sufficient air and heat. In wet tilling, also done in 
three stages, the horse was used to pull a toothed grader (manga or 
maguwa). The first time (ara shirokaki), a thick, long-toothed 
grader was used; thereafter, the second (naka shirokaki) and third 
(ue shirokaki) times, a thinner, short-toothed grader was used. 
The compost was carefully worked into the soil and the soil was 
worked to a fine, smooth consistency. Wet tilling required the 
largest volumes of water during the season; in the present day, for 
example, main canal intake volumes during wet tilling are about two 
and a half times the volumes during the mid-summer. 
7. transplanting (taue or satsuki). Transplanting was done about 
40-50 days after the nursery beds were seeded, about June 5th to 
15th (traditionally begun on nyiibai, or the beginning of the 
monsoon rainy season, about June 11th, though there was no monsoon 
season in Shonai). In Shonai, transplanting was done randomly with 
about 20 plants per square meter; it was not until the turn of this 
century that straight-line planting with lines or frame was 
introduced. Sometime after, a second transplanting (niban ue) was 
' done to replace plants which did not root and to fill in spaces 
missed. Soy beans or millet might then be planted on the bunds. 
8. supplementary fertilizing (oigoe). Perhaps a week or so after 
transplanting, freshly-cut grasses were worked into the paddy soils 
with the feet. Alternatively, night soil, burned rice straw, and 
grasses were rolled by hand into balls and put into the soil 
between the stalks (sashigoe). 
9. weeding (joso). Weeding was done 3-4 times in the 45 days 
following transplanting (in June, July, and early August). Weeds 
were either pulled by hand (kusatori) or a small hand cultivator (a 
kanitsume) was used for shallow inter-tillage (chuko). 
10. harvest (inekari). The rice harvest in domain period Shonai began 
in late September in years of average weather through the growing 
season. The rice was cut by hand with a short-handled sickle 
(inekari kama), tied several plants to a bundle, and stood u�side 
down on the field for a few days so the stalks might begin to dry. 
The bundles were then tied into larger sheaves which were piled on 
stakes that lined one side of the field� The rice was left to dry 
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on the stakes until about mid-October, when it .was brought back to 
the house using human and horse labor (ineage or zaku seoi). 
11. post-harvest processing (chosei or hikeshi). Processing began in 
mid-October and continued into February. The rice was first 
threshed with a senba koki, a comb-like line of iron or wood teeth 
mounted on a frame. The unhulled grain (momi) was then spread out 
on the earth floor and beaten with a pestle so that no grains 
remained attached to the stalks. It was then winnowed by fan and 
unripe grains selected out with a karami. The grains were husked 
(momi-suri) with a baked earth mortar (kara usu or tsuchi usu) and 
winnowed again with a kome toshi (or mangoku toshi) to separate the 
husked rice from the chaff. The husked but unpolished rice 
(genmai) was then bagged in woven rice straw bags in 5 to (90 
liter) volumes .  
Despite the differences in growing se�son length, all varieties of the 
japonica group exhibited a similar growth cycle, each stage of which was 
associated with a different water demand pattern: 
1. germination. The grains were germinated before sowing by soaking 
in tubs of water for about 30 days. Germination, marked by a tiny 
white spot appearing on the hull surface, followed 6-10 days after 
removal. 
2. nursery seedling. The germinated seeds were broadcast on carefully 
prepared and levelled mud nursery beds, where they sprouted and 
grew for 25-50 days. A small volume of water, easily satisfied, 
was needed early in April to prepare the seed beds. Water was also 
needed in the month of May for the seeded beds; again the volume 
was small, though the application had to be precise and continually 
adjusted. Water temperature also had to be checked carefully. 
3.  transplanting and rerooting. After wet tilling the main paddy 
fields, water was left ponded for transplanting. The small rice 
seedlings were removed from the nursery bed and transplanted in the 
main paddy fields when the stalk length was about 10-15 cm. 
Because the root systems were damaged and cut in the transplanting, 
the seedlings had to reroot in the paddy field. The month 
following transplanting was a critical period of water application. 
The stalk was weak and the root system broken; the young plant 
could be blown over easily and cool temperatures were harmful. 
Thus, for a week after transplanting, deep water (c. 10 cm) was 
maintained to hasten rerooting and protect the seedling. By the 
second week, the level could be lowered. Shallow water during the 
day would raise the ground temperature, and in this period, higher 
temperatures were best for plant growth. 
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4. tillering. Tillering is the development of several stalks on the 
same plant. That is, buds at the base of the stalk develop and 
branch to form new stalks; thus, each grain sown will grow several 
stalks, and a panicle (head) of rice grains will grow on each 
stalk. Tillering began about 8 days after transplanting, as soon 
as the seedling had rerooted and continued for 1-2 months. 
However, beyond a certain point, tillering produces stalks which do 
not form panicles, and, then as now, cultivators tried to identify 
that point and prevent further tillering through water control and 
fertilizer application. 
In its early stage, tillering was improved by a wide night-day 
ground temperature differential (30-35'! ,c daytime to 1s0 ,c nighttime 
temperatures). Barring cold, cloudy days, then, shallow, standing 
water (3 cm) was favored during the day. In the evening, water was 
run through the paddy field, and deeper, standing water was 
maintained at night, which cooled the ground as well as insulated 
the plant against unseasonable cold air temperatures. By the late 
tillering stage, the cold temperature resistance of the plant was 
improved, and in mid-July, all water was drained from the field for 
several days. 
This mid-season drainage period, variously known as nakaboshi, 
doyoboshi, etc., was long an important difference between east Asia 
irrigation techniques and the standing water methods of southeast 
Asia. A principal function was to halt tillering at the point 
where panicle-bearing stalks were no longer being produced. It 
came at the point in the life cycle when the plant shifted from 
vegetative to generative growth, and it aided this by preventing 
further inter-nodal elongation of the stalk (i.e., it stimulated 
the conversion from stalk growth to panicle formation). 
The nakaboshi also replenished oxygen to the soil and roots and 
dried out the soil; this improved soil ventilation and encouraged 
the elongation of the root systems, which tended to remain shallow 
and close to the oxidizing surface layer. That is, paddy soils 
when submerged or water-logged were in a reduction state, except 
for the surface micro-layer. This was intensified by the 
decomposition of inorganic matter in the soil, such as the previous 
year's rice straw; with rising summer temperatures, this decomposed 
to supply valuable nutrients to the plants, but the decomposition 
also consumed needed oxygen and released toxic gases. The 
mid-seaon drainage was thus vital to lower soil layers and root 
systems in creating temporary oxydizing conditions. 
. 
.This field drainage was continued for 7-10 days depending on the 
soil conditions--generally, until small cracks appeared in the soil 
(which improved soil ventilation) and walking on the field left 
slight footprints. 
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5. panicle formation. This was the critical stage when the spikelets 
flowered and the panicles (heads of grain) appeared. Rice 
spikelets contain only one flower, which has six stamend.and an 
ovary. The ovary, after wind-pollinated fertilization, develops 
into the fruit, or grain; it is enclosed by modified leaves (the 
. .
lemma and palea), which close up again after fertilization and 
become the hull or husk. The panicles are erect at blooming 
(flowering) but begin to nod as the grains develop and mature.d ·d· 
In an average year in Tokugawa period Sh8nai, flowering in early 
ripening varieties was about mid-August; late-ripening varieties 
flowered about a week later. In years of less sunshine and cold 
temperatures, flowering could be delayed up to two weeks. 
Water was important in the first three weeks of August both for 
the cultigen growth and because the young ears were quite
susceptible to extreme high and low temperatures. Water 
application in this period was known as hana-mizu ("flower water"). 
Ideally, water flowing through the fields was preferred to standing 
water. 
6. ripening. The weight of the grains increased for about 30 days 
following fertilization, depending on sunshine and temperature.
There was a gradual reduction in water needs during this period. A 
final field drainage began by mid-September, as it was important
both for harvest work and grain drying that the fields be as dry as 
possible. Determining the moment of harvest cutting was a delicate 
decision; there were small differences in the rate of grain growth,
and it was necessary for maximum yield to judge when the maximum 
number of grains had reached.dbut not passed full maturity. 
Each stage of plant growth, then, required characteristic strategies of 
watering and drainage. Roughly, though, cultivators of the period 
compressed these stages into a distinction between shitsuke mizu 
("planting water") and yashinai mizu ("nurture water"). The first 
referred to the large volumes of water applied from May through mid-June 
for wet tilling of the paddy fields and to the deep water that was 
maintained for transplanting and rerooting. The second, nurture water,
covered the smaller but much more frequently manipulated volumes of water 
used in the summer months from mid-June through the end of August during 
the periods of tillering, panicle formation, and flowering. While 
remembering that this distinction glosses over much more complex watering 
practices, I will refer usually to this planting water/nurture water (or
spring water/summer water) distinction in this monograph. Indeed,
throughout the plant growth cycle, watering and draining demanded 
continuous attention and skilled judgment; it is no wonder thatd. 
agricultural books of the period urged that they be entrusted only to the 
shitsukainin of the household--the person of greatest prudence and longest 
experience (Inami 1977: 78). 
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The basin environment 
Shonai Plain is a small coastal plain about 50 kilometers long from 
north to south (see Hap 2). The Mogami River bisects the plain roughly 
mid-way. South of the river, the plain is about 16 kilometers wide, east 
to west; north of the river, it is only about 6 kilometers. The plain is 
surrounded on three sides by mountains, and to the west, it is separated 
from the Japan Sea by a line of coastal sand dunes. Excluding- these 
dunes, surface area of the plain .eis roughly 530 square kilometers. The 
plain is low-lying, largely between 3 meters and 15 meters above sea 
level. It was formed when the shallow lagoon behind a coastal sand bar 
was gradually built up with deposition from the several rivers flowing 
into it. At least by the seventh century, A.O., a low-lying, swampy plain 
had emerged (YKS 1968:112-119). 
The Mogami River, which bisects the plain, is a long, extensive river 
system that passes through a number of inland mountain basins before 
entering the plain at Kiyogawa (elevation 20 meters). Until quite 
recently, it traced a wide and meandering course across the plain to the 
Japan Sea. Throughout the Tokugawa period, its width and heavy discharge 
prevented the control necessary to exploit the river for irrigation and 
brought periodic flooding to the land on either side of its channel. 
Instead, it was the smaller river systems that drop to the plain in the 
north and south for short runs to the sea which were developed as water 
sources. 
In the Tokugawa period, it was possible to distinguish four separate 
river networks on the plain (Map 5). North of the Mogami River were the 
Gekko River, the Nikko-Arase Rivers, and the Aizawa River. This northern 
half of the plain is dominated by the volcanic cone, Mt. Chokai (2230 
meters). Dissection of its ash apron created a labyrinthine valley 
pattern that somewhat diluted the basin character of the northern plain; 
the rivers north of the Mogami tended to run west in parallel courses to 
the Japan Sea. 
The southern half of the plain displayed much more of a true basin 
character. The surrounding mountains, diluvial uplands, and coastal dunes 
caused the rivers to flow together at the center, forming a single 
drainage system, the Aka River basin, named for the largest in-flowing 
river (see Map 3 and Figure 1). As Table 8 indicates, the total drainage 
basin area was approximately 1126 square kil.ometers, of which almost three 
quarters was the mountainous upper basin. As mentioned in chapter one, 
the basin could be subdivided hydrologically into what I shall call the 
master stream drainage basin (that is, the Aka River proper), and two 
tributary stream systems, the Kyoden River system to the east and the 
· Oyama River system to the west. Both the Oyama and Kyoden Rivers and the 
streams feeding into them were quite small in discharge. There were, in 
Tokugawa times, several small canals constructed along and drawing water 
from upstream sections of both systems but the.y served only minimal 
acreages. 
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Figure 1: Schematic  drawing of master stream and principal 
tributary networks 
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Table 8 
·Watersheds and stream lengths in the Aka River drainage basin 
stream area in area on total water­
length mountain plain shed area 
(master stream) -
Otori-Aka River 78 km) 609 sq km 117 sq km . 728 sq km 
Benji River 30 
(Oyama tributary) 
Yushiri R -
Hi$hizu R Oyama R 25 86 76 162 
Yazawa R 
(Kyoden tributary)
Kurose R)
Sasa R � Fujishima R 40 109 127 236 
Kyoden R 36 1 
TOTAL 179 km* 804 sq km 320 sq km 1126 sq km 
*Total stream length exceeds 300 km with smaller tributaries 
Source : MAF 1959:7, 733 
The landform of the Aka River master stream system is composed of three 
sections: the mountainous upper reaches, an alluvial fan mid-section, and 
a broad, downstream deltaic plain. Figure 2 is a channel profile of the 
master stream. The Benji and Otori Rivers drop fairly steeply at a 1/45 
grade through the mountainous upper reaches, flowing together at Ochiai 
. .
{elevation 77 meters). The scouring actions of these headwaters and the 
high discharge in the spring following the snow melt can give the river a 
heavy sediment load, and from Ochiai, where the plain begins, the rather 
sudden loss of grade and wider flatland combine to rapidly reduce river 
velocity. This has resulted in the deposition of much of the heavier 
sediment load (the gravels and other coarse particles) at this point, 
forming over time an alluvial fan (cf. Bull 1977). 
Alluvial fan topography and river systems are common in Japan-­
geomorphologists count up to 800 of them (Koide 1974:44 ff.)-- and they
have several important implications for irrigation. As the Aka River 
built up more of a fan-shaped slope with successive sedimentation, its 
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natural channel was destabilized. The river was always stable as far 
downriver as Ochiai and Kumaide. · But prior to the 1605 embankment project 
at Kumaide, it had flowed off the fan and across the plain in several 
different channels, shifting abruptly from one to another at times of 
unusually high discharge (OA 1974, Koide 1975)e. 
Thus, a precondition of irrigation in such alluvial fan topography is 
the source control problem of stabilizing the river to prevent channel 
shifting. At the same time, if channel stabilization is successful, the 
grade of the alluvial fan will allow for gravity-flow canals taking off 
near the top of the fan and delivering water to fields throughout the 
downstream plain. Indeed, in the Aka River basin, excepting two small 
canals which had intakes farther up along the Sonji River, all master 
stream canals began close together along the alluvial fan. Moreover, the 
historical pattern of multiple river channels meant that lengths of these 
older natural channels could be modified and used as the main canals of 
these irrigation-drainage networks. 
The third landform section of the master stream drainage basin is the 
flat, low-lying deltaic plain, which begins where the alluvial fan levels 
off, roughly around the castle town of Tsuruoka. The river grade here 
ranged from 1/1000 to 1/3000 for its 20 kilometer run to the mouth of the 
Mogami River. Paddy land in this area was around 2-10 meters above sea 
level, and until the early 1600s, this part of the basin, like the eritire 
central portion of Shonai Plain, was a wet marshland of reeds and swamp 
grasses. 
The master stream in the alluvial fan section is the water source for 
the canal networks; in this downstream section, it serves a critical 
drainage function, receiving the discharge from the canal networks (which 
drain the paddy fields as well as supply them with water)e. Because of the 
flat grade, natural drainage is quite poor, and in the long course of 
river training projects, improving downriver drainage efficiency and 
capacity has demanded as much attention as improving upriver source 
controle. Of special concern to irrigators living in this downriver 
section was the frequent flooding around the confluence of the Aka River 
with the Oyama River tributary. This perennial problem was caused by the 
backing up of the river where it met the coastal dunes and was forced to 
turn ninety degrees north and follow the dunes to the Mogami River. 
The Aka River in the domain period was unstable and unpredictable not 
only because of its shifting channel pattern but also because of its 
variable river regieme. A river hydrograph (a graph of time variation of 
river flow), constructed from recent years' data, shows that the Aka River 
has a primary peak flow in April and May (due to the spring melt of snow 
in the upper basin), a secondary peak in November and December (due to 
late autumn rainfall), and two troughs of low water--during the mid-winter 
months of January and February and a more severe trough during the 
mid-summer months, bottoming in August (see Figure 3, Table 9 and Table 
10)e. 
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Table 10 
Flow characteristics of the Aka River at Kumaide, 1954-1961 
maximum normal low water drought lowest 
discharge discharge discharge discharge discharge 
1954 208.9 26.38 12.38 6.34 
1955 574 .1 
1956 284.3 
1957 696.7 
44.71 
45.10 
18.56 7.58 3.89 
26.39 14.57 11.05 
28.51 12 .29 9.25 
1958 601.6 57.75 41.66 28.65 21 �49 
1959 369.6 55.35 39.55 22.47 16.19 
1960 298 . 1  48.62 31.29 14.76 13.52 
1961 420 . 0  50.90 36.60 21 . 19 9.25 
MEAN 432 .0  46.04 29.37 15.98 11.28 
Note : All values are in cubic meters per second. 
Although this hydrograph is based on recent readings, I believe it 
broadly suggests flow characteristics for the domain period as well. In 
attempting to quantify river volume and variability in previous centuries, 
however, one encounters serious problems of evidence. An exhaustive 
search has uncovered no early long runs of water discharge values, even 
for the irrigation season only. Data since 1957 are of limited use 
because recent construction of two' large headwaters dams has greatly 
affected river discharge values. There are some scattered readings in the 
years 1930-1950 for those times in the summer months when river levels 
remained low long enough to require a special allocation among the main 
canals; the mean measured discharge for eight such readings was 13.05 
cubic meters/second (5/5 1968:336-368). And, a 1954 study of Aka River 
irrigation cited figures from the basin irrigation cooperative office of a 
"mean flow" for the two-month interval of May-June of 89.3 cunm/sec and 
for the subsequent interval of July-August of 17.6 cunm/sec (Shirakawa 
1954:26-27). These are admittedly inadequate bits of evidence, but I have 
tentatively accepted them in estimating that in the Tokugawa centuries, 
the mean river discharge for July-August was on the order of 17.6 cunm/sec 
and that there was considerable variation around this mean, both within 
the two-month interval and annually. 
I am also estimating that the mean discharge for the two-month interval 
· of May-June (corresponding to field preparation and tran$planting) was on 
the order of 90 cunm/sec, again with considerable variation. Rather than 
an absolute shortage of water, the more usual danger in these months was 
damage to irrigation works of high discharges and flooding; where 
3 9  
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facilities were damaged, flow was disrupted, and as it was a time of 
maximum demand and peak labor needs, shortages could and did develop. 
Again, though, it is difficult to quantify the flood volumes and 
frequency. The figure for bankfull stage (the incipient flood stage of 
the river} used by engineers in planning the dams in the 1950s was 2200 cu 
m/sec; given the extensive embankment works constructed in the alluvial 
fan section in this century, the domain period figure must have been much 
lower--and thus much more often exceeded. Records of domain period 
flooding will be discussed in chapter four, but it has been impossible to 
calculate a mean annual flood value (Leopold et al. 1964:63-66} or a 
coefficient of river regieme {kajo .keisu}. However all indications are of 
a highly unstable and variable flow in the Aka River. 
Soil 
As an alluvial and aggradational plain, the parent material of Shonai 
soil has come from the surrounding mountains--material scoured, carried 
down, and deposited by the rivers. In the Aka River basin, river flow and 
topography have combined to produce two distinct soil problems for 
cultivators. The larger sand and gravel particles dropped early from the 
river's sediment load to form the light soils of the alluvial fan. 
Lacking a thick clay topsoil, these soils were very permeable, with water 
percolation rates of 35-66 mm/24 hours when recently measured (MAF 1974}. 
Finer-grained sediment was carried farther downriver to form the clays 
and loams of the downriver plain (roughly, those fields below 15 meters 
elevation, about three-quarters of basin arable acreage). Here, the flat 
topography, lack of river control, and high water table waterlogged these 
potentially productive, dense clay loams to create permanently gley soils 
(soils in a constant reductive state}, with little percolation (12-18 
mm/24 hrs.)e.e3 9  
Soil is either in a state of oxidation or reduction, depending on the 
availability of oxygen. In oxidized state soils, aerobes are active 
while anaerobes are dormant; iron is oxidized, and the Fe+3 gives a 
brown or yellow-red color to the soil. In reductive layers, anaerobes, 
which are dormant when exposed to air or untra-violet light, become 
active; iron in the reduce Fe+2 state gives a blue or blue-gray color 
to the soil. The optimum condition in paddy soils is an alternation 
between oxidized and reduced soil states. 
Soil under standing water or permanently below the water table may 
be in a constant reductive state. Such soil, termed gley, is very 
unproductive because lack of oxygen means there is little breakdown of 
organic soil material to supply nutrients to crops and inadequate 
oxygen supply for crop root systemse. This '.is not to say that rice 
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Climate 
The Aka River basin has a temperate zone climate with distinct seasonal 
variation (Table 11). Tsuruoka is located at latitude 38d1143' N, roughly 
on a line with Washington, D.C., and Sacramento. Twentieth century 
temperatures produce a winter severe enough to limit rice cultivation to a 
single annual crop between mid-April and mid-October. There is an average 
of 190-210 frost-free days on the plain, and a continuous snow cover 
averaging 74 days (MAF 1974:54). 
It must be emphasized that as with most other aspects of the natural 
environment, our climatological data are restricted to the present
century. It  is only with considerable caution that inferences may be 
drawn about domain period climate. While the basic pattern of temperate 
zone seasonal variation without a summer monsoon was constant, it is 
well documented tht the centuries of 1550-1850 were a period of low mean 
temperature and early winters across much of the northern hemisphere
(compared to temperatures in the centuries preceding and following). This 
period is in fact known as the "Little Ice Age" (see Lamb 1972:chapters 
17, 18; Le Roy Ladurie 1971; Arakawa 1957). This would have meant for 
Tokugawa period Shonai a shorter growing season and cooler summer 
temperatures (though not necessarily more precipitation) than have 
prevailed in the present century. It is thus probable that twentieth 
century data understate the climatic restraints on domain period rice 
cultivation. 
The precipitation pattern in the drainage basin had varied consequences 
for irrigation and rice cultivation. Rainfall was moderate to heavy in 
the fall (October-November), which proved troublesome for drying fields 
for harvest operations and for field-drying the cut sheaves before 
threshing. The heavy winter snowfall was stored naturally in the upper 
basin; its release as the spring melt was of critical value to spring
planting, but there was no year-round cover and the melt ran off quickly.
In mean totals, summer precipitation in recent decades has been moderate,
suggesting an important source of mid-summer water needs. On closer 
inspection, however, summer rainfall has been highly variable and 
cultivation is impossible in gley soils. Even under standing water,
the surface soil (a few millimeters to a centimeter) will be oxidized 
through ion exchange with oxygen in the water. There can be oxidation 
layers below this as well, basedd.on the principle that water passing 
down between two soil particles will release dissolved oxygen as it 
comes out below because of the pressure change. Even in gley soils 
where the water table is high and drainage poor, careful construction 
of paddy soil, e.g., micro-layering, can bring about enough oxygen 
release around roots to cultivate rice. However, yields in such soils 
are low and unstable, and the cultivation work itself difficult. These 
soil conditions obtained in much of the basin until quite recently..
9 . 7  
4.6 
0.4 
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Table 11 
Climatological features of the lower Aka River basin 
mean daily
temperature
( o  C) 
Jan 0 . 6  
Feb 0 . 8  
Mar 3.5  
Apr 10.2 
May 15.7  
Jun 19 .3  
Jul 23.6 
Aug 25.2 
Sep 20 .8  
highest
daily temp 
( oc) 
3 . 7  
5 . 0  
7 . 5  
15.4 
21.3 
23.7 
27.7 
29.7 
2 5 . 3  
lowest 
daily temp 
( oc) 
-2 .3  
-2 .6  
- 0 . 6  
4.9 
10. 0  
14.7 
19.4 
20.6 
16 .3  
hrs. of 
sunshine 
56.0 
83. 2  
104 . 8  
158.4 
186 . 8  
172.0 
163.7 
221.4 
163.4 
precipitation 
(millimeters). 
214 
123 
116 
121 
113 
124 
242 
202 
231 
14.3 138 . 2  215Oct 19.0 
8 . 9  13.1 77.8  297Nov 
3.6 6.8  39 . 7  280Dec 
year 12.2 16.5 7 . 9  1565.4 2278 
Note : All measurements taken at the Tsuruoka measuring
station. Values are mean values for the years 1944-1976. 
Source:  Norinsh6 1945-1977. 
• • 
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concentrated in short, intense rainstorms that bring little usable 
precipitation to cultivators. For example, readings from 1945 to 1954 
show that an average of 40% of August's total precipitation fell in a 
single 24-hour period (Kelly 1980:75).4 0  
As a consequence of this pattern of concentrated rainfall and wide, 
annual fluctuations, there are often extended periods of dry weather in 
the summer months. Records of 11.dry weather" (kanten; a period of at least 
seven days with less than five millimeters total precipitation) from the 
Tsuruoka station from 1927 to 1962 show that the mean longest dry weather 
spell in a single year was 20.42 days. This ranged from 9 days in 1934 to 
54 days in 1943. The mean total of summer dry spells was nearly 60 days 
per summer, ranging from 37 days in the summer of 1935 to 92 days in 1943, 
virtually the entire summer (MAF 1974:72-3, 76). 
Another feature of the basin climate worrisome to cultivators was the 
low minimum temperatures in the summer, which could and did have a 
pronounced adverse effect on rice plant growth. 
For rice culture in the northern part of Japan low temperature 
is the most important climatic factor. Continuous low 
temperature throughout the vegetative growth period causes the 
delay of heading and results in a dramatic reduction in yield. 
But the effects of a short period of low temperature at the 
emergence or transplanting, as well as during the period from 
young panicle formation to flowering, are remarkable. (Hanyu 
1974:84)a. 
Extension service agents in Shonai presently consider the following 
temperatures to represent the danger levels below which plant growth is 
retarded in the basin (Onuma Wataru, personal communication)e: 
rooting - 12.5 - 15.5e° C
-tillering to flowering l8e° C 
ripening 20e° C 
Table 11 indicates that while daily highs approach 30e
° 
C in August, the 
hottest month, daily lows do not average much above 20e° c, the minimum 
temperature for ripening rice. Similarly, daily lows in late June and 
4 0  Not only did this pattern of concentrated rainfall limit the utility of 
summer precipitation for irrigation, but such storms caused much damage 
to irrigation facilities and paddy fields. Of the thirteen most 
. 
serious recorded floods in the Tokugawa period, nine occurred in the 
summer months and seem to have been the discharge of just such sudden 
storms. Teppo mizu, "rifle water,e11 was the term used to describe the 
first crest of flood water in the swollen river, pouring out of the 
mountains. 
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early July hover around what is presentlye-thought to be necessary minimum 
temperatures for healthy tillering and panicle formation. While these 
temperature danger levels are for present-day varieties, we will see that 
a frequent cause of harvest failure in the Tokugawa centuries was thought 
to be periods of low temperatures during the growing season. This 
indicates that basin irrigation had a vital role as a means of ground 
temperature maintenance and insulatione. 
Calculatinge� supply-demand balance 
We can see from this brief portrait that the basin environment posed 
problems in all four phases of irrigation. Source control required river 
control, and features of the topography and precipitation pattern 
presented intractable challenges. The river, destabilized by the alluvial 
fan topography, was disposed to run off the fan in a number of channels, 
though the alluvial fan landform itself acted to localize the source 
control problem; if the river reach around Kumaide could be stabilized, 
the master stream could become a major irrigation source. The steep grade 
of the upper basin, the spring snow melt, and the sudden, unpredictable
summer storms combined to present major high water problems while the 
minimal summer precipitation apart from the brief storms caused extremely 
low river discharges for much of the summer months. The low river 
discharge required weir construction, which was then threatened by the 
flood discharges following storms. 
The alluvial fan favored water delivery through dendritic, multi-level 
networks from the fan on both sides of the master stream. The numerous 
channels traced by the master stream in the past could be, and were, 
modified into main delivery canals without large investments of labor and 
materials .  The flattening out of the river in its downstream reach 
discouraged intakes below the alluvial fan (as in settling Narita-shinden, 
they were occasionally attempted but failed)e. 
Water was used in the basin almost exclusively for rice cultivation, 
and characteristics of the rice plant and of the paddy field had several 
effects on the strategy and volume of use. Water served a variety of 
functions through the growing season, supplying nutrients to plant and 
soil, renewing soil fertility, protecting the plant against temperature, 
wind, disease, and insect damage, and so on. This not only required a 
judicious strategy of continuous adjustments in paddy field water levels, 
but also, as a consequence, made it very difficult to determine a 
minimally adequate water volume. The multi-purpose nature of water left 
considerable room for disagreement in allocation disputes. This was 
compounded by the wide variation in water percolation rates between 
upstream and downstream soils; all else equal, water permeated upstream 
soils two to three times faster than downstream soils.e · The upstream areas 
thus could have a much higher consumption of water. Finally, the critical 
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need for water following transplanting and around flowering intensified 
disputes at those times. 
The nature of rice cultivation makes drainage a problem of equal rank 
to delivery, affecting both plant growth and long-term soil fertility. 
Drainage was quite adequate in the upstream area (too good perhaps), but 
in the flat, low-lying downriver plain area, the clay loam soil was 
compacted and water-logged much, if not all, of the year. This was not 
simply a matter of local field drainage but was related to the sluggish 
and flat master stream and tributaries, all of which were trunk drainage 
canals for the master stream basin. 
Taken together, characteristics of the Aka River basin environment 
would appear to have favored technical solutions involving a basin-wide 
integration of the physical system. Control of the master stream as water 
source and of the master stream and tributaries as drainage channels was 
absolutely critical to satisfying water needs, assuring stable yields, and 
·maximizing expansion of paddy lands throughout the basin. A piecemeald
approach could prove dangerous; improvements in upstream source control,
for example, would only increase river velocity, which in turn would 
exacerbate downstream drainage problems. And, by the nature of the three 
large canal networks,d.dirrigators in those service areas were faced with 
both upstream flood control and delivery problems and downstream poor 
drainage conditions .d. In this sense, basin irrigators were implicated
together in source control, delivery, use, and drainage problems by the 
basin topography, precipitation pattern, stream flow, etc. The situation 
would appear to have called ·for an integrated organizational approach to 
the tasks of irrigation. That extensive, centralized organization, either 
articulated to the domain or autonomously developed by the water users 
themselves, did not emerge is thus all the more striking and 
problematical. 
Or was it not surprising? Was there such a surplus of water supply 
over demand that a decentralized and unorganized approach to irrigation
tasks could be tolerated? Drawing up a supply-demand balance involves at 
least three precarious estimates. First, there is supply; figures were 
introduced for river discharge at Kumaide (that is, river water available 
to the main canal intakes) of 89.3 cubic meters per second (mean value for 
the two-month interval of May-June; higher in May and lower in June) and 
17.6 cudm/sec (mean value for the two-month interval of July-August). 
Averaged into the July-August mean are the flood discharges from brief 
storms so usable discharge is actually lower by an undetermined degree. 
Moreover, supply was not only seasonably variable but also fluctuated from 
year to year; it was estimated that with a mean frequency of one in every 
two years, discharge dropped below 15 cudm/sec for periods long enough to 
have caused inter-main canal disputes in the present century. 
Second, there is demand per unit area, the duty of water. Given the 
multiple uses of water in rice cultivation and soil variations in the 
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basin, it is impossible to determine precisely demand values for the 
Tokugawa period. It is also difficult to infer these values from present 
duties of water because of substantial changes in rice varieties and 
growing techniques. There have been essentially two shifts in cultivation 
·practices since the domain period.d Around the turn of the century, there 
was an introduction of horse-drawn plowing together with a gradual 
adoption of purchased fertilizers (dried fish cakes, oil cakes, and 
others), rectangularization of fields, and changes in germination 
techniques, seed bed preparation, and transplanting methods. This pattern 
continued until the 1960s, when changes such as mechanization, increased 
chemical fertilizer/pesticide use, and another redesign of paddy fields 
have brought a second complete reform of cultivation practices. 
There was, however, in the period of roughly 1900-1960, a figure for 
average duty of water in basin paddy fields developed by the Aka River 
Irrigation Cooperative for use in allocations during the summer months 
among the main canals (Shirakawa 1954:27).· This was 0.023 cu m/sec/10 ha,
and apparently represented a minimal demand volume during the period from 
transplanting to ripening (June through August). We know too that the 
accepted estimate of the water demand differential between the pre-horse 
plowing cultivation pattern of the Tokugawa period and the post-1900 
pattern was on the order of 1.4-�that is, the newer techniques required on 
the average during the season 1 .4 times the previous water volume (see the 
1897 report for the Aka River Irrigation Cooperative by the engineer Nagao 
in S/S 1968:170-181, especially page 177). If these figures are used,
they yield a value of 0.016 cubic meters per s.econd per 10 hectares as an 
average minimal water demand rate for Tokugawa period cultivation 
practices. It is not a figure that can be used with much confidence, but 
it represents the best estimate we have. 
Third, total water demand for the basin acreage must be calculated. I 
have been able to compute reasonably accurate service area acreage figures 
for the end of the domain period (1870) but can only develop gross
estimates of acreage earlier in the period by inferring from the pace and 
extent of paddy land expansion (these inferences are detailed in chapters 
5 and 6). In 1870, total acreage served by the nine alluvial fan intake 
main canals was about 9,430 ha; in 1750, it is estimated to have been on 
the order of 8,000 ha, and in 1650, roughly 5,000 ha. 
Using the above supply and demand values, the following estimates 
obtain: 
87 
c.1650 c.1750 c.1870-
acreage . served : 5000 ha 8000 ha 9430 ha 
duty of water: .016 cudm/ .016 cudm/ .016 cudm/ 
(June-Aug. mean) sec/10 ha sec/10 ha sec/10 ha 
total demand: 8.0 cudm/sec 12.8 cudm/sec 15.0 cudm/sec 
(June-Aug. mean) 
river volume : 89.3 cudm/sec 89.3 cudm/sec 89.3 cudm/sec 
(May-June) 
river volume: 17.6 cudm/sec 17.6 cudm/sec 17.6 cudm/sec 
(July-Aug.) 
These estimates indicate that throughout the domain period, the mean river 
discharge in May and June was more than enough to satisfy water needs; 
problems in these months included the disruption of delivery due to damage
to irrigation works by high discharge and shortages in mid- to late-June 
after the snow melt and when the mean discharge was falling to July-August 
levels. 
By July and August, the margin of supply over demand was much smaller; 
in fact, there are two additional factors to be considered that further 
reduced the margin: in-transit losses (such as evaporation and seepage in 
delivery canals) and non-irrigation demandsd. I have chosen to use a 10% 
in-transit loss value based on measurements several decades ago along the 
still unlined canals (see Shirakawa 1954); this is a very conservative 
estimate, and losses even in recent years have run as high as 25%-30%. 
The only non-ir�igation use of the river water in the alluvial fan section 
was an allocation to the castle town of Tsuruoka for municipal and 
domestic uses and for castle moat maintenance. This was delivered by 
means of a branch of the Shoryujigawa Main Canal and amounted to 
approximately 15% of the river discharge. 
In-transit losses and the Tsuruoka town allotment thus amounted to at 
least 25% or 4.4 cudm/sec of the river discharge, reducing the available 
supply to paddy fields to 13.2 cudm/sec. This is 1.9 cudm/sec below the 
1870 demand figure and only fractionally above the estimatedd_ 1750 demand 
figure. It is still well above estimated demand in 1650. 
Figures once produced have a way of gathering an aura of authority, and 
it must be remembered that these figures rest uneasily on informed but 
highly speculative inferences. Still, if they even roughly approximate 
the domain period conditions, they suggest that by at least 1750, water 
demand was approaching available supply. Given the annual fluctuations 
and given any departure from ' equal' allocation, one may expect that by 
the mid-1700s shortages would not have been uncommon. They suggest, then, 
that expansion of the service areas through development of new paddy land 
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in the first 150 years of the domain period made water supply relative to 
demand increasingly tight in the last 120 years of the period. It cannot 
be for lack of supply-demand imbalances nor for lack of irrigation 
problems posed by the. natural environment that strong elite control or 
effective water user organization did not emerge throughout the domain 
period. 
' 
. 
Chapter IV 
MANAGEMENT OF THE RIVER 
We have seen in the previous chapter that irrigators using the Aka 
River had to contend with highly variable discharge volumes that could 
bring both flooding and drought within a single irrigation season. Sudden 
spring thaws and mid.,.summer rain storms could swell the river above 3500 
cudm/sec and quickly overflow channel banks, damaging irrigation intakes,
canals, and paddy fields (as well as threatening life and property in 
villages ·and castle town). Moreover, field drainage back through the 
canal networks and into the master stream and tributaries frequently
threatened the low-lying downstream plain with inundation. On the other 
hand, the steep grade in the headwaters and the normal summer .
precipitation patterns reduced river flow by August at the critical time 
of rice plant flower�ng to perhaps 15-20 cudm/sec. 
Inaba ' s  embankment construction and channel diversion project in 1605-6 
did provide a modicum of stability for the river course in the alluvial 
fan, but it did little to moderate the variable flow. After that, 
throughout"the domain period, there were only very modest efforts to 
further control the river. There was repeated flood damage, .downstream
drainage problems, and water shortages within the delivery networks. The 
few river projects of the period were usually handled through the domain 
administration. Yet despite the modest efforts and continued problems, 
there is little surviving evidence of either debilitating conflict or 
water user organization at the river level. This chapter examines these 
points in some detail. 
Domain officials could and did exercise jurisdiction over the major 
rivers in Shonai, including the Aka River. While particular projects 
might on occasion be assigned to a special officer ,  general river matters 
were administered through the rural magistrates (gun-bugyo). The 
headwaters and alluvial fan secion of the Aka River basin fell within.
Kishibiki District; in the downstream section, the east bank lands 
. 
were 
part of Nakagawa District while the west bank lands lay within Kyoden 
District. Because there was one magistrate post for every two districts, 
there were thus two magistrates, the Kushibiki-Nakagawa magistrate and the 
Kyoden-Yamahama magistrate , with jurisdictional responsibility along the 
master stream. 
,.. 89 . ·  
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River repairs and projects, like all rural civil construction, were 
formally initiated by local petition from villages through the village 
group headman (ojoya) to the rural magistrate--for example, by headmen of 
villages in an area that had suffered damage from breached river 
embankments. Each rural magistrate had under him several officials for 
project estimates and supervision. Upon receipt of a petition, an initial 
survey was made by an assessor (wariyaku), who would draw up a plan, 
estimate costs and labor, and propose labor quotas (i .e . ,  how many 
laborers from which areas) .  These plans were then checked by a general 
assistant to the magistrate (shitayaku)e. If estimated labor was below 
1000 laborer-days, construction could be authorized by the assistant; if 
the estimate exceeded 1000 laborer-days, it was necessary for the rural 
magistrate to survey the site personally. For a particularly costly 
project, approval by the council of elders might be necessary. 
The general assistant then supervised the approved project, aided by 
surveyors (otsuetsuki and kotsuetsuki) and materials procurement officers 
(kishiba shoharai yaku).  These latter two roles (and that of wariyaku) 
were seasonal and filled by peasants in each district; they were paid with 
a small rice allowance by the district deputy, for which the villages of 
the district were assessed. 4 1  
River repairs and projects were one form of g�-fushin, a term which 
referred to all civil construction outside of the towns that was 
underwritten by the domaine. This included irrigation facilities, bridges, 
and roads as well as river repairs. Such projects were financed by a 
fixed annual levy on all villages in the domain, amounting to 3.5% of 
assessed village yield (muradaka) .  It was payable in rice and collected 
as part of the general tax payment (one of the miscellaneous taxes; see 
chapter 2). Two-thirds of this total g5-fushin tax (known as sadame-mai 
and san-ka-ichi-mai) were alloted to the rural magistrates and the 
remaining one-third (called go-fushin-mai) to the domain rural affairs 
officers (gundai) .  The budget for the domain rural affairs officers would 
allow them to subsidize particularly expensive repairs or projects that a 
single rural magistrate could not cover with his budget. If the rural 
affairs officers did not use their full allotment in the course of the 
year, the balance could be released to the rural magistrates (YKS 
196lb:266 ).  It has been estimated by Sato and Shimura (S/S 1966:8) that 
the annual expenditure for Aka River projects was about 1700 koku; I would 
hazard the supposition that much of this amount was expended for flood 
damage repairs to the Shoryujigawa intake and to the alluvial fan section 
41  This section is based on the document, "Stipulations for Civil 
Construction and Requisitioning of Men and Animals in the Rural Areas 
of the Domain,e" (Go-gofushin narabi go-kata jinma-wari sadame-kaki) ,  
circulated in 1730 by the domain rural affairs officer through the 
rural magistrates to the villages of the domain (YKS 196lb:266-67; YKS 
1980:103-105).  
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embankments. 
Labor services were also requisitioned for domain public works 
projects; if called upon for a project by the rural magistrate within 
whose district it lay, a village was required to provide up to seven 
corvee workers per 100 koku of assessed village yield. A small daily wage 
was paid to those above that number. Although labor was drawn generally 
from the area that would benefit from the project, the rural magistrate 
could requisition workers from other areas if local numbers were 
insufficient. This could on occasion function as a form of public
assistance in so far as it provided temporary employment for poorer 
peasants. 
For certain brief periods (for example, 1720�30), these procedures were 
replaced by an alternative method, by which the domain contracte.d with 
townsmen to undertake civil construction and repair projects
(chonin-ukeoi-sei). It is not clear why the domain would turn to 
contracting, but documents (cited in Sato 1967) indicate that it was 
dropped because of poor performance and alleged profiteering by the 
contractors. 
Barring serious damage demanding immediate attention, the calendar of 
civil construction seems to have been as follows. In February and March, 
surveys and decisions about prospective projects were made by domain 
officials. Actual work, especially work on the intakes from the river, 
began in late March and continued until about the middle of May, when 
laborers returned home for transplanting. The period from late June 
through mid-August was often devoted to river embankment repairs, because 
the river was quite low in these summer months. With a break for the obon 
festival ,  projects could continue until mid-September ,  when the workers 
returned home for harvest. There was a final work season following
harvest , from mid-October until mid-November when winter halted most 
projects (see Shoji and Sato 1962 : 93ff.). 
Such were the procedures by which repairs and new construction along
the domain rivers were to be handled. During the domain period, however ,  
there appear to have been few major river improvement projects or 
significant river construction along the Aka River--or, for that matter,
on other domain rivers. It is true that following the original river 
channel diversions by Niizeki in 1605-6, there were few recor.ded shifts in 
the natural course of the main river requiring major repair or digging. 
At the same time, there is little evidence of efforts to train the Aka 
River further to alleviate the persistent problems of flooding and 
drainage that plagued the basin throughout the domain period. 
As one might expect, there are less than full details available to 
document this persistency and to quantify flood occurrences. Table 12 
summarizes dates of known Aka River flooding, but these probably refer 
only to those which caused damage to the castle town and surrounding area. 
- · 
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The dates come from mid-nineteenth century sources, which probably 
explain$ the concentration of dates in the period, 1820-1860. In this 
forty-year period, there were thirteen recorded floods, seven of which 
were notated demizu and six of which, either kozui or daikozui. Demizu 
refers to flood levels which breach the river banks and damage areas 
commonly so inundated; kozui refers to unusually high discharges that 
flood an even larger area. Along the Aka River, the sections of the 
natural levees most frequently breached were, on the right bank, those · · · 
between the Inaba Main Canal intake and Matsuo and Akagawa Villages below. 
On the left bank, breaks often occurred between (and including) the 
Shoryujigawa Main Canal intake and Ise-yokouchi Village. That is, the 
river reach from the top of the alluvial fan to around Tsuruoka remained 
vulnerable to heavy discharges.d42 
Table 12 shows that most reported flood discharges were in mid�summer, 
following a sudden rain, and written reports typically note that the 
Shoryujigawa Main Canal intake and/or surrounding embankments were damaged
and breached by the high water; this is of course the section where 
Niizeki built the original channel diversion embankments. This happened, 
for example, on August 11, 1833; rain began the night before, and by early 
morning the river had reached bankfill stage and then broke through the 
embankments. In a later report to the shogunate, the domain said that the 
river rose 3.9 meters above normal level, and that 84,841 koku of lands 
were damaged by subsequent flooding. Then, a month and a half later, 
there was a second heavy discharge which destroyed over 2000 meters of 
levees and embankments as well as damaging the ShBryujigawa intake works 
and parts of the Nakagawa Main Canal (for contemporary accounts of the 
1833 flooding, see OA 1974:704 and OB 1974 :98-99). 
Following this second flooding, the domain did finance a project to 
reinforce the levees between Ishino-shinden and Matsuo Villages on the 
right bank with a stone embankment. But significantly, other than and. 
attempt to rechannel a short section of the river between Ise-yokouchi and 
Daihoji in the late 1850s, this is the only evidence of any attempt to 
improve source control and river training in the entire two and one-half 
centuries. It would appear that the common response to recurring flooding 
was simply to repair the damaged irrigation works, breached levees, and 
42 Though circumstantial to the domain period, the more carefully recorded 
flooding in the immediate post-domain Meiji era is further evidence of 
persistent Aka River problems. Flood records exist for 1869.6, 1870.7, 
1872.6 ,  1875.? ,  1879.7, and 1881. ?. In the 1879.7 flooding, almost 
4000 hectares were inundated, while in 1881. ? ,  about 2900 hectar�s were
said to suffer flood damage. A river engineer estimated in 1897 that 
the 1879 and 1881 flood discharges exceeded 3750 cudm/sec. In the next 
fourteen years, from 1882 to 1896, another ten floods were recorded, 
with damage ranging from 150 to 1000 ha (Aka River Irrig Coop 
1902 :33-41 } .  
#3 
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Table 12 
Reported flooding along the Aka River in the domain period 
year month/day note year month/day note 
1663 Aug 12 #1 1827 late Aug/ 
1664 Aug 30 #2 early Sept 
1674 Aug 1828 Aug
1682 May 1833 Aug 11 #6 
1686 late Jun/ 1833* late Sept/ #6 
early Jul early Oct 
1726 Sept 1837* 
1729 Sept 2 
Aug1744 
1839* Aug
1840* Aug
1753 Aug 1845* Sept
1795 late Aug/ 1850* Aug
early Sept 1852 
1808 April #4 1854* late Sept/ #7 
1822 Aug 19 #5 early Oct 
1861 Jan 
* = demizu (see text) 
Notes : 
#1: damage to Shoryujigawa intake 
#2: damage to Shoryujigawa intake ,  five bridges destroyed
along Uchi River 
#3: A 127.4 meter stretch of the Shoryujigawa intake 
embankment was breached, and flood waters II surged" into the . 
Uchi River, raising its height to 4.6 meters above normal. 
#4: flood level discharge due to sudden spring thaw 
#5: A 63.7 meter stretch of the embankments around 
Shoryujigawa intake broke in high water caused by sudden, 
heavy rains. 
#6: discussed in text 
#7: Over 600 meters of river levees were breijched. 
Sources : OA 1974: 702-7; S/S 1966:293-5; Aka 
River Irrig Coop 1902:33-41 
' 
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channel banks through standard domain public works procedures. 
For basin water users, of course, the Aka River served a dual role: in 
the headwaters and alluvial fan sections, it was their principal water 
source, while in its downstream section, .it was the. ultimate drainage 
outlet. In several respects, the downstream stretch of the Aka River 
presented even more complicated water flow difficulties than the alluvial 
fan mid-section. The flat grade through the low-lying deltaic plain meant 
a sluggish flow, which was further disrupted by the ninety-degree turn the 
channel was forced to make just below its confluence with .ethe Oyama River 
tributary, where it met the coastal dunes and was turned north. Then, in 
addition to the flood discharges from the spring melt and mid-summer 
storms, the downstream stretch also had to handle the drainage discharges 
from the entire Shoryujigawa Main Canal service area, from a small 
southwest corner of the plain serviced by the upper Oyama River tributary, 
and from a part of the Nakagawa Main Canal service area.e13 
Broadly speaking, there were two types of projects along this 
downstream stretch in the domain period: embankment building and channel 
straightening. The first was typically undertaken by individual villages 
at the time of first settlement; subsequent embankment repairs might 
receive domain financial assistance. The few instances of channel 
straightening were more extensive, involving labor from a number of 
villages and financial backing and technical direction from the domain, 
through its public works procedures. 
Given the finer sand and silt sediment depositions in the downstream 
area and its very low elevation at or just above sea level, the river 
never built up very high natural levees; as chapter three described, the 
water table was high, and the soil waterlogged for much of the year. 
Thus, when this area began to be developed for paddy lands in the middle 
to late 1600s, an initial task of new settlements was to build up and 
reinforce the river banks--both for protection of village, fields, and 
irrigation channels and for improved drainage. It is instructive to 
return here to the example of Narita-shinden to understand the 
inter-village disputes that could ensue. 
43 The Shoryujigawa service area drained into the master stream proper and 
into the Yushiri-Oyama tributary network, which then emptied into the 
master stream. Perhaps 35%-40% of the Nakagawa service area drained 
into the master stream while the balance, as �ell as all of the Inaba 
Hain Canal service area, drained into the Kyoden-Fujishima River 
tributary network. The Kyoden-Fujishima network had less of an effect 
on the master stream than the Yushiri-Oyama because it joined the 
master stream just above its outflow into the Mogami River at Sakata. 
The Kyoden-Fujishima River did share many of the same problems as the 
master stream, and it would contribute to the backing up of the master . ' 
stream. 
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Obana Village, just upstream of Narita-shinden along the Oyama River 
and predating it in time, had built a 692 meter embankment perpendicular 
to the Oyama River (known as a yokodote) along the downstream boundary of 
its lands. When Narita Heizaemon founded his village in 1658, Obana 
Village, afraid that the development would increase the discharge into the 
Oyama River and cause a backing up of the flow, made Narita promise to 
assume maintenance responsibility for the yokodote. Narita agreed but 
1then proceeded to build embankments all around his villagees lands, both 
along the Aka River and the Oyama River (see Map 4). The effect was to 
aggravate seriously Obana Villagee1 s f�ood danger as water would now back 
up much farther and faster along the Oyama River. Ironically, the better 
maintained the yokodote was, the worse the problem for Obana. 
First records of the dispute between the two villages followed a flood 
in 1789, during which the yokodote was damaged. Narita villagers promptly 
repaired it, but later, villagers from Obana (and Tenshindo, which joined 
with Obana) broke it down. An agreement was reached through the 
conciliation of several village headmen and the Kyoden Village Group 
headman by which Obana and Tenshindo were to fix the embankment, but they 
delayed doing so. More flooding in 1795 caused further damage, and in 
1796, Narita-shinden persuaded the district deputy to order its repair by 
Obana. Obana then shifted tactics and claimed that the customary height 
of the embankment was much lower than that at which Narita-shinden had 
maintained it (the recent flood damage had apparently much altered its 
height and shape) and that furthermore it was not a designated domain 
public works site (implying that the district deputye' s  order was not 
binding). The dispute eventually reached the attention of the domain 
rural affairs officer, one of the few irrigation-drainage cases that we 
are certain did reach that f·ar. An inspection of old domain records 
yielded a 1715 document mentioning the yokodote embankment with 
measurements of 692 meters long, 7.3 meters wide, and 1.2-1.5 meters high 
and with a designation as a gofushin-tokoro (a "domain public works 
place"). Narita-shindene1 s contention was thus confirmed, but sporadic 
disputes about the embankmente1 s maintenance continued through the domain 
period.◄◄  
A year later, in 1802, Obana Village joined with Tenshinao and 
Higashi-nonuma Villages to build an embankment along the Oyama River, but 
in so doing it became embroiled in another dispute. This embankment, 
connecting with existing ones upstream at Kakuda-futakuchi and downstream 
along Narita-shinden lands, provided a measure of protection for the right 
bank lands. Conversely, it caused the left bank villages to bear the 
brunt of high water discharges. The result was a prolonged disagreement 
This discussion is based on 35 pages of documents relating to the 
dispute copied by the Narita-shinden Village headman in 1803 from 
petitions, directives, 
in Ose 1952). 
etc. at the district deputy office (published 
.. .  
, 
.� . 
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between right bank and left bank villages (including a rivalry to see who 
could build and maintain the higher embankment) that was not resolved 
until a quarter of a century after the domain period as part of a 
comprehensive project of river training along the Oyama River, which also 
settled the ayama-Narita dispute (YKS 1968 :329-31). 
An alternative river training strategy to improve drainage and high 
water discharge is channel straightening, which increases the flow 
velocity. A number of villages in the downstream area (including both 
Obana and Narita-shinden) joined to petition the domain repeatedly in the 
Kyoho era (1716-1736) for a project to rechannel the master stream into a 
straighter course from Inoko to Sakanobe (about 3.64 km). These were all 
turned down, but in 1732, the domain did agree to a small project whiche · 
would improve_the channel from Kuromori to Sakanobe (about 1.85 km), that 
is, from the Oyama confluence to the outlet at the Mogami River. From 
project documents, it appears that 150 workers were used for five days in 
July of that year; they were recruited from 11 villages in the downstream 
area at the rate of 3.35 workers per 100 koku of assessed village yield. 
The 1732 project was said to have improved drainage, but in 1747, after 
particularly severe flooding at the Oyama-master stream confluence, the 
villages petitioned anew for improvements to the river channel between 
Narita and Kuromori; the domain, however, rejected the proposal, citing 
the fact that it had on-going projects elsewhere in the domain. 
Finally, in 1840, a joint petition of nine villages on the left bank of 
the Oyama and on both sides of the master stream below the confluence 
proposed that the domain organize a project to dig an excess water channel 
through the coastal dunes at Kuromori to allow direct access to the sea. 
The domain refused, citing the heavy expenses such a project would 
require. This coastal dune cut-off was not done until the 1920s; it did 
substantially ameliorate the flooding and drainage problems that continued 
up to that time (YRS 1968:328-331; Aka River Irrig Coop 1905:11-13; S/S. 
1966:9-10)e. 
In sum, there would appear to have been very. little change in either 
the degree or techniques of river training for high water discharges.
There were some embankments constructed around new villages in the 
downstream area and an occasional attempt at channel straightening in both 
the upstream and downstream areas, but most work consisted of repairs of 
natural levee breaks and damage to irrigation intakes and canals caused by 
high water discharges. This is surprising because damage was continual in 
the downstream area and frequent in the alluvial fan sections--not only in 
terms of facility damage but also in terms of crop losses from inundation, 
long-term effects on soil from water-logging, and difficulties in 
· cultivation practices (e.g., harvesting is much more difficult when fields 
do not drain properly and remain wet). Domain public works procedures 
worked well enough to handle repairs, but the petitions for new projects 
that were consistently rejected by the domain ,reveal its unwillingness to 
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invest in more permanent and preventive solutions to high water and 
drainage problems. At the same time, there were few instances of 
supra-village level organizational initiatives alternative to domain 
administration. 
In addition to river training, another facet of source control in the 
basin was the headwaters forest, which is said to have been actively 
managed by the domain for the purpose of watershed conservation, although 
there are no surviving records that clearly express this intent (Aka River 
Irrig Coop 1904; S/S 1966:140). Forestlands, like major rivers, were 
within the jurisdiction of the rural magistrates. Each had in his office 
four assistants for forestry affairs, two for each of the two districts 
the magistrate was assigned. In the forestlands themselves, guards (yama 
mori) were appointed from nearby villages (Shoji and Sat� 1962:93ff. ) .  
Forestlands actually presented an ill-defined pattern of multiple 
ownership and usufruct, due in part to the multiple and renewable resource 
nature of forest lands at the timee. Grass was cut for fodder, compost, 
and green fertilizer; brush and small trees were used for firewood, while 
brush and larger trees were used for charcoal-making; the larger trees 
were also felled for construction timbers; stones were gathered for 
various building purposes; wild plants were gathered for food and 
medicine; and even earth was excavated for fill in embankment projects. 
As with arable lands and surface water, the domain lord's claim, 
however preeminent, was not exclusive. In contrast to arable land, 
though, there was in Shonai no survey and registry of forestlands, nor 
were rights assigned to the extent that individual households or villages 
incurred tax obligations. Rather, forestland usufruct (known as 
iriai-ken}, like that of rivers, was based on certain customary uses of 
its resourcese. Forestland was divided and claimed territorially by 
settlement village units, which treated 'their' forest as commons and were 
allowed to regulate entry and use. Such customary claims to regulation 
and use predated the Tokugawa period in many parts of the country and some 
areas of Shonai Domain .e1 5  
1 5  With 85% of Japanese land at a slope greater than 15 degrees and little 
of that settled or cultivated, forestland is generally synonomous with 
mountain land and is extensive and valuabelee. The history of iriai-ken 
is long and complex (see Kawashima et al. 1959), but specification of 
and contention over rights typically reflected the value of the 
forestland resources. Where commercial exploitation was feasible, 
vertical disputes between villages, merchants, and domain lord were 
frequent; where population density was high, horizontal disputes 
between villages were common. 
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Yet it was probably not difficult for the domain to manage forestland 
in the Aka River headwaters for watershed conservation--that is, to 
regulate timber cutting. This part of the. basin was sparsely settled 
(about twenty villages in the 550 sq km of the upper basin) and rather 
·inaccessible to villages on the plain. There was little commerciald
logging; the domain satisfied its needs by requiring headwaters villages 
to deliver cut logs in payment of their tax levies.d46 
Maintaining a forest cover in the headwaters retards surface run-off 
and thus not only reduces the force of a sudden spring thaw or a 
mid-summer storm but also in so doing may increase the river volume in the 
following low-water periods. However, the average August discharge of 
only 15-20 cudm/sec suggests that even a well-maintained forest cover in 
an extensive headwaters was of limited value. A more effective solution 
to the low water troughs would have been ponding behind dams along the 
river or tributary streams, but I do not believe an appreciable reservoir 
storage along the Aka River was within the technology of the period. In 
fact, large ·storage volumes were not possible until the dam construction 
of the 1950s. Ponding has had at least a 1600-year history in Japan, but 
headwaters damming of the large and fast rivers of northeast Japan has 
been beyond all but the most recent engineering. 
On the other hand, from a technical standpoint, it would not have been 
surprising to have seen further training of the Aka River channel in light 
of major advances in river and flood control engineering in the sixteenth 
These logs were floated down the river to Tsuruoka, and together with 
small boat navigation between Tsuruoka and Sakata and water for 
municipal and castle moat supply, constituted those alternative uses of 
Aka River water potentially competitive with irrigation. The logs were 
known as 11 8-shaku trees" (hasshaku-ki) because an itaya kaede tree (a
kind of maple) 8 shaku long (2.42 m) with a trunk diameter of 1 shaku 
(0.303 m )  was set as a standard equivalent of 1 bag of rice tax. 
Because of possible damage to the Shoryujigawa Main Canal intake , a 
special intake was built below the Shoryujigawa intake for the logs, 
which were then floated into the main canal channel to the Uchi River 
and by the Uchi River into Tsuruoka. There was a complaint in 1726 by 
eleven downstream villages asking the domain rural affairs officer to 
prevent any use of the river by the loggers until after the irrigation 
season; they claimed that to move the logs through the Uchi River to 
Tsuruoka required that an extra volume of water be diverted from the 
main channel into the Uchi River, reducing the volume to downstream 
branch canals at a time when they were suffering shortages. There is, 
however, no further evidence of any problems between loggers and 
irrigators, and I judge the logging to have been of minor consequence 
and competition to the irrigators. Indeed, the available evidence 
shows few conflicts between irrigators and other river water users 
(boatmen, loggers, municipal users), in sh.arp contrast to the problems 
99 
to eighteenth centuries, especially in central Japan; these included 
various techniques of embanking, diking, double-banking, controlled 
flooding, and so forth developed by engineers of several domains and the 
shogunate. These would not necessarily have improved source control along 
the Aka River because of the upstream location· of the intakes, but it 
certainly would have mitigated some of the serious drainage problems in 
the downstream areas as well as the general flood danger along the length 
of the river. 
The reasons for domain reluctance to sponsor major river training 
projects such as dredging and rechanneling were probably more financial 
than. technical, as its rejection of the request for a direct Aka River 
cut-off through the coastal dunes reflects. The labor requirements of 
such projects exceeded normal corvee requisitions and would have drained 
increasingly tight domain income. Moreover, the domain would have left 
itself open to ·further claims on its public works funds. Given a respect 
for precedents, a site which once obtained public works assistance could 
thereafter have expected to receive continued support for repairs. And, 
as irrigation cooperative members discovered in the Meiji era when they 
obtained river training improvements in the alluvial fan .esection, a 
project which improved river flow in the midstream section exacerbated 
flow in unimproved downstream sections; the domain, in improving one 
section of the river, might have found it necessary to improve other, 
adversely affected sections. And finally, investment in _such river 
projects along the Aka River might have increased pressure to assist major 
training of other troublesome rivers such as the Nikko and Arase Rivers 
north of the Mogami. 
'. 
Instead, the basin irrigators dealt with the mid-summer stretches of 
, 
low river levels by setting out temporary weirs at least part way across 
the river at the intakes to the larger main canals; it is not clear if the 
weirs were used at the very small intakes. The weirs were used to raise 
the river level at the point of intake and to direct river water towards 
the intake cut. They consisted of a line of triangular stake frames, a 
common construction known as ushi-kura and used for river control and 
diversion weirs in Japan at least_ as far back as the eighth century, AD 
(Aki 1975 : 484-6). Cut poles were joined with straw rope to form a 
triangular frame and then weighted down with sand-filled bags. These 
frames would be set in a line perpendicular to the flow. Stakes might be 
driven into the river bed along the upstream side of the log frames and 
then faced with straw mats, rocks, and packed mud. These weirs .were 
usually set out in late June, after the spring snow melt and at the start 
of the summer low water period. 
along other rivers, such as the Takahashi in Okayama (S/S 1974 :329-35). . . 
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The weirs were maintained as part of the intake works of the delivery 
canal networks, and details of the Shoryujigawa and Nakagawa weirs and 
intakes will be taken up in the following chapters.e· For the moment, in 
terms of source control, the issue raised by the use of the weirs in low 
river water periods is that of allocation of the source water among the 
several delivery networks. Determining this allocation, though, raises 
again the intractable problem of studying historical irrigation, the 
confounding paucity and incompleteness of documentary evidence. 
Amazingly, there survives only a single reference to the allocation of Akae· 
River water during the entire domain period. 
This reference appears in the course of a 1794 petition from and 
official response to villages of three tailend branch canals of the 
Shoryujigawa Main Canal, which sought some relief to water shortages (S/S 
1974e:88). One of their three requests was that the line of triangular 
frames that composed the Shoryiijigawa weir be extended alt the way across 
the Aka River. The petition was forwarded to the district deputy by the 
village group headman and was the subject of discussion among other 
(unspecified) village group headmen summoned by the district deputy. They 
decided that the request was inappropriate and might cause future trouble 
as there was no precedent for such a step. The official reply noted that 
the "traditional allocation" formula of Aka River water was seven parts to 
Shoryujigawa and three parts to Nakagawa. The seven parts to the 
Shoryiijigawa intake were further divided: two parts were allocated to the 
Uchi River (the improved natural stream channel off the Shoryiijigawa Main 
Canal, which functioned as a branch canal and served both irrigation and 
castle town needs) and five parts served the remaining main canal service 
area. 
The domain rejection does not elaborate how this seven-three principle 
was actually applied and enforced, nor does it detail its origins in 
'traditional and customary practice.e' Moreover, it does not mention just 
how the "Nakagawa three parts" were in fact distributed among the 
remaining intakes downstream of Shoryujigawa.4 7  It does imply: (a) that 
the Shoryujigawa Main Canal service area did not enjoy unlimited access to 
Aka River water; (b) that river water allocation was proportional to 
discharge volume (as opposed to division by prior appropriation); and (c) 
that domain administrative authority could and did on occasion protect 
this traditional allocation formula. 
· 47  There were six intakes downstream from Shoryujigawa :  Nakagawa, the 
second largest service area, Inaba, the third largest, and four much 
smaller canal networks. I interpret "Nakagawa three parts" to mean the 
water volume to be passed through, over, and around the ShoryOjigawa 
weir for use by all of these downstream networks. 
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In view of considerable surviving evidence of allocation specifics and 
conflict over river water 
. 
in other Japanese basins during the Tokugawa 
. 
period (to cite the Takahashi River as 
. 
but a single example: Fujii & 
Kahara 1977), the absence of such records in Shonai is unusual. It is all 
the more surprising in light of the records of frequent conflict.ewithin 
the various main canal networks, to be discussed in later chapters. Was 
there conflict over source control and river water allocation, and 
documentation has simply disappeared or remained uncovered? Or, was there 
actually little conflict at this level? 
There are a number of reasons which support the judgement that there 
was little serious conflict at the river level in the domain period. 
First, the three largest main canals were put into operation at roughly 
the same time { 1615), and thus historical precedence (prior . 
appropriation), a principal legitimating basis of customary claims, was 
difficult to establish. This was soon followed by the creation of a 
domain administrative framework that was of potential application to 
irrigation affairs but which cross�cut the irrigation networks. 
A third reason is that it was not in the interests of the domain to 
allow unilateral appropriation by the upstream Shoryujigawa Main Canal. 
Chapter two has demonstrated that the taxation system, which was the 
domain's method of extracting agricultural production, was served better 
by maintaining a certain level of production throughout registered .lands 
than by maximizing production in a single area. To a certain point, 
shortages in water were better distributed widely through the basin than 
allowed to fall in downstream areas only. 
A fourth and related factor stems from another feature of the taxation 
system; domain revenues were increased more by expansion of registered 
arable lands than by increases in land productivity of existing paddy 
land. This was of course why the domain promoted development of the 
downstream areas of the basin. Each of the larger main canals served both 
older paddy lands on the alluvial fan and new paddy lands on the 
downstream plain. Again, it was not in the interests of the domain to 
support attempts to alter water source allocation and increase 
Shoryujigawa's share at the expense of the other main canals. 
This is not to argue that domain officials actively intervened to 
insure fair and conflict-free allocation of river water; it is rather to 
suggest that domain authority was lent to the preservation of the status 
quo. Allocation of river water was determined by the dimensions and 
design of the weirs and the intakes. To prohibit and prevent changes in 
these dimensions and designs would have been sufficient to maintain 
allocation at the same relative level.. There was still probably some 
violence, perhaps the occasional, noctural dismantling or damaging of 
lengths of weirs that one hears of for the twentieth century. But domain 
support for the status quo would have served to discourage litigation.eand 
other conflict modes on the river level. 
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Given a reflexive domain stance in the face of sizeable yet variable 
expansion of paddy lands in the basin, one might expect to find some 
alternative organizing initiative among basin irrigators to tackle the 
river problems the domain was not actively addressing. However, the 
available evidence suggests that, paradoxically, on the river level 
neither sustained conflict nor alternative organization was forthcoming. 
I should hasten to add that the next two chapters will detail many 
instances of both conflict and cooperation at the village and branch canal 
levels. The point here is that there do not appear to have been any 
broader coalescences of interests--for example, of lower basin irrigators 
versus alluvial fan section irrigators over high water drainage discharges 
or of downstream main canals versus Shoryujigawa Main Canal over low water 
allocation. With both high water discharges and low water allocation, the 
common locus of conflict was among the injured parties, as illustrated by 
the persistent conflict between Narita and Obana Villages. 
There were perhaps two reasons why water user discontent remained 
unorganized at the river level. First, it was difficult to coordinate 
interests within the main canal service areas because the effects of 
source water allocation were differentially distributed. Unlike canal 
patterns in other basins, both Shoryujigawa, with an 'upstream' intake, 
and Inaba and Nakagawa, with ' downstream' intakes, stretched from the 
alluvial fan out on to the downstream plain. Shortages from an 
inequitable allocation of source water seem to have been localized in the 
downstream areas of Inaba and Nakagawa, making concerted action by the 
entire main canal service areas less likely. Moreover, these downstream 
areas affected most by such allocations had high concentration of new, 
leniently registered and taxed paddy lands; we may presume that land 
holders in these areas were reluctant to press water claims too explicitly 
in fear of adverse consequences for land tenuree. 
In sum, a technology and organizational pattern for river control to 
provide a water supply and drainage outlet minimally adequate for rice 
cultivation was established in the basin in the early to mid-seventeenth 
century. At this time the official domain hierarchy claimed a 
comprehensive authority over agricultural·eproduction and land tenure, and 
decision making tasks concerning source control and drainage were embedded 
in the domain administration. Necessary labor and materials were 
generated through the domain tax systeme. Still, such management wase. 
passive and reluctant. It responded, favorably or unfavorably, to claims 
and petitions from below, but it never seized the initiative to clarify 
the ambiguous nature of rights to river water, to specify allocation 
practices, or to organize drainage schedules that might have increased 
water use efficiency and prevented readily anticipated damage. With high 
water damage and low water allocation, it acted to restore and preserve 
the existing facilities and/or procedures, mindful of the status quo and 
wary of any changes to it. Levees were repaired, the headwaters forest 
was preserved, and the log frame weirs were set out each summer, but there 
is little evidence of major steps taken to develop storage capabilities. 
. . 
•• 
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Although the effects of both high water flooding and low water 
shortages were exacerbated by the expansion of paddy fields through the 
basin, this minimal technical order and conservative, domain-embedded 
organizational framework for river control persisted. I have suggested 
that this was becausee� and not despite a growing dissonance in .ethe 
configuration of administration, land tenure, and irrigation interests; 
this is a point to be developed with more evidence in the next two 
chapters, which take up delivery, use, and drainage within the two largest 
canal networks. 
Chapter V 
THE SHORYUJIGAWA NETWORK 
We turn our attention now to the organizational and operational details 
of two of the basin canal networks. This chapter treats the Sh�ryujigawa 
network, which had the largest service area in the basin and the most 
upstream intake of the three major networks. In the following chapter, I 
will consider the Nakagawa network, serving the second largest area in the 
basin from an intake that was the most downstream of the major networks. 
In each case, I will draw from surviving documents a portrait of who was 
handling in what manner the various tasks of construction and 
reconstruction, operation and maintenance, water allocation, and dispute
resolution. I believe these chapters to demonstrate that, overall, both 
networks were characterized by a dispersed control over these tasks 
through most of the period. Several tasks were nominally articulated to 
domain administration, but domain officials showed a reluctance to 
exercise authority. There was little evident involvement in network 
matters by the merchants who began to accumulate large holdings in the 
mid-eighteenth century. And, there were few appearances of formal, 
effective supra-village associations of water users at either the branch 
canal or main canal levels throughout the period. I shall reserve for the 
final chapter an interpretation of how developments in domain political
economy insured the persistence of this form of irrigation organization. . . 
We saw in chapter one that the 1605-6 river diversion and embankment 
project at Kumaide immediately sparked canal construction, which in .dturn 
led to a century of paddy land development arid expansion through the 
basin. Digging of the Shoryujigawa Main Canal (in essence, the 
construction of the gate at Kutnaide and a modification of the former Aka 
River channel) reflected the common pattern of irrigation construction in 
the basin--that is, local initiative and resources sanctioned, or at least 
encouraged, by domain officials. 
The principal coordinator of the Shoryujigawa project is thought to 
have been Kudo Kamon, on the basis of a Kudo family document presented to 
the domain lord by the Kudo household in 1851 (text in S/S 1974:6-7,
9-10). According to this record, Kamon was the son of Kudo Kageyuzaemon, 
the headman of Hongo Village (now Honden) on the plain north of Tsuruoka. 
The Kudo family had lived for many years in Otori Village, in the upper 
basin of the Aka River; in the 1570s, Kageyuzaemon moved down on to the 
plain and became headman of the new village qf .Hongo. 
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Following the transfer of Shonai to the Mogami domain in 1601, there 
were some attempts by the new district deputy (daikan) under Niizeki, 
Fujiwara Mino, and by Kamon's father, Kageyuzaemon, to tap water of the 
Mizunashi River and the other intermittent streams that ran off Mount 
Hokari into the old Aka River channel. However, they proved unstable and 
insufficient sources, and the efforts apparently failed. Kaman himself 
may have been associated with Niizeki's river diversion project (Koide 
1975 :97)  before undertaking direction of the Shoryujigawa canal. The 
canal seems to have been more or less completed by 1610-11 . 
Unfortunately the Kudo record provides no details of the canal 
investment required in this project. Kaman secured permission, and 
perhaps encouragement, from Niizeki. The Kudo record claims that 
construction of the intake works (sekiguchi toritate) resulted in Kudo's 
receiving from the domain the administrative right over the canale. 
(yosuigawa shihai, literally, "management of the irrigation river"), 
though Kaman later for unknown reasons transferred this right to 
Jirozaemon of Takadamugi Village, with whom he had worked on the project. 
But there is no indication of labor requisitions or financial assistance 
received from the domain. Rather, he must have organized leaders of 
settlements along the line of the main canal and directed 
cultivator-laborers mobilized by the settlement leaders. The incentive to 
participate was the possibility of constructing a turn-out from the main 
canal and using the water to expand paddy land acreage in one's own area. 
Participation could be solicited through the promise of rights to the 
canal water. 
Obviously, Kamon's ability and incentive to coordinate such a project 
derived from the position of the Kudo household as a wealthy, local 
peasant leader (dogo)e. We get a glimpse of this from a fragment of the
1611 land records for Hongo Village. At the till}e, just following the 
completion of the canal, the village had paddy lands with an assessed 
yield of 26,268 kari-soku and dry fields of 21.497 koku, for a total of
218 . 301 koku in assessed lands. Of this, about 19 ,700 kari-soku of paddy 
lands and 18.9 koku of dry fields were fief lands of Wada Etchu, a Mogami 
retainer resident at Tsuruoka castle, while about 1900 kari-soku of paddy 
lands were direct fief lands of Mogami. 
There were 37 cultivators named (as naukenin) on the Hong5 cadastral 
register. Listed by paddy field holdings: 
paddy land over 1500 kari-soku: 3 cultivators 
IIpaddy land of 1200-1500 kari-soku: 2 
IIII 900-1200 II 10 
II II II600-900 4 
II II II300-600 9 
IIII less 300 IIthan 9 
• 
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Two of the three cultivators with holdings above 1500 kari-soku were 
Kageyuzaemon and his son, Kaman. Furthermore, most of Kageyuzaemon ' s  
holdings were free of tax obligations; as headman, in return for 
tax-collecting and other administrative functions, he received taxd· 
exemptions for much of his own land (kimoiri-bun). His paddy holdings 
totalled 5695 kari-soku (or roughly 22% of the entire village holdings) 
and consisted of the following: 
fief lands of Wada EtchO: 745 kari-soku 
. . 
, 
IIdirect holdings of Mogami : 175 
IInon-taxed headman lands: 4775 
The Hongo cadastral record fragment suggests, at least for this particular
settlement, considerable stratification in holdings and, in the Kudos, 
resources and incentives for initiative and investment in irrigation 
improvement. 
At the Shoryujigawa intake works at Kurnaide, river water was diverted 
by the log frame weir to a large, gated intake, the most substantial works 
in the basin (see Map 6). The main canal itself, about twenty kilometers 
in length, ranged in width from six to twelve meters; although wider in 
the upper section, it did not narrow uniformly. It ran through the west 
bank paddy lands in a northward direction from the intake, passing to the 
west of the castle town and eventually emptying back into the Aka River. 
Its major branch, the Uchi River, diverged near the village of Kawahara 
about two kilometers below the Kumaide intake; the Uchi River was about 
ten kilometers long, and after winding through the castle town (where it 
served municipal needs and replenished the moat works), it too emptied 
back into the Aka River. By 1658 along the main canal, there were intakes 
to twenty-seven branch canals, with an additional ten intakes along the 
Uchi River. 
After the Kwnaide intake works, these 37 branch canal intakes, or 
"water diversion points" (bunsuijo) as they were termed, were the primary 
structures along the main canal. The wide variation in design and 
dimensions was the source of much contention as we shall see. The branch 
canals themselves were simply narrower and shorter versions of the main 
canal--unlined earth channels with a minimum of improvements at difficult 
points. Water moved by gravity-flow, and because the land grade evened 
out towards the downstream plain section, it wasdnecessary to go quite far ·d
up to take off from the main canal. As a consequence, a branch canal 
might pass through lands of several villages before reaching its service 
area, which could extend over one to fourteen villages. 
The branch canals each fed a number of usually named tertiary laterals, 
· which in turn delivered water to the field ditches that actually supplied
the paddy fields. Only rarely were there permanent gates at the 
diversions along a branch canal to its tertiary laterals; more commonly, 
water movement at this level was regulated by the temporary placement of 
. � 
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sand bags, boards, mats, and mud. Field ditches also collected drainage 
water from the paddy parcels and emptied back into the laterals and branch 
.
canal at a downstream point or else into laterals of a second branch canal 
below the delivery source. Branch canals withd.intakes on the right side 
of the main canald- tended to empty back into the Aka River or into 
downstream branch canals. Those on the left side of the main canal 
generally flowed into the Byama River tributary. 
From at least the 1650s, this service area extended over eighty-seven
administrative villages on the alluvial fan and downstream plain, roughly 
between the master stream and its Oyama River tributary to the west. 
These eighty-seven villages fell within eight different administrative 
jurisdictions: most Shoryujigawa villages were assigned to five village 
groups (kumi) of Shonai Domain, only one of which was wholly within the 
service area boundary. However, some service area villages had come under 
direct shogunate administration, while others fell within the territory of 
the Maruoka Branch Domain of the Sakai family. There was also a small 
amount of land in three villages which was controlled by the Mt. Haguro . . 
temple complex.d· 
In 1659, the total registered paddy land yield of the service area was 
26,046.5884 koku, which I estimate to be about 2188 registered hectares.d4 8  
By 1833, this registered yield increased to 31,828.d9568 koku (about 2917 
registered hectares by my estimate) due to paddy land expansion within 
service area villages. However, the official acreage in 1878, following 
the Land Tax survey, was 3910 hectares, confirming that there had been 
much unregistered or underregistered expansion within the ShoryUjigawa 
network during the period. 
The Kumaide intake works 
As we have seen in chapter one, after initial construction of the 
intake and main canal, rights to main canal management were first accorded 
Kudo Kamon by the lord Mogami. Kudo, however, for reasons unknown, soon 
passed them to Jirozaemon of nearby Takadamugi Village, who was apparently 
appointed Chief Canal Guard (�sekimori) of the main canal after Sakai 
became domain lord. A second asekimori was appointed from another service 
I have estimated acreage equivalencies in 1658 and 1833 in the 
following way. The cadastral formula for yield per area unit ranged 
from 0.9 to 1.5 koku per 1 tan, depending on the quality grade of the 
field. For 1658, I assumed a mean quality grade of 1.2 koku per tan, 
and for 1833, after much new paddy land development commonly graded at 
0. 9 koku per tan, I assumed a mean of 1.1 koku per tan. These figures, 
it bears reiterating, represent registered yield totals, not actual 
yields. 
• 
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area village. 
There was a further elaboration in irrigation organization in 1660. In 
November of that year the headmen of the six west bank villages nearest to 
Kumaide intake (see Map 7) sent a petition to the rural magistrate
complaining that the demands of maintaining the intake facilities posed a 
heavy burden. They claimed that from April 7th through November 8th of 
1660 they had expended a total of 15,350 worker�days and considerable 
material supplies in intake repairs and maintenance (the petition is 
reprinted in S/S 1974:59-61 and YKS 196lb:192-3). 
In reply, the domain official conferred formal responsibility for 
intake works maintenance of these six villages; they were exempted from 
payment of the miscellaneous taxes (komononari) and from all corvee; 
instead, these commodities and labor were to be used for intake 
maintenance. At the same time, the headman of Kumaide Village, Hachiemon, 
was apparently appointed Chief Intake Guard (�sekimori) and charged with 
organizing the intake works maintenance. (This appointment is not 
explicitly mentioned in the document; it is first confirmed in a 1688 
document, and by 1702, there were two persons in Kumaide Village with this 
title. ) 
It is only possible to construct a partial listing of the Kyoden and 
Kumaide osekimori during the Tokugawa period (see Keily 1980:279). We 
have the most complete information about the line of the first Kumaide 
�sekimori, Hachiemon , as it is the record maintained by his household that 
provides much of our data on the intake during the period. Beginning with 
Hachiemon (possibly in 1660, at least by 1688), this household served for 
three generations as both Kumaide village headman and as the intake works 
osekimori. Then, in 1774, for reasons unknown, the third generation 
household head, Kihachi, was banished from Kumaide by domain order, and 
both posts were given to Sajiemon, head of a branch household (bunke). 
The posts continued in this household for another three generations (S/S 
1974:66-70). 
In 1732, the annual salary allowance to the Kyoden osekimori was six 
bags of rice (432 liters) each and to the Kumaide �sekimori, about 1 bag
each (72 liters). This was collected from all villages in the main canal 
service area in proportion to each village ' s  registered yield within the 
main canal service area. The Kumaide osekimori received an additional six 
bags each from the district officer, so that their total salaries slightly 
exceeded those of the Kyoden osekimori. 
Thus, by the early 1700s, there were separate roles for main canal 
maintenance and for intake works maintenance, both termed osekimori and 
· both occupied by two individuals. At this point, the intake works 
osekimori were subordinated· to the main canal osekimori, but in the 
following decades, a shift in authority occurred: while the post of 
Kyoden osekimori continued, the duties became .obscure and it no longer 
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figured in allocation and maintenance matters discussed in surviving 
documents. At the same time, the Kumaide osekimori came under the direct 
jurisdiction of the district-level domain officials. 
The Kumaide intake works themselves consisted of the diversion weir, a 
gate intake, and a spillway just in front of the gated intake. The weir 
was described in chapter three as a line of triangular stake frames set 
out across the river after the spring flood discharge to raise the summer 
river water level and direct water to the intake. There is no surviving 
map of the intake area in the domain period, but document descriptions and 
an 1886 map suggest that there was an island in the middle of the river 
channel in front of the Shoryujigawa intake and that the intake weir 
extended from the island to the right bank of the river (see Map 7). 
The earliest recorded dimensions of the intake gate date from 1818. At 
that time, the opening was reinforced by buttresses (sode) on either side; 
on the upstream side, the standing log buttress was 14.56 meters long, and 
on the downstream side, 10.92 meters (the latter was lengthened to 12.74 m 
in 1840). The opening itself (agekuchi) was 7.9 meters wide, with a gate 
height of 3.7 meters (raised to 4.0 meters in 1840). The maximum gate 
height opening, however, was fixed at 1.06 meters from the base log 
(sekidai) to the bottom of the gate itself, which was constructed with 
massive horizontal• logs known as metagi (S/S 1974:190-91; see figure 4). 
The spillway is rarely mentioned in documents about the intake, 
although as an unlined channel leading back to the river, it served the 
important function of preventing excess water from entering the intake in 
times of sudden high river discharge; if it was not opened, the intake 
gate and main channel could (and did) sustain serious damage. 
Maintenance of the Sh�rynjigawa intake works required three tasks. The 
diversion weir had to be set out in times of low water, dismantled in the 
fall and repaired when broken by flood discharges. The river bottom in 
front of the intake gate and the canal bed behind the gate had to be 
dredged of accumulating debris and sediment. And, the intake gate itself 
had to be operated, repaired, and, on occasion, completely rebuilt. 
We have seen that the maintenance and management of the diversion weir 
was the responsibility of the six villages under the two Kumaide 
osekimori; these villagers supplied both labor and materials. They were
also responsible for ordinary maintenance and operation of the intake gate 
and for annual dredging around the gate. Their charge, essentially, was 
to insure and maintain an adequate and customary flow into the main canal 
and to protect the intake works and canal from high water damage. 
It was not without difficulty that these duties were discharged, and in 
fact mounting problems in the nineteenth century forced a shift in intake 
maintenance practices in 1840. In large part, these problems resulted 
from the increasing demand for water in the main canal service area as a 
- -
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Figure 4 :  A hypothetical drawing of the Shoryujigawa Main Canal 
intake at Kumaide 
---------
. 
gate cross-section: 
")
\ 
2 ' --- metagi logs"" 
--> 
sekidai base log 
1.06 meters (fixed height) 
Source : Based on list of construction materials, 1840-64 in S/S
1974: 190 and on Meiji period photographs (Shoryujigawa
Irrig Coop 1935). 
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result of downstream paddy land development. Furthermore, there were 
repeated major breaks and damage to the intake works due to high river 
discharges, requiring frequent repairs. Both factors placed heavy burdens 
on the six Kumaide area villages and on the osekimori. For example, on 
the occasion of the major 1833 flood discussed in chapter three, rural 
magistrate officials visited the house of the osekimori Kyushichi to 
emphasize the difficulty to the domain in providing necessary repair
materials. Kumaide village burden was compounded by a poor harvest that 
year. Again in 1839, there was serious flood damage to the intake works, 
and the total labor demand that year was 13,704 workers; this compared to 
previous levels of 2,000 to 3,000. 
It appears that the burden felt most heavily by the residents of the 
six villages was increasing tax levies. We have seen that in the 
seventeenth century the villages were exempted by the domain lord from 
certain taxes and corvee duties. Instead, they supplied without 
reimbursement all materials and labor necessary for intake maintenance. 
This changed, however, in about 1730; from that time, a public works levy 
(at the domain standard of 2.8% of village registered yield) and a 
non-rice product duty (though payable in rice) were collected by the 
domain--and turned back to the six villages for intake works maintenance. 
It was an accounting sleight-of-hand, but it represented a shift from 
corvee to wage labor, from requisitioning materials to buying them. The 
tax monies, that is, were used by the osekimori to hire village residents 
and buy necessary mats, rope, stakes, etc. from them. 
Discontent was evident by the nineteenth century when more workers were 
needed than tax money could hire. It is not clear whether this was 
handled by reducing wages, simply conscripting extra workers, or adding a 
tax surcharge to the public works levy. In any case, in late May or early 
June of 1841, an assembly of registered farmers of the six villages met 
and decided on a new system of intake works maintenance whereby 
responsibility for maintenance and repairs (except for the reconstruction 
every twelve years) would be given to 'contractors•d. Domain officials,
judging from a communication of the previous year to the osekimori, were 
not in favor of such a change. The l5sekimori, who retained operating 
responsibility for the intake, supported it (see S/S 1974:148-179 and YKS 
1980:675-679 on which this discussion of the contractor system is based). 
The aim of the new system was to limit the tax liability of six-village 
taxpayers. In the 1840s, the combined registered yield of .the six 
villages was 1589.d0377 koku. Thus, their public works levy, at the 
standard rate of 2.8%, was 44.492 koku; in addition, they paid 8.5898 koku 
as a materials and produce tax. From this total (53.0818 koku) was 
subtracted (a) 3. 3450 koku for two osekimori salaries (b) 1.6725 koku for 
one kosekimori salary19 (c) 0.334 koku given to the shrine in Kumaide 
◄9 This is the only reference to a kosekimori, or "lesser intake guard." 
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village; and (d) 0 . 840 koku, divided among the 18 officials of the six 
villages for expenses (koban-mai). This left the sum of 46.8903 koku, 
which at the prevailing wage rate of 1 sho 4 go (0 . 014 koku) per day, 
represented wages for 3,349.1 worker dayse. 
The new system divided this sum equally among thirteen individual 
contractors, who assumed joint responsibility for intake maintenance. 
There are no records of how the thirteen actually divided repair work; it: 
would seem to have been a complicated matter. Nevertheless, the principle 
was that if a contractor met his responsibilities within the annual budget 
alloted him, he turned a profit; any amount he was forced to spend above 
that was his personal loss. 
This contractor system appeared to work smoothly in the 1840s. In 
1848, the osekimori, perhaps to retain some control over contractor 
activities, appointed two of them to be head contractors and authorized 
each of them to take an annual allowance of 1 koku from the total budget. 
At the same time, they required of these two that they pay them 5 ry6 in 
gold coin as "insurance money" (hoshD-kin) in the event that a contractor 
would be derelict. This seems to have become an annual levy and was never 
returned. It is difficult to judge the intentions of the osekimori on 
this as well as other points; perhaps their concern was legitimate, 
perhaps the money amounted to a kickback. It was the case that in 1853, 
noting that river conditions had improved (and implicitly, that contractor 
profits were increasing), the osekimori asked each contractor for 1.6 koku 
(per year? ; see S/S 1974:e153-54). 
This contractor system continued for 23 years until 1863, the year 
before a scheduled reconstruction of the intake workse. In 1863, there. 
were a number of requests from individuals to become contractorse, and in 
February of 1864, the two osekimori and the headmen of the six villages 
met to decide whether to continue the contractor system at its present 
thirteen, to expand the number of contractors, or to appoint the two 
osekimori as sole contractors .  A month later, the osekimori had secured 
the approval of the various village assemblies (at their spring meetings) 
for the third alternative. It is significant that this was not a return 
to the old procedure; this time, the osekimori were to operate as the 
contractors had--given a fixed annual sum by the six villages, they had to 
handle intake maintenance within that budget or cover additional expenses 
from their own pocketse. 
At least in the closing decades of the Tokugawa period, then, taxpaying 
cultivators of the six villages were able successfully to limit their 
liability in maintaining the Shoryujigawa intake works . It is difficult 
to determine whether the increasing burdens of the 1820s and 1830s that 
prompted the new system reflected real increases in maintenance demands or· 
Subordinate to the 8sekimori, his duties are- not clear. 
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whether they arose from manipulations of money and labor by the osekimori 
for personal profite. From Table 13 one can see that most registered 
paddy-land owners in the six village areas were small�scale cultivators; 
77.4% held less than 10 koku of land. There were none of the large 
landlords of fifty or hundred koku who were appearing in the downstream 
areas; Kumaide was an area of old paddy land, hemmed in by the mountains, 
with only limited flat lande. The four largest land holders were: 
. .. . . . . . . 
Sazaemon (Kumaide) 31.727 koku 
Jirozaemon (Kumaide) 35.596 koku 
Yosozaemon (Koya) 32.080 koku 
Mataemon (Katakai) 40 .066 koku 
Sazaemon was the household of the osekimori Kyushichi; unfortunately, we 
do not know the holdings of the other osekimori, Gihachiro (holdings are 
listed by household name). It is clear, though, that Kyushichi had much 
larger holdings than both the village headmen and the thirteen 
contractors. The headmen tended to come from the middle stratum of 15-20 
koku land holders, while the contractors represented a wider range of 
holdings (mean of 10e. 5  koku, with a high of 23.051 koku and a low of 0.0 
koku, the Kumaide shrine priest). These are grounds for suspecting some 
conflict of interest between the upper stratum osekimori and the middle 
and lower strata land holders, but the differential power is difficult to 
assess. Certainly the osekimori's actions in the 1850s in appointing head 
contractors and then collecting "insurance money" from them and 'refunds' 
of 1.6 koku from each of the thirteen contractors and their succes.s in 
1863 in regaining control of intake maintenance reflects a degree of 
influence over the villagers. Still, the ability of the village land 
holders to limit their tax liabilities can be interpreted as an ability to 
curb such influencee. 
We can see a similar pattern of constrained influence if we turn from 
ordinary maintenance of the intake works to its occasional reconstruction. 
The ShBryujigawa intake was the largest, most technically complex and 
perhaps most strategic irrigation facility in the drainage basin. Its 
reconstruction every twelve years was undoubtedly the largest periodic 
assembly of labor and materials for irrigation purposes during the 
Tokugawa period. We are fortunate that a notebook (hikae) survives which 
was compiled by Kyushichi and which details the course of the 1864 intake 
reconstruction project. The notebook is dated 1865 and combines 
diary-like entries and copies of relevant circulars and directives from 
domain officials. Additional documents (principally, project completion 
reports, dekimokuroku) concerning reconstruction in 1816, 1828, 1840, and 
1852 have also been preserved by Kyushichi's household.e5 ° From the 1865 
so The diary and other documents appear in S/S 1974:173-180, 184-190, 
207-236, 254-259; some of these documents also are published in YKS 
1980:672-675, 679-681. See the discussione,,in 5/S 1974:e198-206 and Kelly 
31 
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Table 13 
Distribution of registered land holdings, Kumaide area, 1853 
registered land holding (koku) 
village 1 1-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 30 total 
Kumaide 9 33 14 1 1 2 91 
Koya 3 6 1 0 1 0 1 12 
Nishi-iwamoto 2 8 1 2 2 1 0 16 
Katakai 1 4 9 2 5 0 1 22 
Katakuki 3 8 15 5 0 2 0 33 
Itaigawa 8 8 14 3 4 1 0 38 
six village 
total 26 67 71 26 13 5 4 212 
six village 
headmen 2 4 
contractors 2 2 3 2 2 0 13 
Note: These figures are the number of households with 
total registered holdings in the above categories; they include 
non-resident landholders. 
Source: S/S 1974 :154-155 
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diary and these other records, the following points may be distilled. 
(1) The purpose of the reconstruction project was the replication of 
the existing intake facilitiese. Although there were minor differences in 
the dimensions of some of the logs and boards used in projects from 1816 
to 1864, the only change in the actual dimensions of the intake works 
throughout these years was in 1840 , when the downstream-side buttress was 
lengthened 0. 91 meters to 12 .84 meters and the height of the intake itself 
was raised from 3 . 64 meters to 3 .9 1  meters. Neither change increased the 
intake volume. 
(2) The time span of the 1864 project was about fourteen months, from 
an initial petition from the Kumaide osekimori to the rural magistrate' s  
office in late November of 1863 to the final accounting by the osekimori 
in mid-January of 1865. Actual construction work, however, did not begin 
until March of 1864 and was concentrated in the spring and the fall. 
March was spent in locating and arranging for the pur6hase of trees for 
timbers for the new intake, cutting and hauling them to the intake site, 
and sawing them into timbers of the required dimensionse. In April, sawing 
was completed, a work shed constructed, and the cut timbers prepared 
(soaked and dried). 
In May, the channel in front and behind the intake was dredged. While 
this was considered part of the rebuilding project, it was actually normal 
maintenance because the intake and the main canal were used throughout the 
summer growing season. It was not until after harvest, in late October, 
that actual river diversion, intake demolition, and rebuilding began. 
This work extended through November, and on the first of December, the 
rural magistrate himself came up from the castle town with his various 
assistants for an official inspection of the completed project .e. The 
osekimorie1 s work was not finished, however, for the financial accounting, 
payment, and reimbursement required most of December and January. 
(3) The division of expenses, labor, and materials was complex, 
involving the six villages, all villages in the main canal service area, 
and the domain treasury (specifically, its public works account allotted 
among the several rural magistrates). Overall responsibility for 
coordinating and carrying out the reconstruction was assigned to the 
Rumaide six villages and their two osekimori, under the formal supervision 
of the rural magistrate's officee. The cost of the materials used, 
however, was divided between the domain public works account, with. which 
several of the larger timber pieces were purchased, and the six villages, 
which had to supply the remainder of the timbers and other materials like 
rope and matting. The three metagi timbers, which had to be cut from 
straight cedar trees with usable lengths of 11.7 meters and stump 
circumferences of about 2 . 4  meters, were always difficult to locate; they 
1980:370-378. 
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were generally found in shrine precincts and purchased from reluctant 
shrine priests. In 1864, . although reference 
rural magistrate 
the is ambiguous (3.23
. 
entry), it is possible that the intervened to order the 
requisition of all three metagi trees from a single shrine in 
Nakano-shinden Village, a settlement in the upper basin outside the 
Shoryujigawa canal network (as were most the villages from which materials 
were purchased, there being few forested areas in the main canal service 
area itself). Kyiishichi apparently compromised with the Naka.no-shinden · · · 
Village officers and purchased only two metagi trees from them; he got the 
third from the Kumaide Village shrine. 
Labor for the project was divided, at least formally, between the 
Kumaide six villages and all villages in the main canal service area. The 
latter were responsible for direct construction tasks : cutting saplings 
to be used for the side buttresses (300 saplings taken from the domain 
forest, calculated at one laborer per tree), dismantling the old gate and 
building the new one, and the channel dredging around the intake. The six 
villages handled all ancillary tasks, including cutting, transporting, and 
preparing all other timber, diverting and controlling the river water flow 
during the construction period, building the work shed, providing 
messenger runners, and so on. There are references for several of the 
years to a requisition of laborers from village groups outside the 
Shoryujigawa service area, including those on the opposite bank of the Aka 
River, for dredging along the river; it is not clear, though, whether this 
was a special requisition for the intake project or whether it was an 
annual corvee duty. 
While labor in principle was so divided between the Kumaide six 
villages and the main canal villages, in fact most work was done by 
workers from the six villages. That is, tasks to be done by the main
canal villages had customary fixed labor quotas--for example, 300 workers 
for cutting and preparing the buttress saplings, 70 workers for the 
channel dredging, 580 workers for embankment repair, etc; Some 
negotiation was possible, as in 1864, when a meeting of the osekimori, 
main canal village officers, and domain officials decided that 700 workers 
would be needed for intake demolition and building, but generally, the 
limits were set by precedent. The important point, though, is that these 
70, 580, 700, and 300 workers were rarely actually dispatched. Instead, a 
rice, and later cash, equivalent in wages was paid by the village group 
headmen of the main canal area to the osekimori, who then hired and 
supervised Kumaide area workers in the projects. These payments were 
shared by all main canal villages in proportion to their registered main 
canal paddy land acreage (mizukake tadaka). It i� not clear when this 
arrangement began; it was used from at least 1816. It is clear that it 
could work to the considerable personal advantage of the osekimori, a 
· point to which I will return below. 
(4) Another feature of these projects which emerges from the documents 
is the tendency to carry out transactions (wages and material purchase) in 
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cash rather than in kind. Furthermore, there was a steady escalation of 
costs through the nineteenth century. In 1816, the two major timber 
purchases paid by the domain public works account (3 metagi and 23 front 
gate timbers) amounted to 53 kan in copper coin; by 1864, the same 
materials cost a total of 156 kan. 
(5) While the project was nominally under the supervision of domain 
officials, concern did not reach beyond the rural magistrate's office in 
1864. The magistrate himself made only two perfunctory visits to the 
intake, and most references in Kyushichie1 s diary are to rural magistrate 
assistants. Even the assistants played a passive role: Their permission 
was secured at various moments and they made belated reimbursement for 
materials expenses, but they seem to have intervened only rarely in the 
project. The most direct reference is the entry of 11.30; Kyushichi 
recorded that the assistant Matsuda became very angry at him because only 
122 workers had shown up that day and he (Kyushichi) was not handling the 
labor hiring satisfactorily. Of course, from Kyushichi's standpoint, the
fewer workers he hired, the more he and Gihachiro stood to profit, a 
situation Matsuda may have been cognizant of. The project itself ended 
that day, and the incident elicited no further references in the notebook. 
(6) Within the framework of customary procedure and domain regulations 
(often one and the same}, a certain measure of control had been 
appropriated by the two osekimori and by the village group headmen of the 
main canal service area. The basis of this control was not technical 
know-how; there are not references to construction difficulties or to the 
need for technical specialists. The design was fixed, and the carpentry 
and earth-moving skills required were probably general and transferable 
skills. Nor does materials procurement seem to have been a source of 
influence for the osekimori; in 1864, they actually paid slightly more for 
the metagi timbers than they were reimbursed by the domain. 
Rather, it was their manipulation of labor that was important, a 
manipulation that depended on the cooperation of village group headmen and 
on a degree of control over local cultivators. Kyushichi was fairly frank 
in his notebook about such manipulations. On November 13th and 19th of 
1863, Kyushichi met with officials of Daihoji Village Group (the village 
group headman) and Kyoden Village Group (the labor supervisor, who worked 
under the village group headman) to confirm that he would handle the 
embankment repair work associated with the intake project, and a figure of 
580 workers was agreed upon. In fact, as Kyushichi noted in hise_eprivate 
accounting, only 382.1 workers were used; moreover, from the main canal 
villages he received wages of 160 mon per worker (times 580) but only paid 
out wages of 150 mon per worker. Thus, he (and Gihachir�) were paid a 
total of 92 kan 800 mon (580 workers times 160 mon) by the Kyoden Village 
- Group headman. They paid out a total of 57 kan 315 mon in wages to the 
382.1 workers plus additional expenses of 4 kan 780 mon for rice wine and 
dried fish for the workers. They then returned 11 privately11 (uchi-uchi) 12 
kan 800 mon to the Kyoden Village Group headman as well as small payments 
.:. , 
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of 1 kan 600 mon to three other village group headmen in the main canal 
service area. The balance of 13 kan . 105 mon, roughly equal to the amount 
they returned to the Kyoden Village Group headman, was split between 
themselves .  These arrangements were also true of the other intake tasks 
for which main canal villages were responsible. Because all accounting is 
not recorded in such detail by Kyiishichi, it is impossible to determine . 
the total profit of the osekimori during the project, but on the basis of 
relative numbers of workers per task, I would estimate it to have been · 
about 15-20 kan each. 
In sum, these documents present a general view of the intake 
reconstruction project as circumscribed by customary procedures and 
formally carried out by a hierarchical role structure ranging from the 
water user-cultivators , who shouldered the tax and labor burdens, to the 
osekimori, who directed the work, and the rural magistrate , who supervised 
the osekimori. Domain financial support was substantial ,  though 
supervisory interference was minimal; domain officials had a potential 
power to intervene, but they showed little inclination to do so. I t  is of 
course difficult to judge whether intervention was unnecessary or they 
were unable to enforce unpopular orders . On the one hand, there did not 
appear to have been any attempts to alter the dimensions , design, or 
materials of the intake to increase intake volume during the nineteenth 
century. On the other hand, when Kumaide villages indirectly challenged 
domain precedent by shifting to the contractor system of intake 
maintenance in 1840 , the domain did not try to intervene. 
In the middle , between the water user-cultivators and the domain 
officials were the osekimori and the village group headmen,  who found they 
could turn domain passivity to personal profit. In this sense , it was in 
their interest to support the customary procedures because this would 
insure continued lack of official interference. 
Irrigation tasks along the main canal 
Along the main canal itself, there were two important sets of 
tasks--maintaining and repairing the canal and allocating water at the 
intakes to the thirty-seven branch canals . The main canal required 
periodical dredging of the canal bottom as well as repairs to the earth 
canal banks , which could be washed out in high water or storms and 
weakened by vegetation growth and traffic. There was at least one annual 
dredging of the main canal, in the spring before field work began. It is 
. unclear how labor was allocated in this dredging, but the Kurnaide 
Osekimori records suggest a tripartite division of the canal. Work at the 
top 1 . 1  km section of the main canal was done by about 1500 workers , drawn 
from all villages in the service area (known as mizu-shita ninsoku ) .  Work 
in the mid-section of the canal was divided equally between labor 
recruited from· all villages and labor recruited from only those villages 
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in the lower two-thirds of the main canal service area (termed jimoto 
·ninsoku) . Finally, dredging below this mid-section was done exclusively 
by those villages in the downstream area. 
Labor requisitions seem to have been proportional to a village ' s  (or 
perhaps village group's) irrigation acreage registered yield. Unlike 
intake reconstruction, labor (rather than a cash equivalent) was actually
supplied by all villages. Requisition arrangements may have been 
organized by the village group labor supervisor (waritsuke), and the 
actual work supervised by the Kyoden osekimori, but this is conjecture. 
By contrast, repair work on the canal banks was evidently handled ,
through the domain public works procedures. That is, upon petition _from a 
village headman through the village group headman, the rural magistrate 
approved a repair project and channelled public works funds for the hiring 
of workers. 
As we noted earlier, by the early 1700s, the two Kumaide osekimori, 
previously subordinate to the two osekimori from the Kyoden area (in the 
mid-section of the service area), came to have direct responsibility for 
all intake matters under the rural magistrate's office. While the Kyoden 
osekimori role continued, its duties were less clear and its authority 
much attenuated compared to that of the Kumaide osekimori. Most documents 
of main canal matters contain no reference to the Kyoden osekimori. 
Allocation of main canal water to the branch canals was the second 
critical delivery task along the main canal, and here there were three 
distinctions of importance. The first concerned the design of the branch 
canal inta�es themselves, which varied widely with the use or elaboration 
of one or more of the following structural elements (see Figure 5 for a 
schematic illustration) :  
a. sekine ("canal base11 ) .  This was a stone and/or board lined 
section of the main canal just below the branch canal intake. 
The lining fixed the main canal width at that point. It was 
also termed a sekidai. 
b. makura ( 11pillow 1 1  ) .  This was a weir of boards, logs, stones, 
and/or bags of earth laid across the main canal sekine. It 
raised the water level of the main canal flow, increasing the 
flow into the branch canal. 
c. sadame kui ("measuring pole11 ) .  This was a notched wood pole 
planted upright in the middle of the main canal sekine either 
above or below the makura. It thus served to measure the level 
of the water flowing downstream in the main canal. 
,
d. sekiguchi ( 11canal mouth11 ) .  This was the cut in the main canal 
bank above the sekine to the branch canal. For a few large 
b .  
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branch canals, intake was regulated by a gate (suimon) of fixed 
structure and dimensions.  More commonly, regulation was by 
boards laid horizontally across the canal mouth and supported 
by vertical poles; such an intake was called a mido (written 
with the same characters as suimon), hence the alternative to 
sekiguchi, midoguchi. At some intakes, only bags of earth 
and/or stones laid at the mouth served to regulate volume. 
e .  otoshi (11spillwaye11 ) .  There was sometimes a spillway channel 
just below the intake along the branch canal to lead excess 
water back to the main canal. It was occasionally gated 
(harai-suimon)e. 
Each of these structural elements--their presence or absence, their 
dimensions, and the construction materials--could be used to regulate 
water flow and measure the division of water between main and branch 
canal. 
A second distinction was between two allocation 1 statese1 --normal and 
special. Under normal allocation (josui or heisui), there was constant 
water flow in the main canal and water was diverted to the branch canals 
in proportion to the dimensions of the branch canale' s  intakee. A second 
allocation state, special allocation, was instituted in the spring during 
field preparation and transplanting (when there was a heavy demand for a 
short time period) and in the dry summer months when there were shortages. 
There were three methods which could be used in special allocation: 
a .  bansui. This was a rotational allocation among the branch canals 
based on a time schedulee. 
bunsuie. This was allocation proportional to the acreage or 
registered yield (expressed as either kokudaka or the older 
karidaka) of the branch canalse. 
c. tOshi-mizu. This was a special allocation of a timed volume of 
water to downstream branch canals, accomplished by lowering or 
removing the diversion weirs of the upstream branch canals for a 
fixed period of timee. It was also called mido yaburie. 
Of course, allocation proportional to acreage or yield (bunsui) was 
implemented with a timed rotation, but this can be distinguished from 
rotational allocation (bansui) which was based on time schedules of 
customary usage but which did not necessarily reflect acreage or yield 
proportionse. 
Finally, a third distinction of relevance to allocation was that 
between y8sui ("irrigation water") and morai-mizu ("received water" ) .  
Yosui was water delivered through a canal network to its official service 
area, which we will see in the case of Shorynjigawa to have been those 
. . •. __. ....... 
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Figure 5 :  Schematic drawing of structural elements of branch canal intakes 
. .  
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branch canals and villages on the 1658 registry; it was 1 full�rightsd1 
water, the water delivered to those branch canals, villages, households, 
or paddy field parcels (depending on the unit holding the water right)
with full use rights and maintenance responsibility. In contrast, 
morai-mizu was the drainage (sute-mizu or akusui)5 1  or surplus water 
(josui) of a unit (branch canal, village , household, parcel) with rights 
to yosui, use of which was granted by special agreement to a unit without 
such rights. 
I have derived these allocation distinctions from an inspection of 
Shoryijjigawa materials in S/S (1974) and Shoryijjigawa Irrig Coop (1937). 
How they were actually applied is the subject of the remainder of this 
section as well as the following section on irrigation at the branch canal 
level. It should be noted, though, that they were also the relevant 
distinctions in the Nakagawa and Inaba networks and resembled distinctions 
used in other areas of the Tokugawa state (for example , see Tsuchiya
1966:d85-111). 
The thirty-seven branch canals of the Shoryujigawa network served paddy 
lands in a total of eighty-seven villages. Each branch canal served from 
one to fourteen villages; the mean was 3.6 villages per branch canal. 
From another perspective, the great majority of villages (58 of 87) were 
served by a single branch canal. Most of the remaining 29 villages had 
lands in two branch canals; they were generally in the upstream area where 
branch canals were shorter. 
As seen in chapter two, large increases in registered acreage in the 
second decade of the seventeenth century indicate that the main canal was 
in use soon after its construction,  and we know that by 1658, thirty-six 
of the thirty-seven branch canals were in operation. It was in 1658 that 
a registry was prepared which listed each branch canal in order from 
upstream to downstream with the amount of paddy land in its service area 
expressed in koku and itemized by administrative village. This document, 
known as Kumaide oguchi yori mizukake tadaka mokuroku (Registry of Paddy 
Land Yields of [Land] Irrigated from the Great Kumaide Intake), became the 
basic irrigation document for the Shoryujigawa network. It survives as a 
written listing and a crude map of the main canal , dated the twenty-fifth 
.
day of the sixth month of 1658 (reproduced in Shoryujigawa Irrig Coop
. 
1937 135-52 and S/S 1974:24-35). The nature of the registry, however,
remains somewhat of a mystery, and by whom and under what circumstances it 
was drawn up is not known. At least one copy was kept by the Kyoden 
osekimori, but their role , and more importantly, the role of domain 
officials in making up the registry is unclear. 
s 1  Akusui could also mean "excess water" and even "flood water , "  but here 
..it referred to field drainage. .
· 
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Because those were years of rapid expansion of paddy acreage in the 
main canal service area, it is reasonable to speculate that the registry 
was an attempt to specify and so protect existing claims to main canal 
water. A service area figure known as mizukake tadaka, 11irrigated paddy 
land yield total, "  was noted for each branch canal and for each 
administrative village within the branch canal (see Table 14 for a listing 
of branch canals and Table 15 for a listing of administrative villages). 
This figure, expressed in terms of putative yield, represented the amount 
of paddy land registered within the main canal service area, but it 
corresponded neither to actual acreage nor, often, to the domain muradaka. 
Dispute documents throughout the period demonstrate that appearance on 
this 1658 registry legitimated claims by branch canals and villag�s for 
main canal water--that is, claims to Shoryujigawa yosui. At the same 
time, two features of the registry fueled many of the allocation disputes. 
First, it contained no explicit statement of the principles by which 
Shoryujigawa water was to be allocated among the branch canals and 
villages; it was cited in support of claims for proportional allocation by 
registered yield and also in support of allocation by "customary branch 
canal dimensions." Because these dimensions were not included in the 
registry, ambiguity was compounded. Second, the 1658 figures came 
increasingly to vary with actual branch canal and village service areas as 
paddy land expansion continued differentially through the main canal 
service area. In brief, the 1658 registry was useful to main canal 
irrigators in enumerating the branch canals and (within the branch canals) 
the administrative villages with rights to main canal (yosui) water, but 
it proved an ambiguous and unreliable standard for allocation among these 
'legitimate,' registered users. There are at least partial records of 
problems and conflicts concerning allocation of main canal water for the 
years 1726, 1741, 1753, 1768-71, 1794, 1798, 1809, and 1824. Each of
these cases will be briefly outlined; following this, several 
generalizations about these allocation difficulties will be proposed. 
The first problems for which records survive arose in 1726, when 
midstream villages (roughly branch canals #13-#18) complained to domain 
officials of water shortages (S/S 1974e: 38-41). The. officials in 
response ordered two changes in main canal arrangements. First, the 
registered irrigation acreage yields were reduced for eight of the branch 
canals, generally upstream of the petitioners. These were minor 
reductions, one result of which was to reduce the total main canal service 
area figure by 2.3%, from 26,036.4092 koku to 25,433.2872 koku; they may 
have been intended to correct redundant entries on the 1658 registry. The 
second change was in the order of some of the intakes to some of the 
branch canals between #7 and #17. Generally speaking, the left bank 
branch canals tended to move ahead upstream in position at the expense of 
the right bank branch canals. For example, Kuranowaki moved ahead of 
Kawaguchi, Terada moved ahead of Minde and Takazaka, etc. (see Kelly 
1980:305). 
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
27 
33 
34 
#34 ( ? )  
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Table 14 
Branch canals of the Shoryujigawa Main Canal 
. 
branch canal name 
[no name recorded]
[no name recorded] 
Uchi River(2) 
Araya
Sekiguchi
Takahashi 
Yudono
Maruoka (3) 
Bizen(4) 
Kawaguchi 
Kuranowaki
Minde(5 )  
Takazaka (6) 
. Terada-
Dogata 
· 1658 registry
intake registered no. of 
order( l )  yield villages 
1
2 
34.1 koku 
300.0 
2
1 
- -- -
3
4
5
6
7 
8
9
10
11
12
• 13 
13 .0  
· 241.4 
110.0
207.0 
1199.4
173.0
75. 8 
2896.5
688.0
851.0
936.6 
1
4 
3 
8 
8 
3 
4 
14 
4 
3 
3 
changes in registered 
yield in 1726 document 
reduced 92.6 to 148.8 
reduced 300 to 2596.5 
14 320 .4291 2
15 60.0 1 ---
16 716.79
17 1551.2986 
Yoka-cho ( sokohi) 
Shinmachi 4
7 reduced 49.9202 to 1501.3748 
reduced 55.2741 to 1890.826 
Chiyasu (7)  
Hayashizaki 
Niigata (8) 
18 1946.1001 7
19 512.a5459 4 reduced 121.1675 to 391.3784 
Takadamugi 20 2166 . 4480.
Hongo 21
22 
9 
2225.2060 6
Hodashi
Harima 
715.47 2
1510.a5430 323
24 
reduced 60 to 1450.a5430 
Naka-ky8den 
Zennami 
1219.6554 3
5
4
25 reduced 463.1271 to 877.692 
reduced 30 to 2394.5560 
1340.8191
Aoyama
[Narita] (9)  
2424.556026
26A 339.72 1 
460 . 0  1
28
[no name recorded]
Nishi-araya 
Nakamura 
41 . 5  2
55.0 129
30
31
32 
296.0 3
53.6 1 ---
Kami-katsuramata
Kami-yamazoe
Toriesa-shima 235.5 3
65.0 2
27.0 1 
increased 6.5  to 242.0
[no name recorded] 
[no name recorded]
[no name recorded] 35
36 
increased 200 to 227 (?)
combined with 
Kami-tonoshima
[no name recorded] 37 
200.0 (?) 2
130.0 2
100.0 1 
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Notes :  
1. This is the order of intakes from upstream to 
downstream. #1 to #26 were along the Shoryujigawa Main Canal 
itself, while #27 to #37 were along the Uchi River. These numbers 
are used to identify branch canals in Map 6. 
2. After the two most upstream intakes, the Uchi River branched 
from the Shoryujigawa Main Canal. 
3,  This was later known as Kami-nakashima Branch Canal. 
4. This was later known as Maruoka Branch Canal. 
5. This shared a diversion weir in the main canal with 
Terada Branch Canal in 1726. 
6. This shared a diversion weir in the main canal with 
Shinmachi Branch Canal in 1726. 
7. This was also known as Antan Branch Canal. 
8. This was also known as Kayabara Branch Canal. 
9. Narita Tertiary Canal was not listed in the 1658 registry 
but it did appear on the accompanying map as a branch of Aoyama 
Branch Canal. 
•·
57 . 
445. 
54. 
433. 
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Table 15 
Administrative villages in the Shoryujigawa Main Canal service area 
village 
Higashi-araya
Nishi-araya
Katakuki 
Sekiguchi
Yudono 
Takahashi 
Ousui 
branch canals 
served by 
(#) 2 , 27 
1 , 3 , 28 
1
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8
4 , 5 , 6
4 , 5 , 6
4 , 6 ,28 
registered yield 
on 1658 registry 
760. koku
42 . 3  
25 .8
250.
183.
118.4
52.3
6Nakasui 
Maruoka 
Bizen 
6 , 7 , 8 , 9  250 . 
6 , 8 , 9  100 . 
7 273 .8 Kami-chOshima 
Shimo-ch·ushima 7 , 30 
Toriesashima 7 , 32 
7 , 9 , 11 
296 . 9  
154.8  
140.
189.
162 .4 
29 . 8  
Kawaguchi
Nakamura 7 , 29 
7 , 34 Oribashi 
9Shioda 
90 . Shoryuji
Urushibara 
11
1 1
Minde 
Takazaka 
Komaki 
Kami-katsuramata 
Shimo-katsuramata 
Kami-yamazoe
Shimo-yamazoe
Shinshii 
Kami-tonoshima 
Shimo-tonoshima 
Yoka-cho
Sakai-koya
Naganuma
Kenukibashi 
11 , 12 
12
12
30
30
31
32,33 , 35 
35
36
36
1 5 , 37 
10
10
10 
66 . 
900.
401 . 
so.
85 . 
180.
93.6
200.
150.
30.
100. 
160.
86 .8 
101 .5  
88.
39.8Nakano 10 
6yodogawa 10 
Koya 10 
Terada 10 , 13 677.
10
10
Bande 
Yamada 411.4
10 95.
10
Shirayama-hayashi
Zenryuji-shinden 42. 
Inooka 10 700. 
13 
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Yarnaya 10 150.
Akasaka 10 so.
13,16 334.Koyodogawa
Yanagida 170.
170.Daihoji 20
19 323.4291Shirno-daihoji
Niigara
Shinrnachi 
Saito-koya
Nunome
Nakano-kyoden
Hira-kyoden 
Tanba-koya
Abe-k(Sya
Sangen-zaike
Chiyasu
Matsui-shinden 
Hayashizaki
Nishi-kyoden
Takadamugi
Daibe-kyoden
Chihara 
Hodashi 
Rinda 
Kita-ky8den
No-koya
Urushijima-'Sh1n-koya
Shobunuma 
Hongo
Kakuganji
Ko-ky8den
Arai-kyoden
Hodashi 
Yunozawa 
Harima-kyoden
Naka-kyoden
Kakuda-futakuchi 
Zennami 
Higashi-nonuma
Aoyama
Inoko 
Tenshindo 
Obana 
Narita-shinden 
14,18 , 19 , 21 
16
16
16
17
17
17 , 18 
18,20 
17
17
17
18
18
18,20 
18
19
19 ,22 
20 , 21 
20
20
20
20
20
21 ,23 
21
21
21
19 ,22 
22 ,24 ,25  
23 
24 
24
25
25
26
26
26 
26
26 
190.6980 
449.
40.
183.39
347.703
435.442
173.7929
108.804
187.0572
167.7343
41.5392
991 . 8860 
400. 10·20
556. 5499 
282.282
364.203
640.47
353.38
282.121
346.91
60.253
267.554
138.433
583.626
348.753
557.16
760.667
640.47
600.4615
1420.543
866.2754
153.18
410.609
467.083
917.769
1062.8
330.476
113.511
339.728 
Note: The branch canal numbers refer to Table 14. 
Sources : Shoryujigawa Irrig Coop 1935:35-52, S/S 1974 :24-34 • 
.. 
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Although it is not entirely clear from the 1726 map, references in a 
1732 document make it highly probable that these changes (and the water 
shortages that prompted them) arose from the development several years 
earlier of an area of swamp land (Kimura Yachi) between the villages of 
Kimura, Yase, Shiroyama, and Shiomizu (ibid.:41)e. This was upstream of 
the Kyoden villages, adjacent to paddy land irrigated by Minde and 
Takazaka Branch Canals. The swamp land was developed by a Tsuruoka rice 
wine merchant, Miura Nibei, who had received permission from the domain in 
1720. This was the same year that the contract system of public works was 
instituted by the domain, a system in which the castle town merchants were 
quite active. 
The first survey of the new paddy lands in 1724 registered 16 cho 
(about 15 hectares).e52 A canal was constructed for water delivery-- Kimura 
seki-- but it never appeared on the main canal registry or maps during the 
domain period. However, an 1885. map includes Kimura kakehi (flume) and 
notes for it a service area of 851 koku; this total is broken down as 
Takazaka Villagee= 401 koku, Hinde Villagee= 400 koku, and Komaki Village 
= 50 koku. This total is the same as the domain period total for Takazaka 
Branch Canal. Sato and Shimura (1974) surmise that Miura managed to 
extend channels from Takazaka and Minde Branch Canals for a water supply. 
In time, at least one of these channels became known as Kimura Flume, 
though it was never officially recognized in the domain period. 
This incident illustrates several points. It was most difficult, 
indeed impossible, to construct a new branch canal directly from the main 
canal; the only strategy available for development was to attempt to 
extend an existing branch canal. In the case of the Kimura development, 
this was possible perhaps because of close relations between the Tsuruoka 
merchant and domain officials, perhaps too because it was still somewhat 
early in the land development process. Even so, problems--or at least 
complaints--arose, and the domain attempted a compromise solution. Its 
decision in 1726 was to reduce downstream registered yields slightly and 
to allow several of the Kyoden area branch canals to move their intakes 
upstream above Takazaka and Minde Branch Canals. 
In August of 1741, another complaint petition reached the domain 
authorities, this time from the headmen and residents' representatives of
eleven villages with lands serviced by the downstream branch canals 
(roughly #20 through #26; S/S 1974:71-75). They claimed that no water was
reaching their branch canals and requested (i) that the domain organize a 
special toshi-mizu allocation and (ii) that it have a measuring pole 
(sadame-ki) put in at the Aoyama Branch Canal division point. Aoyama was 
the last branch canal along the main canal, and the request for the 
measuring pole was perhaps to provide some official evidence of the volume 
5 2  The_ rate of expansion of paddy land in this swamp land is not known but 
as the present-day acreage is 137 hectares,e·ethere was obviously 
considerable margin (see Kitamura 1956 for ;-further details). 
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of main canal water reaching its lowermost branch. The measuring pole 
request.was apparently rejected, but the domain did try to arrange a 
special allocation to the downstream branch canals by ordering the 
upstream branch canals to allow water to pass (mizu-sage), presumably by 
temporarily lowering or removing their diversion structures. The 
downstream villages continued to complain that no water (or insufficient 
water? ) was reaching them. Unfortunately, lack of further do�uments 
prevents us from tracing the dispute beyond this second complaintd. 
The incident does suggest, though, that it was domain officials, rather 
than the Kyoden osekimori, who had the authority to arrange special 
allocations of main canal water. At the same time, the continued 
complaints of the downstream villages raise doubts about the effectiveness 
of that authority and/or the effectiveness of the special allocation 
measure.53 
A 1753 inspection record entitled Kyoden-kumi Yodogawa-kumi oseki 
kenbun-sho (A Record of an Inspection of the Main Canals in Kyoden and 
Yodogawa Village Groups) contains the earliest surviving data on intake 
dimensions and water flow. The record was part of a noteboo.k (hikae) of 
the Kyoden area osekimori Jiroemon, but neither hi- role in the inspection
nor the time of year is clear from the surviving portion of the document. 
Furthermore, rather ambiguous descriptions of only sixteen of the branch 
canal division points are given (see Table 16; the sixteen are the branch 
canals #10 through #26 along the main canal, with the exception of #12, 
Minde) .  
The inspection record does illustrate, however, the structural 
variation in the design of the branch canal intakes. Generally, #10 
through #18 were two-gated intakes,d.dand at the time of inspection, only
one side was open. The four intakes below #18 (Hayashizaki) had no gates, 
while the four tail-end intakes we.re but single-gated. Most of the 
intakes also had spillways, channels just below the intake which led 
excess water back into the main channel, and they were reported to be 
open, half-open, or closed. Where open, the water depth measurement 
appears to have been made in the branch canal below the spillway. 
An interesting feature of this case was that the eleven petitioning
villages were all shogunate-territory villages, and following 
administrative procedures, they presented their petition to the Oyama 
shogunal office, which forwarded it to (probably the rural magistrate's 
office of) the domain. Although S/S, who discuss this petition 
(1974:?lff.), interpret this as a case of shogunate versus domain 
villages, I find little evidence in the case to support that. These 
villages were frequently aligned with other downstream villages under •
domain administration, and the issue much more clearly divided upstream 
branch canals and downstream branch canals. 
, 
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1 . 5  
#13 
7 . 8  9 . 6  
8.7  
1.5 
Suunnary of measurements 
1 and instructions in the main canal inspections of 1753, 1794, and 1824 
Branch canal 
(1726 order) 
119 Kuranowaki 
� . ' . 
intake
width 
1753 inspection
water intake structure main
depth canal
(branch width
canal) 
3 
1794 inspection 1824 standards2 
adjustments ordered main • depth of water
canal flowing over 
width makura 
:x
(I)
�
{/l
�
11 m
(I)
::,
rt
{/l
midoa , 1/2 open
spillwaya(?)  
remove 8-9 bags of 
fill from top of main 
canal makura weir 
2.1 0.74 9.9 11.7 1.3 ::,
p,. 
,....
::,
{/l
rt
t1#11 Terada 0.74 mido, 1/2 open (10.8)
4 
none 9.9 1.1
spillwaya(?)  ()
rt
Takazaka not take out two large 
noted stones from main canal 
1.9 0.12 not not
noted 
,....
0mido, 1/2 open
spillwaya(?)  ::,noted ·.. {/l 
1-'3 
C"
,....
::,
bottom; level out fill 
bags which form top of 
main canal makura 
....
I-' w
0en (I)
::r"
0 ..... 
t1 °' /114 Shinmachi 1.8 0 . 15 mido, 1/2 open
no spillway 
close off 1/2 of branch
intake with boards 
1.2 ·
1..1.
I-'•
(IQ
1115 Dogata 1.7  0 . 12 mido (10.8)
4 
level out fill bags on 10.8 1. 3 
no spillway top of main canal 
makura; cut away small 
brush in main canal ::,
,....f 
same as 1114 1 .  4 1/16 Chiyasu 1.8 0.51  mido, 1/2 open 6.9
no spillway 
(") 
::, 
I-'
1117 Yoka-cho 1 . 1  0 .30 mido (10.8) 4 none not not ,.....spillway, 1/2 open noted noted 
"C. .
// 18 Hayashiiaki 0.09 mido 8;0 close off 1/2 of branch 10.8 
no spillway canal intake with fill 
(I)l·. 2 ()
rt ,....
0bags ::,
{/l 
5. 1  1.5 
1. 4 
7.8 1. 5 
/1 19 Niigata
5 2.4 0.24 no gate structure 8.1 place fill bags at 9.0 1.2 
no spillway intake according to 
verbal instructions 
//20 Takadamugi
5 
2.3 0.51 no gate structure 6.8 same as 1119 7.8 1.1
no spillway 
//21 Hongo 2.1 0.99 no gate structure (10.8)e4 same as /119 6.9  1.4
spillway, 1/2 open
/122 Hodashi5 6 .3same as 1.8 0.27 /119no gate structure 
no spillway 
mido/123 Harima5 0 . 36 5.6 none 7.2  1.1
no spillway 
/124 Naka-kyoden5 1.7 0.54 mido . none
no spillway 
none/125 Zennami5 1.4 0.17 mido 
wno spillway I-' 
0 . 64 no gate structure not none no standards 
spillwaya(?)  noted set for /126 
7.5 1.3 I-' 
#26 Aoyama 1.8 
Notes: ::I
0 
rt•1 .  All measurements are in meters . .......
2. These 1824 standards are taken from an 1885 map which indicated that these standards had been 
established in the fourth month of 1824 by the Daihoji Village Group headman and in force since 
that time without change. 
3. See text for explanation of mido gate. 
4 .  The main canal width was apparently not measured at these intake points. Rather, the ucustomary 
width" was recorded instead. 
5. The 1753 inspection record included the notation "insufficient water" for each of these branch 
canal intakes. 
Source: S/S 1974:e92-94, 98-101 
• • 
#3). 
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The record is also interesting for its notation of actual "water flow.e1 1  
This was not a timed volume measurement but simply a calculation of the 
branch canal intake width times the measured water height in the branch 
canal (listed in Table 16) . Unfortunately, this is not very useful; not 
knowing the water velocity (which will vary among division points), we 
cannot really compare the amount of water available to each branch canal. 
It is also difficult to reconcile the water flow measurements with the 
notations on the report that six of the eight most downstream branch 
canals were receiving an "insufficient" water volumee. This was no doubt 
the crux of the investigation--downstream shortages--but the 9ata of the 
written report shed little light on this problem. One might surmise from 
the report a more general difficulty in expressing relative volumes with 
precision. 
Increasing water flow tensions along the main canal are documented by a 
series of petitions and counter-petitions from the years 1768-71.a54 This 
was aggravated by worsening conditions along the Aka River near the 
Kumaide intake--especially the accumulation of debris and sediment, 
despite annual dredging of over 1000 worker-days and intake reconstruction 
requiring 4-5000 worker dayse. In the fall of 1768, villages throughout 
the main canal service area had petitioned through the village group 
headmen to the domain55 for a project that would re-channel the Aka River 
at Kumaide, but this was not approved. 
Then, in late August of 1770, a petition reached domain officials from 
seven downstream villages (shogunate-administered villages), complaining 
strongly of water shortages and asking for water allocation to the branch 
canals in proportion to their registered yield (so-sekiko mizudaka o motte 
bunsui) (document #2). As a solution to their immediate shortages, theye. 
joined with five domain-administered downstream villages to request twelve 
days of special allocation (t8shi mizu) (reference to this .in document 
Neither request was approved. 
In the spring of the following year, just before spring field 
preparation, these twelve villages again petitioned the domain, arguing 
that the upstream branch canals were taking in water freely and 
•selfishly,' without respect to customary levels (document #3).56 They 
5 4  These are reproduced in S/S 1974:79-87 and are numbered 1-12. In the 
following discussion, they will be cited by these numbers. 
55 Again, the domain official is not identified. The reference here is to 
the 11 Tsuruoka Domain Office" (Tsuruoka oyakusho). At other times, the 
term "Riverbank Domain Office" (kawabata oyakusho) is used, as the 
office where both district deputy and rural magistrate officials 
conducted business was located beside the Uchi River in the castle 
town.  
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requested that stricter allocation be applied to all branch canals and 
that, as a one-year experiment, the upstream branch canals refrain from 
setting up a permanent structure in the main canal at their intakes. That 
is, a diversion could be constructed for the spring season (referred to as 
a haru makura), but they asked that during the summer dry season the 
domain limit the number of days they could maintain a diveersion weir (a 
natsu makura) so as to insure water reaching the downstream branch canals. 
This proposal was apparently circulated among the several village 
groups because it inspired a number of counter-petitions from upstream 
villages. Two of them, signed by a total of nineteen villages spread 
among midstream branch canals from Shinmachi (#15) to Hodashi Branch Canal 
(#22), argued that the plan would constitute a change in traditional 
procedures and that because each branch canal had a number of tertiary 
laterals, it would cause water shortages in their service areas (documents 
#6 and #7). Another petition was sent in by four shinden villages on the 
west bank of the Oyama River. They had been developed at the end of the 
1600s and were not on the 1658 registry; rather, they depended ori the 
morai-mizu from several midstream branch canals, and they complained that 
they would be severely jeopardized by such a plan (document #9). They 
countered with a request to the rural magistrate that they themselves (and 
their 2700 koku of paddy lands) be added to the registry! 
This last request was dismissed, as was the original proposal for the 
one-year experiment (document #5). The domain officials said there was no 
consensus among themselves and the village group headmen so they would 
simply inspect the branch canal intakes to ascertain the situation. 
This was hardly satisfactory to the downstream branch canals 
(specifically, the tail-end four: Harima, Naka-kyoden, Zennami, and 
Aoyama Branch Canals), and in July of 1772, another grouping of thirteen 
downstream villages tried a new tack. They asked for improvements to the 
main canal intake at Kumaide (document #10). In 1761, the intake had been 
moved slightly upstream, and the thirteen villages argued that this had 
only worsened the flow because large rocks and silt now repeatedly blocked 
the intake. They complained that since then, it was necessary to send up 
several thousand workers two or three times a year for emergency repairs. 
However, for unknown reasons, upstream villages opposed this request as 
well. 
The downstream thirteen villages then countered with a request that the 
intake at least be widened. This drew strong opposition from the Kumaide 
villages, which claimed that the intake had been moved upstream because 
its embankment had been breached by flooding (that is, moving it upstream 
56 This appears to be a re-petition of a request made previously in late 
1769 or early 1770, because the subsequent counter-petitions are dated 
either February or March of 1770. 
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would decrease the intake angle between the Aka River and the main canal 
and thus relieve pressure on the downstream channel bank of the main 
canal, which seems to have been what was breached). They said that to 
widen the intake would endanger their lands because of the great danger of 
flooding with increased volume, and they noted that, anyway, land around 
the old intake site had been eroded away by the river (document #11). The 
Kumaide arguments prevailed. 
Finally,. frustrated in every attempt thus far, the downstream villages 
called for the dismissal of one of the Kumaide �sekimori, Kihachi; they 
claimed that in contrast to his predecessors, he never made any 
inspections of conditions along the main canal. No domain response is 
documented, but in 1775, Kihachi was ordered to leave his native Kumaide 
and the osekimori post was given to Sajiemon, the head of a branch 
household. This, if indeed it mater�ally improved conditions along the 
main canal, would be the only action of the domain favorable to the 
tail-end villages during this period in the early 1770s. 
Difficulties continued for the four tail-end branch canals in 
subsequent years, and three documents from 1794 reiterated several 
familiar complaints, while also reflecting a more coordinated and 
aggressive posture. On the thirty-first of July, 1794, a number of 
headmen from villages in these four branch canal service areas met to 
discuss the growing drought conditions. There had been continued sunshine 
·from July 2 to July 12; despite a rainfall on the evening of the 12th,e
rainless, sunny days had continued from July 13 through the day of their 
meeting. What had appeared to be a good crop was seriously threatened. 
When the meeting broke up, four of the headmen went up to Kumaide to 
inspect the intake and found the volume flowing in from the Aka River to 
be quite low. At the same time, two others had gone up along the main 
canal itself to investigate the upstream branch canal intakes. They found 
that even if the river volume were increased, it would not reach their 
downstream areas because the diversions in the main canal to the branch 
canals of Daih5ji (i.e., D�gata), Chiyasu, Hayashizaki, Takada, Honga, and 
Hodashi were built up very high� They claimed that these branch canals 
were taking in their normal volumes of water (j5sui) despite the drought 
conditions. 
These observations were included in a petition sent to the domain 
officials the next day (S/S 1974 :91�2, document #1). A second document57 
described conditions at three of the upstream intakes in more detail. 
They reported that at Hongo and Takada Branch Canals' intakes, the 
diversion weir was too high, there were no intake gates nor spillways in 
57 This second document is entitled koj�sho-oboe (or kuchi-age kaki oboe), 
a document of • testimony,• while the first was in the form of a 
petition (that is, 11osorenagara ... 1 1 ) .  
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the branch canals, and the branch canals themselves were too wide and too 
deep. At Hayashizaki Branch Canal in recent years, over one shaku of 
water was being diverted through the use of logs and straw mats�-despite a 
"fixed limit" (sadame-h�) of 0.3 shaku (ibid. ,  pp. 94-6, document. #3)e. 
Thus, the downstream villages made three requests: (a) that the 
diversion weir set out across the Aka River at the Kumaide intake be
extended by five frame units all the way across the river; {b) that a 
special allocation of toshi-mizu be ordered; and (c) that the domain 
officials inspect and lower the intakes of branch canals that were drawing 
too much water. 
This was received by the rural magistrate on the following day (August 
. . 
2)e. He consulted with several village group headmen and, on the tenth, 
issued orders agreeing to the second and third requestse. He rejected the 
first, calling such an extension of the Aka River diversion weir 
unprecedented.Se 
On August 9, three village group headmen and two assistants of the 
rural magistrate conducted the inspection of the intakes from Takazaka 
Branch Canal down to Harima Branch Canal, and on the fifteenth, they met 
with "both osekimori11 (probably the two Kyoden osekimori) at the home of 
the Hongo Village Group headman to issue instructions (goshiho) for 
alterations at the intakes (ibid., pp .e . document #2)e. 59 At Takazaka, 92-4, 
Kuranowaki, and Dogata intakes, they were ordered to remove large stones 
and/or sand bags that had been placed in the main canal to raise the water 
level. At Shinmachi, Chiyasu, and Hayashizaki intakes, they were either 
to close off one side of the intake gate or to pile sand bags at the gate 
entrance to reduce the intake flow. And, at Yoshihara, Takada, Hongo, and 
Hodashi intakes, where the gates to the.ebranch canals were only half-open, 
they were to pile sand bags in front of the intake to reduce the flow 
further. No specific instructions were written down concerning precisely 
how much flow to these branch canals was to be reduced (directions 
summarized in Table 16)e. 
Four years later, 1798, again found the same downstream villages 
petitioning the domain. This time ·they complained that shortages were 
being caused by water seepage and canal bank deterioration along the main 
canal, and they asked that the domain sponsor a project to make the 
5 8  In responding, he cited the formula discussed earlier, that seven parts 
of the Aka River flow was Shoryujigawa's (further divided 5:2 between 
the main canal and the Uchi River) and three parts was for downriver 
main canals. 
5 9 There is a brief passage to the effect that th�se orders were presented 
to a meeting of village officials from whom·eagreement was obtained 
{ "nattoku itashi"). 
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necessary repairs. This was in fact ordered by the domain but was not 
carried out because of lack of agreement (among villages?) about the 
requisition of workers. They repeated the request in subsequent years but 
it was always postponed. 
Then in late June or early July of 1809, the headmen of thirty-three 
villages in the downstream areae.eagain petitioned the domain through the 
Daih5ji Village Group headman (ibid., pp. 96-7, document #4)e� They 
complained that the main canal was in very poor shape, with large rocks 
and sand deposits filling the bottom, eroded and caved-in channel banks, 
and vegetation growth on the banks. The effect, they claimed, was 
continual water shortages and usual harvest losses of 10-20%. The 
petition recounted that following transplanting earlier in June, a large 
crowd of farmers from eight villages in the tail-end three branch canals 
went up to the Kumaide intake and "had an argument" (monoii tsukamatsuri 
soro) with the two Kumaide osekimori; they demanded their removal, though 
the osekimori replied that the problem was that the condition (kawa-gata) 
of the main canal had worsened. The farmers were not convinced the 
osekimori were blameless, and the petition wondered what might erupt if 
domain attention was not forthcoming. It concluded with a plea for 
domain-sponsored repair work within the year. 
Unfortunately, the outcome of this plea is unknown. The only 
subsequent document shows that in 1824, the domain officials once again 
took up the question of main canal allocation. On the basis of 
investigations by the Daihoji Village Group headman "and others," an 
"allocation formula" was issued which specified certain dimensions for 
fourteen branch canal diversion points, from Kuranowaki Branch Canal to 
Aoyama Branch Canal (document reproduced in ibid., pp. 101-2, summarized 
in Table 16) • 
The 1824 standards were at once more uniform and simpler than previous 
attempts. For the fourteen branch canal diversions, two dimensions were
specified: the width of the main canal at that point and the minimum 
height of water flowing over the diversion weir down the main canal. It 
thus avoided the complications involved in trying to regulate the 
dimensions and operation of the variety of branch canal intakes found 
along the canal. Using a measuring pole, maximum intake volume could be 
regulated by checking the width of the main canal and the difference 
between the main canal water level and the height of the diversion weir.6 0  
These standards were in effect through the remainder of the Tokugawa 
period (there were minor changes after that, in 1885 and 1921). 
6 0  The figures for the width of the main canal were generally· 1 . 5  m to 2 m 
wider than those for 1794, suggesting that it may have been widened in 
the interim; the difference, however, might· just be due to more 
reliable measurement. 
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These represented the first uniform, measurable allocation standards 
for which evidence remains. Even so, we have no way of knowing the 
relationship between the intake volumes and the service areas of the 
branch canals, either registered or actual. There is no record of the 
allocation principle used, if any, in establishing the dimensions, nor 
without knowing such data as the grade of the canal bed at the intakes can 
we calculate the actual intake volumes. The domain officials may have 
intended by these standards to insure some type of proportional allocation 
or they may ,have intended simply to establish dimensions which were easier 
to ascertain and less contestable than previous standards. We cannot 
judge from the surviving documents. (It may be added that the new 
dimensions defined permissible intake volumes only for normal allocation 
and no guidelines for special allocation states were included.) 
While the partial nature of surviving data precludes a conclusive 
discussion of main canal matters, several generalizations may be 
attempted. First, as with other aspects of irrigation, domain officials 
were involved in the performance of most tasks along the main canal. 
Channel and canal bank maintenance and repair, rebuilding of diversion 
point structures, and water allocation to branch canals brought together 
several levels of roles. The rural magistrate and his assistants received 
requests and coordinated decision-making about allocation, while the 
district deputies decided requests for domain assistance for repair and 
rebuilding. The village group headmen appeared to play consultative and 
mediating roles in allocation disputes. It was frequently remarked that 
petitions received by the rural magistrate were circulated among various 
village group headmen for comment, but lack of records of such comments 
and debate makes it impossible to decide whether the village group headmen 
tended to represent the interests of villages under their jurisdiction or 
whether they reflected domain priorities for settlement of the dispute 
(rather than judgment of action or injury). 
The role of the two Kyoden osekimori appears to have been subordinate 
and attenuated when compared to that of the Kumaide osekimori. They 
perhaps supervised maintenance and repair projects, but they had no 
decision-making authority. An investigation of intake division points was 
typically conducted by rural magistrate assistants and several village 
group headmen; the osekimori were then informed of adjustments to be made. 
Interestingly, it was the administrative village--or more typically, a 
group of such villages--that was the unit which initiated most allocation 
petitions. For example, in the early 1770s disputes concerning the water 
shortages of the three tail-end branch canals and the alleged over-drawing 
of water by the eight branch canals upstream of these, petitions were 
drawn up jointly by numbers of villages. The issue was discussed in 
village meetings, and the written petitions signed by the headmen. Rarely 
did the groupings correspond exactly to branch canal service area 
divisions. Even where a formal and named branch canal organization 
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existed, it apparently had no standing as a petitioning body. This 
reflected the tendency for irrigation matters on the main canal level, as 
with the intake and the river levels, to be handled through the channels 
of general domain administration. 
Although the complaints in 1798 and 1809 suggest difficulties in 
enforcing labor obligations, allocation was not surprisingly the most 
difficult and conflict-laden task along the main canal. Not surprisingly, 
. .
too, such conflicts pitted upstream users against downstream users; claims 
of historical precedence, by contrast, were never at issue. It is 
actually more precise to identify a tripartite alignment of the 
thirty-seven branch canals--upstream, midstream and downstream. The first 
group included roughly the top nine branches of the main canal (through 
Kawaguchi) and all of the branch canals along the Uchi River; I have not 
uncovered a single incident involving any of these branch canals in 
allocation disputes. The midstream group included the thirteen branch 
canals from Kuranowaki to H6dashi, while the downstream group was composed
of the four tail-end canals: Harima, Naka-kyoden, Zennami, and Aoyama. 
The rearrangement of the intake order of several branch canals in 1726 
resulted from an allocation dispute among midstream canals, sparked by the 
extension of Minde and Takazaka Canals to provide water to a new 
development of a well-connected Tsuruoka merchant. All of the other 
allocation cases of the period, however, involved allegations and 
complaints by the downstream four against the midstream branch canals (the
incidents of 1767-71, 1794, and 1824). This may simply represent skewed 
evidence: most of the main canal documents that survive are those 
preserved by the Tozo-household in Kakuda-futakuchi Village (Naka-ky�den
Branch Canal). There is reason though for believing that most allocation 
disputes did in fact pit the downstream four against the midstream 
thirteen,d6 1  and that is the service area distribution. Most of the 
upstream branch canals, including those along the Uchi River, were short 
in length and served small areas. On the 1658 registry (Table 14), the 
total service area of branch canals #1-#9 and #27-#37 (along the Uchi 
River) was only 4,017.3 koku. This contrasts with a total service area of 
the midstream thirteen (#10-#22) of 15,586.887 koku and a total service 
area for the downstream four canals of 6, 495.5735 koku. Of the total 1658 
registered irrigated yield, 15% was irrigated by the upstream twenty 
branch canals, 60% by the midstream thirteen, and 25% by the downstream 
four. That most contention should have arisen between the midstream and 
downstream canals is not surprising. 
6 1  To be more precise, Takazaka and Minda Branch Canals were rarely cited 
in the disputes. Neither, for example, wasd·dassigned fixed allocation 
standards in the 1824 investigation. 
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It remains puzzling, though, why the lines of conflict came to be drawn 
as theyd.were. Why, for example, did Hodashi Branch Canal (#21) find 
itself aligned with the midstream canals and against the downstream 
canals? Why were they not the downstream five? This we do not know, 
although we do know that the breaks did not correspond to administrative 
boundaries. Kyoden Village Group, for example, extended from Dagata 
Branch Canal (#15) through Aoyama Branch Canal (#27); scatteredd.damong the 
service areas were villages of Saig6 Village Group and 
shogunate-administered villages. Frankly, how the midstream versus 
downstream line came to be drawn remains a mystery. 
The conflicts of the period revolved around complaints of downstream 
shortages in the summer dry months and allegations that midstream branch 
canals had altered their division point intakes to draw in more than their 
'customary' share of water. Assessment of the merits of the charges 
raises a ·number of questions. Was there a real water shortage in the 
downstream areas? Probably yes, although there is no evidence independent 
of the petitioners' claims--for example, crop reports sufficiently 
accurate to determine a harvest differential between various of the branch 
canals. Still, petitioning the domain was a noisome task, and it is 
probably safe to assume that given the frequency with which they undertook 
it, there was at least a perceived basis of complaint. 
But did these shortages arise through extensive paddy land expansion in 
the downstream areas which forced cultivators to seek an ever larger share 
of main canal water? Given the lack of change in the physical delivery 
network, did this not begin to press at the limits of water supply and 
create tensions? Again, there was probably a measure of truth in this. 
We have seen in the second chapter that the development of new paddy lands 
after about 1640 tended to concentrate in. the downstream areas. And its 
deliberate under-surveying and under-taxing meant that much of it was 
never fully registered. 
Nevertheless, paddy land development was not limited to the downstream 
plain, as the example of Kimura Yachi in the 1720s illustrates. Perhaps
the largest development in the Shoryujigawa area outside of Narita, 
Zennami and other downstream villages was the land along the Oyama River 
on the western edge of the service area. As we shall see in the next 
section, paddy lands developed here came to be linked to the midstream 
canals--Kuranowaki, Terada, Chiyasu, Hayashizaki, and others--through 
agreements to use excess water and drainage as morai-mizu. "Excess water" 
proved to be a concept open to several interpretations, and it is probable 
that water intake volumes increased for the midstream canals as well. 
Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that wat�r demand due to expansion of 
service area (in real terms) in both the midstream and downstream bra.nch 
canals precipitated the shortages felt by the downstream villages. There 
is no quantitative evidence of increased demand, but the stress was 
probably limited to the summer months of drier-than-average years. 
140 
A related puzzle concerns the lag between paddy land expansion in the 
service .area and period of allocation disputes. That is, most paddy land 
development in the service area took place in the seventeenth century, 
with little expansion after 1700; Narita-shinden Village, for example, 
grew in its first ten years to 630.d8477 koku (1670) and reached the limits 
of its (registered) growth by 1700 when it topped 700 koku. On the other 
hand, allocation disputes do not appear until the middle to late 
eighteenth century. Perhaps earlier conflict records do not survive or 
perhaps it was the albeit smaller margin of expansion in the eighteenth 
century that finally exceeded main canal capacity. This, too, cannot be 
resolved with the present evidence. 
A third question is raised by the allegations of the downstream canals 
that customary intake volumes and/or procedures were willfully violated by 
the midstream canals. Did such • customary standards' in fact exist? Here 
the evidence suggests that while the 1658 registry provided a framework 
for deciding rights and claims to water, it was sufficiently ambiguous and 
future settlements sufficiently lacking in operational definitions to 
allow both claims for and ignorance of such 11standards.d11 The 1658 
registry defined which villages of which branch canals had a full (and 
presumably equal) claim to main canal water (yosui). Moreover, the 
inclusion of registered yields of irrigated lands, and its distinction 
from land registry· totals by the term "irrigated land yield" (mizu 
takada), provided the basis for a principle of proportional allocation. 
Yet, there is no evidence that proportional allocation was ever explicitly
recognized as a principle of water division at the main canal level. In 
addition, despite references to "domain fixed dimensions" of the intakes 
(go-joho), there are no surviving records of such dimensions. Of course,
these might have been oral understandings transmitted through generations 
of officials and for some reason not committed to writing, but absence of 
references to such oral standards and the seemingly unregulated variation 
in intake design apparent in the 1753 and 1794 investigations of the 
domain make their existence unlikely. As we have often noted above, 
attention to precedent and customary procedure to maintain the status quo 
was a prominent component of domain administration, so appeal to tradition 
could be a powerful argument to a petitioner. But it remains very 
doubtful that prior to 1824 there were measurable and fixed standards for 
regulating intake volumes to which most branch canals and their water 
users subscribed. The 1824 standards carried the force of domain 
authority, but even they failed to articulate any obvious principle of 
water division. In sum, while there was consensus about the general
concepts of normal state allocation and special state allocation (with its 
three forms of bansui, bunsui, and toshimizu), when and how they were to 
be administered, and indeed, the general principle that water division was 
to reflect remained obscure enough to be a source of main canal conflict 
throughout the Tokugawa period. 
Thus, the evidence recommends several conclusions about allocation 
disputes along the Shoryujigawa Main Canal: (a) they most frequently 
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arose between the tail-end branch canals and the large midstream canals; 
(b) there were real shortages in the downstream (and possibly midstream) 
areas by the eighteenth century brought on by expansion of the service 
area in both the downstream and midstream sections (as opposed to, for 
example, shortages from increased per acreage water application, the 
problem in the present century); (c) the 1658 registry provided a 
documentary basis for claims to main canal water, but there was neither an 
articulated principle of allocation among the main canal yosui • water 
rights holders' nor accepted, concrete formulas for regulating intake 
volumes; (d) conflicts were a product of the summer months' water 
shortages and the procedural ambiguities; (e) at least one phase of these 
conflicts was the series of petitions.eand counter-petitions through the 
domain administrative framework, apparently reaching no higher than the 
rural magistrate's office; (f) while we may assume that with an unimproved 
physical delivery system, water shortages continued to be experienced 
throughout the period, the 1824 standards at last provided a means of 
regulating main canal water, although their enforcement in subsequent 
years is uncertain. 
I will postpone for later consideration the important question of why 
there were apparently so few efforts made to improve the physical system 
of delivery as that question arises at each point in our inquiry. I will 
conclude with the observation that the middle-level administrative 
officials of the domain had central decision-making roles in matters of 
both maintenance and allocation along the main canal of the largest 
delivery network in the river basin (indeed, the domain), but their 
posture in these roles was decidedly passive and non-initiating. They
were evasive of exercising authority, unwilling to take positive measures 
to judge claims, and fond of postponing action and the address of 
grievances. 
Irrigation at the branch canal level 
The thirty-seven branch canals in the Shoryujigawa network were, by and 
large, gravity-flow earth channels serving paddy lands in one to fourteen 
villages, with a mean of three to six villages per branch canal. There 
are few surviving materials for most branch canals, but it is possible to 
draw out features of irrigation at this level in three areas for which 
documentation does exist. Their representativeness cannot be 
demonstrated, but the patterns of task performance do not appear atypical. 
(1) Relations among branch canals: the case of Kakuda-futakuchi Village 
While fifty-eight of the eighty-seven villages in the main canal 
service area were served by a single branch canal, water flow patterns 
could nonetheless implicate even these villages in irrigation matters with 
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villages in other branch canal service areas. Kakuda-futakuchi, a village 
in the downstream area (see Map 6) , illustrates the complex tangle of 
cooperation and contention into which villages might be drawn •e . Events in 
Kakuda-futakuchi (here referred to by its local abbreviation, 1 Futakuchie1 ) 
are better known than other villages because of the quantity of documents 
and records preserved by the Tozo household, from which came the village 
headman throughout the domain period.62 Futakuchi Village dated back to at 
least the late sixteenth century, but it was still a small settlement when 
the 1623 cadastre recorded nine households and registered lands of 129 
koku. It was listed on the 1658 main canal registry at 153.8 koku, 
suggesting a modest paddy land expansion of perhaps 2.5  hectares. 
Much of Futakuchie1s paddy land was in low-lying wetland, and a 
continual fear was that after a heavy rain, there would be backflooding 
from the Oyama River (see Map 8). At an early date, villagers joined with 
the neighboring village of Shin-koya to construct an . earth embankment 
along the Oyama River about 946 meters long. This was maintained by the 
two villages, but in times of heavy damage, they could secure support 
laborers (tetsudai ninsoku) from other villages.63 
The Futakuchi paddy lands were irrigated with water from the 
Naka-kyoden Branch Canal, whose intake was #24 along the main canal. As 
Table 17 shows, this branch canal had a registered service area of
1219.6554 koku (roughly 120 hectares) and served three villages, 
Naka-kyoden, Yunozawa, and Futakuchi. The watercourse drawn in Map 8 is 
only speculative. While we know that Naka-kyoden paddy land was upstream 
from that of Futakuchi, the location of Yunozawa paddy land is unclear. 
Yunozawa Village is not mentioned in the various dispute records of 
Futakuchi. Either its tertiary canal branched upstream of Naka-kyoden and 
thus was the first served or it branched below Naka-kyoden; in the latter 
case, it might be expected to have difficulties with Naka-kyoden similare· 
to those of Kakuda. 
Several incidents illustrate the recurrent problems faced by the 
smaller downstream Futakuchi in securing necessary water from the branch 
canal apparently dominated by the much larger and upstream Naka-kyoden 
62 Documents of the Toz5 household are reproduced extensively in S/S 1974 
and in OB 1974, my sources for this discussion. The documents are now 
preserved in the historical archives section of the Tsuruoka City 
Library. 
63 The embankment was constructed in the late seventeenth century. 
Futakuchi and several surrounding villages were part of the fief grant 
to Sakai Tadahir� in 1647, and thus became shogunate territory when he 
died without issue in 1668. The support laborers, when needed, were- . 
requisitioned by the Oyama office from other shogunate territory 
villages. 
. ' . .•. 
. . 
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Table 17 
Naka-ky�den Branch Canal service area 
village 1658 Registry 1726 Map 1877 Registry 
(koku) . (koku) (hectares) 
Naka-kyoden 866.d2754 866.d2754 83.02 
Yunozawa 200.2 200.2 15.9287 (?)  
Kakuda-futakuchi 153.18 153.18 33.d9513 (?)  
TOTAL 1219.6554 1219.6554 132. 9 (?)  
Source : S/S 1974:24-34, 43-53 
Village. During a dry spell in the summer of 1805, for example, Futakuchi 
charged that a Naka-kyoden villager had inserted an extra 8 sun (c. 25 cm) 
board in the channel_ leading down to Futakuchi, and there were several 
incidents of (unspecified) violence when Futakuchi tried to remove it. 
Futakuchi addressed several appeals to the Oyama shogunate officials• 
office; these were received favorably, but no censure was made of 
Naka-kyoden•s violence (OB 1974 :160). 
A similar situation was recorded.din July of 1853, when Futakuchi 
Village officers claimed that not even enough water for drinking was being
allowed down the branch canal to them. This time, shortages were 
apparently widespread, as the headmen of Futakuchi Village and downstream 
villages in Zennami and Aoyama Branch Canals joined in an appeal to the 
Daihoji Village Group headman. As a result the village group headman and 
the rural magistrate assistant arranged a special allocation schedule 
(t�shi-mizu) among villages from Shinmachi Branch Canal (#14) down to 
Aoyama Branch Canal. That is, this was not a rotational schedule among
the #14-#26 branch canals, but rather a special allocation to those 
villages within this area that were judged to be suffering from acute 
water shortage. Unfortunately, only a fragment of the schedule remains, 
indicating that for a two-hour period on the morning of 8.5, Futakuchi was 
one of four villages to receive water. The schedule seems to have been 
repeated later in the month, at which time the villages of Harima Branch 
Canal exceeded their time allocation by two hours, eliminating Futakuchi ' s  
allocation; an equivalent allotment was received later after an appeal to 
• • 
8.5 
pm 
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the village group headman.64  
There was also frequent trouble between Futakuchi and Naka-kyoden over 
the use of undeveloped wetlands or yachi. As we noted earlier, these 
usufruct rights to yachi lands were very important--the wetlands provided
not only grasses for composting and direct fertilization but also for 
animal feed. There was such a yachi (known as  Dekinuma Yachi) within the 
Naka-kyoden boundaries to which four villages had entry and use rights
(Naka-kyoden, Futakuchi, Shin-koya, and Shobu-numa). 
Yachi lands were also valued as  a source for mud and soil which could 
be used in irrigation channel bank repairs, in filling straw bags for use 
in bank reinforcement and diversion weirs, and in filling in land to make 
paddy fields. Dekinuma Yachi, though, was known as a magusa-yachi (an
"animal feed grass wetlands"), and the use rights of the four villages
were apparently limited to cutting and hauling out the wetland grasses.
Futakuchi, however, was in the habit of using the yachi as a source of 
soil both for channel repairs and for constructing new paddy lands. This 
we may judge from the documents of a three-year dispute between 
Naka-kyoden and Futakuchi which began in 1811 and which was mediated in 
1813 by the village headmen of Harima, Rinda, Aoyama, and Dagata villages.
This resulted in an "internal settlement" (naisai toriatsukai), a term 
indicating a settlement without recourse to domainn.officials. Frequently,
however, the term was used in Shonai to mean that domain officials, upon
receipt of a complaint or petition, ordered that a settlement of the _ 
matter be reached through mediation of local village officers. The 
settlement in this case had the following conditions: 
(a) that Futakuchi was to present Naka-kyoden with six 5-sh8 (9
liter) casks. of rice wine and that henceforth it would annually
present Naka-kyoden with two such casks;
(b) that upon request to Naka-kyoden Village officers , Futakuch.i 
would be allowed to take out earth from the yachi for use in 
irrigation channel repairs and maintenance; and 
(c) that while Futakuchi could not use yachi earth for constructing
new paddy land, Naka-kyoden would overlook (minogasu) its use of 
yachi earth for repairs to existing paddy lands (honden fushin)
and field ditch repairs in new paddy land areas. 
(see document in OB 1974:174) 
The document was signed by the four mediating village headmen. 
, 
64 The remaining fragment of the time schedule (OB 1974: 164) l. S :  
8.4 5 am to 8.5 5 am •• Harima (Branch Canal?)
•8.5 5 am to 8.5 7 am • Yunozawa, Futakuchi, Nonaka, & 
8. 5 7 am to 8.5 1
3 pm to 8.6 5 am 
Villages
•• Zennami Branch Canal 
Aoyama Branch Canal,. 
., 
..•·•• 
· <  
; 
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As might be expected, this did not end disputes between the two 
villages. In 1847, for example, a meeting of Futakuchi villagers
delegated a youth from the headman Tozo's household to enter Naka-kyoden 
village lands and cut and take out grass. The youth was subsequently 
caught, fanning the animosity between the villages and requiring mediation 
of an unspecified area village headman (OB 1974:169-70). Then, in 1852, 
Naka-kyoden petitioned domain officials that Futakuchi villagers had dug 
out a large volume of earth from the Naka-kyoden Branch Canal channel 
banks and carted it away by horsed. The district deputy ordered the 
headman of Harima Village to mediate the dispute , but no record remains of 
the resolution. 
It  was perhaps in part these problems with Naka-kyoden that had led 
Futakuchi villagers, beginning in 1665, to develop paddy lands on the west 
(left) bank of the Oyama River, across from their settlement, in an area 
that came to be known as Kakuda-shinden and, alternately, Monmaed. 
Generally speaking, lands on the west bank of the Oyama River faced a 
precarious water situation. While land to the far west, against the line 
of coastal dunes, could be irrigated with ponded rainfall and run-off 
(notably the two ponds behind the town of Oyama that remain today), lands 
towards the center of the plain on the west bank of the Oyama River were 
in a much less favored position. They were too distant from the ponds (or 
rather, the ponds were too small to service them), and the Oyama River 
flow was too little �nd too variable (or rather, its small flow was 
largely diverted by older villages in the very southwestern corner of the 
plain where the Oyama River first entered the plain). Development of the 
west bank land depended in large part on Aka River water,  but because this 
development did not really begin until after the 1658 register, these 
lands were ot part of the main canal service area. Instead, cultivators 
had to nego iate with villages within the Shoryujigawa service area to 
receive exc ss water and drainage as morai-mizu. 
This was the situation with the new lands opened by Futakuchi 
cultivators beginning in 1665. Indeed, rather than being able to use 
excess wate from the Naka-kyoden Branch Canal (which drained into the 
Oyama River after passing through their village, but which the evidence 
above sugge ts to have been insufficient even for their older paddy 
lands), the were forced to negotiate with villages from other branch 
canal areas Initially, they arranged with No-koya Village (on the 
Takadamugi ranch Canal) to use its excess water (josui); they constructed 
a flume (ka ehi) over the Oyama River to the new paddy lands (see Map 8). 
The supply, however, seems to have proved insufficient because in 1721 
Futakuchi V llage negotiated to use the drainage water (akusui) from 
Shobu, another Takadamugi Branch Canal villaged. They accomplished this by 
extending a canal from Shobu through the land of a third village, 
Shin-koya, and then constructing a second flume across the Oyama River. 
They received approval and some expenses from the Oyama shogunate officed. 
Additionally, they promised Shobu and Shin-koya Villages that they would 
do nothing to disrupt the latter's water flow and would only expect excess 
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and drainage water. Presumably, there was both reimbursement to Shin-koya 
for the. land used in the canal extension and annual offerings of rice 
wine, but the documents do not state this (S/5 1974:d143-5, documents 1-4). 
This second water source appears to have encouraged additional 
expansion on the west bank in Kakuda-shinden because village records four 
years later, in 1725, note that 11.5 hectares of paddy lands recently 
opened with this water were suffering from severe drought damage! This 
over-expansion led to several incidents in which F'utakuchi cultivators 
from the new west bank paddy lands were caught cutting into and stealing
Shin-koya's water (that is, the extension. canal from Shobu to the second 
flume ran through Shin-koya, and Futakuchi cultivators perhaps diverted 
water from Shin-koya field ditches into that channel). When caught they 
were ordered to send a statement of apology (and perhaps rice wine },  but 
there is no evidence that this effectively deterred future attempts. This 
is a sequence of events repeated up and down the �yama River bank 
villages, as we shall see in more detailed cases below.d6 5  
In contrast to Futakuchi's vulnerable position vis a vis Naka-kyoden 
along the Naka-ky�den Branch Canal and vis a vis Shin-koya and Shobu 
Villagesd' canal extension, it was simultaneously involved in a protracted 
series of disputes of a similar nature in which it found itself in the 
opposite position.d• These disputes tended to ally Futakuchi together with 
Zennami and Higashi-nonuma Villages against the west bank village of 
Nishi-nonuma (just downriver from Kakuda-shinden; see again Map 8). 
Nishi-nonuma Village had been founded at least by the 1611 cadastre and 
there are records of paddy land expansion within the village boundaries in 
1632 and 1635; it thus substantially preceded Futakuchi cultivatorsd' 
expansion across the river to Kakuda-shinden in the. 1660s. Limited water 
resources led it to appeal in 1657 to Zennami and Higashi-nonuma Villages
to use their excess and drainage water by extending Zennami Branch Canal 
and building a flume across the Oyama River to its lands. The proposed 
flume would have to cross land lying within Futakuchi Village, so the 
initial petition was addressed to all three villages. In the subsequent 
exchange of agreements (shomon), Nishi-nonuma promised: 
(a) not to expect any irrigation water, except drainage, when there 
were shortages in Zennami and Higashi-nonuma; 
(b} not to operate the flume in such a way as to interfere with the 
water flow in Futakuchi paddy lands; and 
6 5  There was perhaps no further expansion in Kakuda-shinden after that; a 
1772 village report (sashidashi meisai-cho) listed for the whole 
village 17 households (93 persons) and about 30 ha of land assessed at 
301 koku. About 24 ha of that land was paddy land, including the older 
east bank paddy land and the newer west bank paddy land (OB 1974:50-2). .
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(c) to provide land in compensation for that used in canal extension 
and flume construction. 
(S/S 1974 :35-7 , documents #1,  #2) 66 
It was perhaps continued expansion of paddy fields that impelled 
Nishi-nonuma i� 1722 to arrange with Futakuchi to receive the drainage 
water from Kakuda-shinden (ibid.: 113-4, document #1) and then in 1769 ; to 
negotiate to recieve excess water from Futakuchi paddy lands around the 
village (ibid.: 114, document #2 ) .67  In return for the latter privilege, 
it was to pay Futakuchi six to (108 liters) of rice annually. 
Additionally, apparently as part of the original agreement with the three 
villages, Nishi-nonuma Village annually contributed workers to the Kumaide 
intake and Shoryujigawa Main Canal dredging as well as a share of main 
canal expense assessments. 
Then, in the spring of 1796, the flume which Nishi-nonuma had 
constructed across the Oyama River was washed away in the spring melt 
discharge, and it appealed to the domain authorities for financial 
assistance in repairing it. When Futakuchi, Zennami, and Higashi-nonuma 
Village officers learned of this, they were enraged--to judge from a 
statement sent by them to Nishi-nonuma which demanded: 
(a) that Nishi-nonuma paddy lands were not part of the Shoryujigawa
Main Canal service area; 
(b) that the Nishi-nonuma flume was in shogunate-administered landd· 
(i.e., within Futakuchi Village boundaries) and thus to petition 
directly to the domain without going through the Oyama shogunate 
office was highly out of order; 
(c) that in the future it must .dnever appeal to the domain authorities 
without notifying the three villages; and 
(d) that it must realize that even if the flume is washed out, it 
cannot begin repairs automatically without negotiations as this 
might cause further damage or difficulties to the three villages. 
66 One confu�ing piece of evidence is that the surviving copy of the 1658 
main canal registry includes Nishi-nonuma Village in Zennami Branch 
Canal (with a registered yield of 173.5016 koku). This is most 
certainly a mistake, as it had no full rights to main canal water. In 
fact, in the next main canal listing, one of the few differences with 
the 1658 document is that Nishi-nonuma does not appear (along with two 
other villages previously included in Zennami Branch Canal). 
67 Previously, drainage and excess water, if any, had been drained from 
Futakuchi paddy lands, at the tailend of Naka-kyoden Branch Canal, into 
the Oyama River. What Nishi-nonuma received permission for was to 
divert this into its canal extension fromd
0
Zennami and Higashi-nonuma. 
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The document continues with the admonition that if Nishi-nonuma did not 
agree to these conditions, not only would it be denied the excess and 
drainage water of the three villages, but also it would be denied the 
privilege of using the animal-feed grassland (magusaba, similar to a yachi 
wetlands) of Higashi-nonuma and Zennami as a source of earth fill. 
Nishi-nonuma acknowledged the conditions in writing (ibid. :114-7, 
documents #3, #4). 
The strident demands of the three villages towards Nishi-nonuma 
reflected a concern that Nishi-nonuma would use the repair project as a 
pretext for entering the official register of the main canal service area. 
Its prior contributions of workers and rice towards main canal maintenance 
and salaries represented a private arrangement with the three villages 
from whom it received main canal water. Now, the apparent fear of the 
three villages was that if the flume repairs received domain financial aid 
as a gOfushin project, Nishi-nonuna might then have a strong case for 
claiming full water rights and becoming an official part of the main canal 
service area. It is not without a measure of irony, of course, that at 
the time these three villages were vigorously insuring that the old order 
would be protected and that this would not happen, they were joining with 
other downstream villages to demand of the domain authorities an 
adjustment of traditional allocation of main canal water that would reduce 
the intake volumes of the midstream branch canals and increase volume 
available to their own downstream branch canals. 
Antagonism between Nishi-nonuma and the three villages broadened in the 
following year to include use of another yachi wetland. This was the 
Hirono Yachi in the west bank domain village of Bara-shinden, to the 
northwest of Nishi-nonuma. Together with eleven other 
shogunate-adminisetered villages, Futakuchi, Zennami, and Higashi-nonuma 
had the customary right to haul earth from the yachi by constructing a 
horse cart path into it; they made an annual payment of 25 bags of rice 
(1800 liters) (to the domain?).  
The yachi seems to have been close to the borders of Hiraoka and 
Nishi-nonuma. On a day in August of 1797, Futakuchi villagers were 
working in the yachi digging out earth, but because of high water in the 
field ditches along the path leading through the paddy fields to the 
yachi, they were unable to repair the path to get their loaded horse carts 
out. They asked cultivators in Nishi-nonuma, Hiraoka, and Bara-shinden to 
lower the tailgates of their field ditches to let out sufficient water so 
that they could get the loaded horse carts out. Not only did they refuse, 
but in the night, they completely stopped up the water flow and allowed 
the whole area to flood, making it impossible for people or horses to 
entere.ethe yachi. 
Nothing is known of events until the following year, 1798, when 
Futakuchi, Higashi-nonuma and Zennami informed Nishi-nonuma that for the 
present, they would not permit repairs to the _flume; in 1800, the 
6 8  
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Futakuchi Village headman attempted to abrogate the flume agreement 
altogether. Through intervention of the district deputy, Nishi-nonuma was 
at least allowed excess water during the 1800 spring transplanting period,
but following this, Futakuchi repeated its attempt to abrogate the 
agreement, citing not only the problems with Hirono Yachi but also another 
matter. 
It seems that there had been a major break in the embankment which · · 
Futakuchi maintained jointly with Shin-koya along the Oyama River., and 
Futakuchi argued that if Nishi-nonurna were permitted to operate the flume 
without repairs to the flood embankment, serious flooding of Futakuchi 
lands would occur.d6 8  It thus demanded that Nishi-nonuma supply 200 of the 
estimated 300 workers necessary to repair the embankment (ibid. : 117-8, 
document #5). 
Nishi-nonuma seems to have found this an unjustified demand and 
appealed to the domain through the village group headman, Sato Hachiemon, 
to intervene and temper the demands of Futakuchi (ibid.). Nishi-nonuma 
admitted that there was an agreement dating back about 140 years (to the 
time of its initial negotiations to use Futakuchi water) by whith it would 
supply laborers for repairs to the Shin-koya and Futakuchi embankment 
"here and there" (tokoro-dokoro). On that basis, it was willing to send 
over perhaps 20-30 persons, but it argued that Futakuchid' s  demand of 200 
workers was entirely unreasonable. Nishi-nonuma Village officers then . . 
went on to itemize other onerous demands which the three villages had 
burdened it with over the years. Not only was it required to pay each 
village annually 7.5 bags of rice, 8 5-sho casks of rice wine and parcels 
of dried fish, but it was also saddled with 11 miscellarieous irrigation 
expenses"; further.more, it was compensating the three villages with dry 
In the absence of locational and technical details, I conjecture the 
following (see Map 8). Futakuchi complained that if the water level in 
the Nishi-nonuma extension canal was allowed to rise above normal 
levels, it would back up and flood Futak�chi paddy fields. Fearing
this on occasion in the past, it had opened the spillway and drained 
water into the Oyama River. With a major break in the embankment, .it 
felt it was especially dangerous to allow the flume to operate. Flume 
operation involved opening and closing the gate on the Futakuchi side 
of the river. The gate would be closed when Nishi-nonuma did not need 
water, when there was no water, or when it needed water but the flow 
was especially low. In the last instance, the gate would be closed to 
allow the water level to build up, to develop a head with sufficient 
height and volume to flow easily across the flume when the gate was 
opened. This required close supervision because a delay could lead to 
flooding of paddy fields adjacent to the gate area and along the canal 
as water backed up. Futakuchi apparently wanted the spillway opened 
permanently to carry all drainage and excess water from Naka-kyoden and 
Zennami Branch Canals into the Oyama Rive�. 
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crop fields and yachi worth· almost 15 koku, and it had to permit the three 
villages to cut the grass along its paddy field borders. 
The three villages promptly sent the domain a counter-petition in which 
they denied all of the above except receipt of the rice, rice wine, and 
fish as "thanks" (orei) for allowing Nishi-nonuma to use their excess 
water. They protested that in a meeting between Zennami and Nishi-nonuma 
officers, the latter were unable to point out exactly where the sb�called 
compensation land was. Finally, they did agree that while Futakuchi did 
not have cutting rights, villagers from Zennami and Higashi-nonuma did 
enter Nishi-nonuma lands to cut grass (S/S 1974:118-20, document #6; cf. 
document #7). 
Resolution of this is unclear, though Nishi-nonuma continued to enjoy 
use of the flume. In any event, relations remained strained and in fact 
probably worsened over an incident several years later in 1814 concerning 
cutting of grass in Nishi-nonuma. Together with the grasses growing in 
the yachi wetlands, grasses which grew along the field borders and along 
the water channels and field paths were critical sources of feed for 
animals and, worked into the soil, valuable green fertilizer. Cutting 
rights were frequently conferred to another village in exchange for water 
use rights and were constant sources of intra-village and inter-village 
friction. 
In late June or early July of 1814, five or six villagers from 
Futakuchi were cutting grass along a water channel bank in Nishi-nonuma 
land when thirty to forty Nishi-nonuma villagers attacked them, took away 
their hand sickles and straw rope, and threw them in the water channel; 
several were cut and injured .  All of this was related in detail in a 
protest from Futakuchi officers (also signed by the Zennami headman) to 
the Oyama shogunate office; the protest also insisted that Futakuchi had 
an unlimited right to cut grass along water channels, paddy field bunds, 
and yachi land within Nishi-nonuma. 
Nishi-nonuma appears to have responded that those villagers were from 
Futakuchi' s  west bank settlement (Kakuda-shinden, formerly a part of 
Futakuchi) and thus had no such right. Futakuchi then claimed that the 
construction of a channel from Kakuda-shinden to Nishi-nonuma in the early 
1700s indeed gave them the right (S/S 1974:122-3, document #8). It asked 
for compensation for the injuries suffered and a statement from 
Nishi-nonuma formally specifying this cutting right. Nishi-nonuma did 
send a statement addressed to Futakuchi and Zennami acknowledging the 
latter's right to cut grass around the flume area and along the extension 
canal banks though details of the mediation required to secure such 
agreement are lacking (ibid . :123, document #9)e. 
A document sent the following year (1815) to the shogunate office by 
Futakuchi claimed that Nishi-nonuma was not living up to the agreement; 
Nishi-nonuma apparently declared that it did not need the water it had 
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been getting from Kakuda-shinden and closed off the gate,· creating much 
flooding on Kakuda-shinden lands. Futakuchi reported in a follow-up 
petition in April that it had dug a 130 ken (237 meter) drainage channel 
to the Oyama River for its drainage water (actually, it probably redug and. 
old channel used before the agreement with Nishi-nonuma) (S/S 1974:124-5,
documents #10, #11). 
Nishi-nonuma responded with a request to domain authorities that it 
wanted to build a flume from Futakuchi to use the three villages' water at 
the place where Kakuda-shinden drainage channel emptied in
.
to the Oyama 
River but that this would require construction of an embankment 
(presumably along the west bank of the Oyama River); because the labor 
requirements would be high, it asked that it be designated a domain public 
works project (gofushin). Nishi-nodnuma further proposed to Futakuchi that 
instead of the overhead flume (kakehi) it construct a river diversion weir 
and intake (irihi). 
This proposal is difficult to evaluate in the absence of technical 
details, but it appears to have been a shrewd one. Nishi-nonuma was 
clearly still trying to get onto the official service area registry--or at 
minimum to secure some form of domain protection for its water sources, in 
the belief that domain support for its water works would bring domain 
sanction for its water supply. In addition, it was attempting to redesign 
its delivery system in such a way that it could use Kakuda-shinden 
drainage water without obligation. That is, previously, it had two water 
sources; it extended a channel from Kakuda-shinden to its paddy lands and 
it had dug a channel from Zennami and Higashi-nonuma through Futakuchi and 
then over the Oyama River by overhead flume to its paddy lands. When it 
told Futakuchi that it no longer needed the Kakuda-shinden drainage, 
Futakuchi responded by reopening a direct channel from Kakuda-shinden to 
the Oyama River. Now Nishi-nonuma was proposing that instead of an 
overhead flume for the second source, the three villages' water be drained 
into the Oyama River (through the embankment) and that Nishi-nonuma then 
construct a weir in the river just downstream of the discharge to divert 
the water into a cut (irihi, also referred to as sokohi or umehi) through 
an embankment it would build (by reinforcing the existing levee) on the 
west bank of the Oyama River. Because this weir-irihi would also be 
downstream of the Kakuda-shinden drainage outlet, it could divert that 
water as well (without the former obligations such as cutting rights and 
annual payments of rice and wine). 
Needless to say, Futakuchi was opposed to such a shift from flume to 
weir, claiming that this would interfere with Kakuda-shinden drainage and 
that past documents clearly referred to an "overhead flume" (uehi or 
kakehi); it threatened that it would withdraw its permission to run the 
extension channel from Zennami and Higashi-nonuma through its lands if the 
design change was made. The response of Nishi-nonuma, as reported in a 
Futakuchi petition to the Oyama shogunate office, was that there was in 
fact no record which specified "overhead flume" and that they intended to 
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go ahead with the proposed change. Futakuchi appealed to the Oyama office 
that it have the domain order that all embankment work be done by 
Nishi-nonwna and that, as in the past, an overhead flume be installed. 
Two days after this appeal, on May 1st, village officers from Futakuchi 
were summoned to the Byama office. They were informed that Nishi-nonwna 
had petitioned the domain (i.e., village group headman) that the diversion 
· -- - · ·of Kakuda-shinden drainage into the Oyama River wasecausinge·ethem 
considerable difficulties (this was the time of spring field preparation 
and transplanting); because of that they had requested that the old 
extension channel from Kakuda-shinden to Nishi-nonuma be re-opened 
temporarily. The same day, after the Futakuchi officers had returned 
home, they were visited by village officers from Nishi-nonuma, 
Bara-shinden, and Hirooka, who informed them that the domain had agreed to 
provide financial support for the proposed irihi project. They further 
annoyed the Futakuchi officers by not mentioning the subsequent petition 
to the domain to order a temporary re-opening of the Kakuda-shinden 
extension channel (Futakuchi reports this in a somewhat injured tone in 
document #12, ibid. : 125-6, implying that at least they might have had the 
courtesy to request it directly of Futakuchi ! ). 
Despite the affront, the extension channel was apparently reopened, 
because other Futakuchi documents (#13-4, ibid.:e126-7) from later in May 
detailed continuous squabbling between Futakuchi and Nishi-nonuina over the 
opening and closing of the gate along that channel leading from 
Kakuda-shinden lands into Nishi-nonuma lands. 
The year did see some resolution to the wrangling, however. At the · 
beginning of June, acting on orders from the district deputy, Nishi-nonuma 
finally returned to Futakuchi four hand scythes and two lengths of straw 
rope that villagers had taken from Futakuchi villagers in the previous .
summer's attack. Then, in September, through the mediation of headmen 
from Umamachi and Ara-koya Villages (acting as toriatsukainin), some 
measure of settlement was reached. In the exchanged agreement papers 
(sumi-kuchi shomon, document #15, ibid.:127), Nishi-nonuma formally 
requested use of Kakuda-shinden's excess and drainage water. . The direct 
drainage channel to the Oyama River was not to be opened up, and 
procedures were specified for operating the gate along the 
Kakuda-shinden/Nishi-nonuma channel. When the closed gate threatened to 
back up the water and flood Kakuda-shinden paddy lands, it was to be
opened by Nishi-nonuma; after 70-80% of the water had drained through, 
Futakuchi would notify Nishi-nonuma and the latter would close it again. 
As an addendum to the agreement, the Oyama office also ordered 
Nishi-nonuma to pay Futakuchi two bags of rice for its efforts in 
· reopening the drainage channel to the Oyama River from Kakuda-shinden 
(which then was not used). Futakuchi was also to receive one bag of rice 
in payment for injuries to one of its villagers in the previous summer's 
attack; half of the bag went to the victim, half of the bag financed two 
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casks of rice wine for all the villagers. There was no mention of the 
issue of the overhead flume. 
(2) A midstream branch canal : Hayashizaki Branch Canal 
Hayashizaki Branch Canal, one of the large midstream branch canals in 
the Kyoden area, provides another example of a branch canal which came 
under pressure to grant morai-mizu water rights to new developing paddy
lands across the Oyama River. It contrasts with the Nishi-nonuma case in 
that domain officials, appearing more indecisive here, were unable to 
persuade villages in the Hayashizaki Branch Canal service area to grant 
these rights. 
Hayashizaki Branch Canal in 1726 had a registered paddy land service 
area of 1890.8260 koku spread among seven administrative villages (see 
Table 18). Four of these villages had paddy lands wholly contained in 
this branch canal service area, while three others had lands in one other 
branch canal area. Hayashizaki Branch Canal took off from the main canal 
just west of the castle town and ran roughly northwest through the Kyoden 
area, draining into the �yama River (see Map 6). There are references in 
the documents to a branch canal guard (seki-mori); the role was apparently 
customarily filled by a villager from Hayashizaki Village (Jinushi 
1958:35). Together with guards of three other branch canals in the Kyoden
area, he is said by a present-day historian (ibid. ) to have 'served 
underd' the Kyoden Village Group headman, but the exact meaning of that 
claim is not clear. 
In the late 1660s, Yonede, a west bank village, developed a new area of 
paddy named Rokumyo-shinden and constructed an overhead flume across the 
Oyama River to use drainage water from Yurushi-tori and No-koya Villages, 
along the Takadamugi Branch Canal (whose service area was adjacent to that 
of Hayashizaki's). In 1714, the flume measured 4.84 meters long, 0.76 
meters wide and 0.42 meters high. As expansion proceeded in 
Rokumyo-shinden, that water supply seems to have proved insufficient 
because in 1766, Yonede applied to the domain for permission to construct 
a second flume across the Oyama River which would connect with Hayashizaki 
Branch Canal and use its excess water (sute-mizu).  
This drew a strong protest in the form of a document addressed to the 
village group headman and the rural magistrate and signed by the two 
Kyoden main canal guards69 and the headmen of forty villages in the mid­
and downstream sections of the Shoryujigawa network; these included 
headmen of Shobu-numa, Shin-koya, and Futakuchi Villages, all of whom we 
This is the only document I have discovered in which the Kyoden Main 
Canal Guards appear as signatories. 
69 
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Table 18 
Hayashizaki Branch Canal service area 
village 1658 Registry
(koku) 
1726 Map
(koku) 
Hayashizaki 991 . 8860 999. 8860 
Nishi-kyoden 400. 1020 400. 1020 
Takadamugi 58.  58. 
Abe-koya 38.556 38.556 
Daibe-kyoden 282.282 282.282 
Tanba-k5ya 7 0 .  120. 
Niigata 106 . 1751 0 .  
TOTAL SERVICE AREA 1946.1001 1890.8260 
Noted: As discussed in the text, the differences in the 
1658 and 1726 figures may merely reflect errors in the 
copy of the documents, as might the 8 koku discrepancy 
the 1726 service area total and the sum of the village 
• •surviving
between 
totals. 
Source: S/S 1974 :24-34, 43-53 
have seen were at the time involved in similar arrangements with west bank 
villages. Although Yonede Village was in shogunate-administered 
territory, six of the forty signers were also shoguate-administered 
villages (including Shobu-numa, Shin-koya, and Futakuchi) ,. supporting
evidence previously cited that this domain-shogunate administrative 
distinction was of little consequence as a predictor of alignments in 
irrigation matters. 
In this protest (document #1 , S/S 1974 : 130-2) of April of 1767, they
claimed that while in the past there might have been some surplus water in 
the Hayashizaki Branch Canal, because of recent water shortages in the 
main canal area, domain officials had surveyed and ordered a narrowing of 
' .. . ,. . 
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the branch canal's intake gate dimensions.e7 0  They reminded the domain 
that previous requests by west bank villages, such as the one in 1735, had
been turned down. Finally, they claimed that the headman of Rinda Village 
(along the Takadamugi Branch Canal) had been acting improperly in 
supplying water to Yonede through the existing flume; they charged that 
although he said the water which Rinda, Yurushi-tori, and No-koya Villages 
were supplying was drainage water .e(akusui), it was in fact "irrigation 
water" (y�sui), i.e.,  extra water taken in from the main canal along 
Takadamugi Branch Canal expressly for Yonede. The protest asked that this 
arrangement be halted .  
Domain officials apparently made an attempt to persuade the Kyoden 
villages in a communication in October of the same year, but the Kyoden 
villages responded adamantly in a petition of the same month (document #2, 
ibid. : 132-3). They noted that because of frequent dry periods in the 
summer monthse, the eleven branch canals of the midstream and downstream 
sections of the network cooperated( ! )  in sharing water; thus , the matter 
of Yonede's request was not merely of Hayashizaki's concern. They 
insisted that there was no excess water (sute-mizu) in the summer months 
as even adequate drinking water supply was imperiled. They closed. with 
the reminder that changes in the intake gate dimensions of Hayashizaki 
Branch Canal had further eliminated any possibility of excess water. 
Efforts of domaine.eand Oyama shogunate officials to persuade the Kyoden
area villages continued through the year; they argued that Yonede would 
simply be using water which the branch canal dumped into the Oyama River 
and that it would not be receiving "irrigation water" (yosui). Yonede 
would further neither expect water when there were shortages nor cause any 
disruptions to branch canal water flow with the operation of its flume. 
Again the Kyoden villages refused .e. The matter was never seen by them as 
only affecting Hayashizaki Branch Canal , and they were clearly wary of 
being open to escalating demands from Yonede , once the gate was open, so 
to speak. 
The issue continued for several years, and in May of 1772, the Ky8den 
area villages again refused domain overtures. This time, they 
specifically cited the case of the four west bank villages of Oyama, 
Tomoe, Sunaoshi, and Yanagihara-shindene, which had been receiving excess 
water from branch canals in Yodogawa Village Group (Terada and Kuranowaki 
Branch Canals). These four villages were now demanding regular allocation
shares (bunsui) and wanted to be included on the main canal registry. 
Such claims, they noted, were now seriously complicating efforts by 
villages in the downstream section of the main canal service area to 
secure a readjustment of main canal allocation water (document #4, 
ibid. :134-5, cf. document #5, ibid . :135-6). 
7 0  This refers to the 1753 survey of branch canal intakes by domain 
authorities and subsequent changes ordered in intake dimensions. 
. .. 
. .. . . 
. ' 
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Unfortunately, final disposition of the issue is not known, although 
there is no evidence to suggest that Yonede was successful in its request. 
After the above discussion of Futakuchi and Nishi-nonuma, the pattern is 
familiar however. The humbly stated guarantees of non-interference which 
accompanied the request are predictable, but we may also pardon the 
skepticism of the Kyoden area villages, given the difficulties of 
Futakuchi, Zennami, and Higashi-nonuma. Although we cannot judge the 
degree to which there actually was a volume of usable excess and/or
drainage water available at the tail-end of the branch canal, the fears of 
the branch canal villages seem justifiable enough--not only in the light 
of the tendency for water once received to become customarily expected but 
also because of the vociferous complaints of downstream branch canals and 
the subsequent adjustment of midstream branch canal intakes in 1753 and 
later in 1794. 
The last point also explains the support lent to the Kyoden area 
petitions by downstream villages such as Futakuchi, Zennami, and 
Narita-shinden. Such an arrangement could come to have unpleasant 
consequences for their available water supply as well. But it is, of 
course, further evidence of the situational nature of cooperation and 
contention in the network that they would be joining together with and in 
support of midstream villages at the same time as they were engaged in 
rancorous disagreement with them. 
The somewhat irresolute conduct of domain officials (i.e., the village 
group headman and rural magistrates) in the matter is also interesting. 
This may very well reflect the fact that the officials were caught in the 
middle in this issue. Yonede Village was in shogunate-administered 
territory which meant that paddy land expansion there would be of no 
profit to the domain; at the same time, because the matter did involve the 
shogun's lands, it perhaps felt impelled to lend some assistance to the 
request. It thus ended up straddling the fence: attempting to persuade 
but not ordering Hayashizaki Branch Canal villages to grant Yonede water 
use rights. The case illustrates another irrigation context in which the 
decisive exercise of domain authority was constrained by circumstances. 
(3) A downstream branch canal: Aoyama Branch Canal 
The third example of matters at the branch and tertiary canal levels 
and the manner in which they were handled concerns Aoyama Branch Canal, at 
the tail-end of the main canal. More particularly, it concerns problems
along the tertiary level canal serving Narita-shinden. 
In the 1650s, Aoyama Branch Canal served the four villages of Aoyama, 
Tenshindo, Obana, and Inoko (see Maps 4 and 6). The canal branched from 
the main canal just west of Yunozawa Village and passed first through
Aoyama and then Tenshindo, both built on high ground along the levee of 
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the Aka River. At Tenshindo, a tertiary canal seems to have branched west 
to the paddy lands of Obana Village. The branch canal continued through
Tenshindo to Inoko Village, where it turned west to serve the Inoko paddy 
lands in the low-lying center between the Aka River and the Oyama River. 
I conjecture that drainage water was conducted through several channels, 
including the tail of the branch canal itself, into the Oyama River. 
Then in 1658, Narita-shinden was founded in that extreme downstreamd· ·  
triangle of land bordered by the Aka River, the Oyama River, and Inoko 
Village lands. As discussed in chapter two, the founders and backers of 
the new village , including the Kyoden Village Group headman, Narita 
Heizaemon, successfully concluded negotiations with the four villages to 
dig a channel from the Aoyama Branch Canal to Narita lands. The original 
document does not survive, but later records show that in compensation for 
land used in the channel construction, Narita-shinden granted developed 
land within its boundaries to three of the four villages.  Aoyama recieved 
1.73 hectares of paddy land, Tenshindo, 1.69 hectares, and Inoko, 4.42 
hectares of yachi grassland. Compared with Narita-shinden's initial total 
development of 300 koku, the land granted was not inconsiderable. 
However, because an early attempt to take in water dir�ctly from the Aka 
River had failed, Narita-shinden had no other choice (Ose 1952). 
As Map 4 indicates, a 4423 meter channel was dug from Aoyama Branch 
Canal on the edge of Aoyama Village, through the territory of Aoyama, 
Tenshindo, and Inoko Villages. As it entered the Narita-shinden 
settlement, it divided into an "Upper Canal" of 1128 meters in length and 
a "Lower Canal" of 1747 meters. Field ditches ran off of these two canals 
(an exception to the general pattern of four levels of water delivery 
canals); Ose (1952:18) estimates that field ditches totalled another 7280 
meters and drainage ditches (yoko-sado), 1820 meters. Water was drained 
into the Oyama River just above its confluence with the Aka River through 
gates in the embankment.d7 1  The gates also served to prevent backflow from 
the river during high water from going up the channels and flooding the 
fields. There were four such gates, approximately 12.7 meters long, 3 .4  
meters high, and 3 . 6  meters wide. They were said to require replacement 
every eight years. A Project Completion Report (deki-mokuroku) for one 
such replacement project in 1746 suggests that the gates were major,
costly works; one gate that year cost 24 ryo in total project expenses
(equivalent at the time to about 24 koku of rice; see the document in 5se 
1 952:18-23). Because it was a domain public works project (gofushin), the 
domain paid for half of the expenses. 
The fact that the Narita Tertiary Canal ran through three villages from 
its intake above Aoyama Village was the source of constant difficulties 
for Narita cultivators. The following two series of incidents illustrate 
7 1  This was the embankment constructed in the ,1660s that was the locus of 
considerable friction with Obana Village, as we saw above. 
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thesee.difficulties; while both occurred in 1812, they are no doubt typical 
of !ong-standing problemse. (Both cases are based on documents reproduced 
in Ose 1952 :67-74.) 
One of these problems was with the village of Inoko, which had argued 
in the past that Narita did not have full rights to Shoryujigawa main 
canal water. The implication was that Narita would have to ask Inoko for 
water (morai-mizu), to which conditions of dependence could be attached. 
In  late May of 1812, just before transplanting, it reiterated that claim 
and stopped the flow to the Narita Tertiary Canal. 
The question of Narita-shinden•s rights to Shoryujigawa water was 
somewhat problematical. The village was founded in 1658, the same year as 
the main canal registry was drawn up, and while it does not appear on the 
surviving copy of the registry list, it is written in on the accompanying 
map. Moreover, in one of the few changes in the 1732 listing, it appears 
as 1 1Aoyama Branch Canal" (Aoyama edaseki), the only such tertiary level 
canal to be recorded. It  was distinct from the 11 Aoyama Canal" listing, 
which itemized the registered irrigation acreage yields for the four 
original villages. 11Aoyama Branch Canal" then appeared as: 
Aoyama edaseki taka 339.728 koku 
Inoko-mura 
Narita-mura 
Because Inoko is itemized under the main canal column, I suspect that the 
339.728 koku is actually the Narita-shinden figure alone. This listing, 
though somewhat irregular, and the fact that some of its watere·eworks 
(e.g., the drainage gates) were domain public works projects, strongly 
suggests that it had a clear and full claim to main canal watere'. 
Narita-shinden so argued this in a petition to the village group 
headman in late May or early June, noting further that it was alloted a 
labor requisition share in Kumaide intake reconstruction and repair and 
that it paid a full share in the upkeep of Aoyama Branch Canal. The 
villagers were thus in every way "children of the canal" (se'ki-ko). 
Despite several such petitions to the village group headman that he 
order Inoko to let their water through, he apparently did not act. ., 
Narita-shinden asked for a meeting with Inoko Village officers. As they 
were approaching the village, a horn blew and they found themselves 
surrounded by a large crowd of Inoko Villagers; a fight seemed imminent. 
In subsequent exchanges, Inoko officers insisted that although the channel 
itself might belong to Narita-shinden, the water was Inokoe1 s, and it 
refused to allow any of it to pass down to Narita lands. 
Narita then sent a direct petition to the rural magistrate, realizing 
that the village group headman was not going to act (document in Ose 
1952 : 70-2). As a result, an assistant in the rural magistrate's office 
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conducted a survey of the Narita Tertiary Canal and discovered four places 
along the channel where Inoko cultivators were taking out water. The 
rural magistrate ordered these filled in, ordered Inoko Village to allow 
water through to Narita, and imposed a modest but unspecified punishment 
on the Inoko Village headman and water guard (documents in Ose 1952:73-4). 
A second incident involved difficulties with Tenshindo Village. Water 
flow in the Narita Tertiary Canal again stopped on Junee- -10; just at the 
height of rice transplanting and just after the above problems with Inoko. 
Upon investigation, Narita cultivators discovered that a number of cuts 
had been made in the Narita channel within Tenshindo lands, through which 
most of the water was being drawn out. Tenshindo refused to repair the 
cuts, so Narita cultivators did. Shortly thereafter, the banks were cut 
into again at night, and again Narita cultivators made the necessary 
repairs. When this continued, it was forced to post guards day and night 
along the channel, a costly exercise during transplanting, one of the two 
peak labor demands of the year. Narita finally appealed to the village 
group headman, who this time agreed with Narita's grievance. He ordered 
that the disruption of flow cease, although no penalties seem to have been 
assessed Tenshindo (document reproduced in 6se 1952 :67-8 ) .  
Chapter VI 
THE NAKAGAWA NETWORK 
The second water delivery network that will be examined is the Nakagawa 
canal network. I n  paddy land served, Nakagawa was in the Tokugawa period
and remains today the second largest in the Aka River basin. In the 
1850s, its registered paddy land yield totalled approximately 17,300 koku,
compared with Shoryujigawa's registered yield of 31,800 koku. Together
they represented about one-quarter of all registered paddy land in Shonai 
Domain. In  contrast to Shoryujigawa's upstream intake position along the 
Aka River, however, the Nakagawa intake was downstream of all others 
except the very small Daihoji Main Canal, which served about thirty 
hectares of paddy land east of the castle town. In this chapter, we will 
have occasion to note a number of similarities and contrasts between 
irrigation matters in the two networks. 
It  is wortb reiterating at the outset that in the Nakagawa area, as in 
the rest of the basin, ' hydrological' lines of water courses only poorly
matched domain administrative boundaries. Fifty-two of the fifty-three 
administrative villages in the main canal service area were organized into 
four domain village groups; in addition, some of the lands of two of these 
villages and of the fifty-third village were part of a fief grant from the 
domain lord to Kato Tadahiro in 1632. When Kato died in 1653, these lands 
reverted to shogunate administration (as we saw with some lands within the 
Shoryujigawa area). 
One of the four village groups, Kurogawa, was attached to Kushibiki 
District, while the other three were attached to Nakagawa Districtn. Only
two of the four village groups were wholly contained within the service 
area, and only one of these-- the small Oshikiri Village Group-­
corresponded to branch canal water course lines; it comprised the seven 
villages of Oshikiri Branch Canal. 
These were the administrative divisions of the latter half of the 
domain period (see Table 19 and Table 20). There had been some 
administrative elaboration and shifting through the period, but it does 
· not appear to have been related to water course divisions. At the end of 
the seventeenth century, Yokoyama Village Group was divided into possibly
three village groups--Naganuma, Aragawa, and Yokoyama Village Groups. 
Then, at some time between 1718 and 1720, there was a further 
'.· 
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rearrangement that shifted five administrative villages back to Yokoyama
Village Group from Aragawa and created Oshikiri Village Group from seven 
other villages in Yokoyama Village Group. Only the last shift can be said 
to reflect water course divisions, though there is no evidence that 
irrigation matters prompted the realignment. 
Generally speaking, ' most of the villages in the upper two-thirds of the 
Nakagawa service area existed with at least some surrounding paddy lands 
in 1615, the estimated date for the digging of the main canal. That is,
there is evidence for agricultural settlements in the area along the Aka 
River bank (the western edge of the service area) as far down as 
Yokoyama,d72 along the Kurose-Fujishima River (the eastern boundary of the 
service area) as far as Hirakata and Yokogawa Villages, and some expansion
in the center of the service area down as far as Kato Village (see Map 9). 
Soon after the main canal was dug, there was expansion of paddy land along 
the Aka River beyond Yokoyama with the settlement of Sanbongi, Tsushima, 
and Oshikiri Villages (YKS 1980:546). In the second half of the 
seventeenth century, new villages appeared in the downstream area;
residential settlements concentrated on the higher ground along the Aka 
and Fuj ishima Rivers with paddy lands opened to the center through
draining and conversion of the low-lying, wet grassland; Yokogawa-shinden 
and Doguchi to the east and Fukuoka to the west were settled at this time. 
The biggest single development was the registry of almost 49 hectares of 
new paddy land in Shimo-doguchi in 1685. Finally, in the eighteenth 
century, the most downstream areas began to be opened up, notably 
Hirono-shinden beginning in 1713 and Okui-shinden in 1788. 
At the same time, of course, there was paddy land development in the 
upstream areas as well, exploiting remaining grasslands, draining small 
swamps and bogs, and converting dry fields. Table 21, however, suggests
from scattered and scanty evidence that after at least the mid-1600s, and 
with several local exceptions, there was only modest (registered) 
expansion in the upper two-thirds of the service area. I estimate that in 
1675, the total registered yield of paddy lands within the Nakagawa Main 
Canal service area was in the range of 12,000 koku, that in 1775, this 
total was in the range of perhaps 16,000 koku. By the end of the domain 
period in 1867, the total was 17255.1712 koku. 
It is of course quite difficult to obtain accurate figures for the 
extent to which registered yields and acreages under-represented actual 
acreages. However, the national land survey, undertaken in 1874-6 as part 
of the reformation of the land tax and conducted rather fastidiously in 
areas like Shonai which had opposed the new central authorities; does 
permit some estimates of under-registration in the domain period. Paddy
land acreage figures for the 1867 village registers and for the post-Land 
72 With the exception of Ishino-shinden, a small area at the very top of 
the service area not developed until the la-te 1700s. 
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Table 20 
Administrative villages in the Nakagawa Main Canal service area 
village households principal land village registered 
(1850) tax rate (1850) paddy land yield (1867) 
? ?Matsuo • • 200* koku
Kawahara • ?• 90*
Akagawa 
? 
?• ?. 250* 
? ?Ishino-shinden • • 26*
21*? ?Shimo-mawatari • • 
? ?Nakaj ima • •
Osaeguchi 14 28%
Hosoya 29 
85.0417
45%
Makunouchi 18
Mitsubashi 15 
660.8531
400.a1922 
97.3756
728.9895 
43%
41.3%
41 . 3% 
24
Kariyanome
Kami-aramata 42%
42%
42%
Naka-aramata 25 
371.9512
323 . 6168 
252.1433
31. 3939 
74 . 6804 
Shimo-aramata
Aramata-shinden 
Mimasu-shinden 
Higashi-watamae 
0
18
19 
33%
39%
32.2% 381 .9835 
Higashi-watamae
(shogunate) 
Nishi-watamae
Makunouchi
(shogunate) 
Makunouchi-shinden
Daihanda
Tsukegawa
Arayashiki 
32
41 
8
0 
35 
?• 
?.
33% 
.?.
61%
49%
52%
51.2% 
220.0000
706.7379 
80.7080
24.4932
608.9679
539.9185
417.4744 
Matagari-shinden 3 46% 29 .4854
Kami-fujishima 28 38% 412.6338
Hirakata 67 54% 365.7506
400 . 1922 ?.
55%
Wanagawa (shogunate) 30
Sunazuka 11 247.7019 
751 . 1241 
124.4421
152.4193
476.6840 
485.a5421 
Yokogawa 83
Yokogawa-shinden 28
Tsutsumino 19
Yokouchi 36
'l'suchibashi 33 
44%
65%
51%
43%
54%Takewarada 13 427.0869
52%
43%
Shoshaku
Hishi-nonuma 
20
15 
308.4243
250.3158 
Kato 11 ?• 162.2503 
Kami-doguchi 15 49% 46. 5240 
Shimo-doguchi 41 29% 611.4475 
57.2% 
54 57.2% 
47.3% 
47.3% 
47.3% 
33 
164 
Yokoyama-kamigumi 38 
78 
57.2% 894.n8469 
772.4911 
694.9317
Yokoyama-nakagumi
Yokoyama-shimogumi
Sanbongi 37 47.3% 184.4304 
Tsushima . 047.3-& 397.n8342 
73
?• 
Oshikiri-kamigumi 184.4304 
Oshikiri-nakagumi 68 
Oshikiri-shimogumi 63 
Fukuoka 
272.n7250 
257.6874 
321.n6275 ?•?• 
ioya 4 33% 52. 8418 
? ?Ofuchi • . 114.1909 
Hirono-shinden 138 30% 914.5916 
Hayashi-shinden 0 
Okui-shinden 
36.9% 18.6920 
80.658015 
Nakamura ?• ? ?• . 
*n=nThese are only approximate yield totals for these 
villagesn. 
Sources : compiled from 0B:110, Naganuma 1964:437-442,
and Nakagawa Irrig Coop 1935 
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Table 21 
Paddy land expansion in Nakagawa service area villages 
A. This table compares figures for total village registered yields 
from a Shoho era (1644-48) map, a portion of which is reproduced 
in Nakagawa Irrig Coop 1935, with similar figures from the 1867 
village land registers (omizuche). Because the f· igures are those 
of total registered yields and not just of paddy land yields , they 
are useful only in suggesting the magnitude of expansion. 
1 1Yokoyama11 on the Shoho map included the three Yokoyama villages and 
the village of Tsuchibashi. 
village Sh5h5 era 1867
(1644-48) 
Osaeguchi 130.202 koku 125. 8217 koku 
Hosoya 722.1 719.6047 
Tsukegawa 620.8 641.6396
Arayashiki 424.169 434.8377
Kami- fujishima 481.302 501.5532
Tsutsumino 40.69 174.1200
Yokouchi 471.135 504.2975
Nishi-watamae 782.489 851.7636
Shoshaku 312.999 331.6983
Hishinonuma 233.194 254.7245
Yokoyama 3161.731 3204.4798
Sunazuka 60. 344 261.4329 
Kato 167.755 167.9511 
B.  A second set of figures are here collated to compare registered 
acreage of paddy land on the 1669 omizucho with that on the 
1867 omizucho. 
village 1669 1867 
Tsushima 38. 7  hectares 42.8 hectares
Sanbongi 17. 3  19.3
Oshikiri-kamigumi 33.8 37 . 6
Oshikiri-shimogumi 28.0 37.7
Kami-doguchi 1.8 6 .9
Shimo-doguchi 2 . 5  70. 2  
' 
Source: OB 1974:102-3 
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Tax survey 1876 registers are known for twenty of the fifty-three villages 
in the Nakagawa network (see Table 22). It is safe to assume that there 
was little, if any, paddy land conversion in that nine-year interval and 
that the increases in paddy land acreage reported after the survey reflect 
the under-registration in the domain village land registers. It is 
significant to note that while in all cases there was a discrepancy in 
paddy land acreage, there was wide variation in the order of such 
discrepancies (from 1.29 times in Naka-aramata to 3.53 times in Hirakata) 
but there was no simple correlation between extent of under-registration 
and location in the service area. Figures are not available for villages 
in the most upstream and the most downstream areas, but it is interesting 
that the five Oshikiri area villages, located along Oshikiri Branch Canal 
immediately after canal construction in the 1610s and located in thee
at the tail-end of the main canal, were surveyed at only 1.41 times their 
domain period acreage. The three Aramata villages, settled either before 
· or 
upstream section, were surveyed at 1.81 times (Kami-aramata), 1.29 times 
(Naka-aramata) and 1.60 times (Shimo-aramata) their domain register 
figures, a variation difficult to explain. 
The evidence, then, suggests that in the Nakagawa network , as in the 
Shoryujigawa networke, the taxable, registered paddy land acreage figures 
considerably understated actual paddy land acreages by the end of the 
domain period. If one assumes that the range of variation in 
under-registration i� the twenty villages for which figures are known 
holds true for the entire main canal service area, and given a known 
post-Land Tax main canal acreage figure of 2971.07 hectares, the 
registered acreage of the main canal service area in 1867 would have been 
1632.46 hectares (a 1.82 increase after the 1875 survey). I will argue in 
this chapter that this under-registration of acreage--its extent and 
variation among villages--was probably at once an important factor in 
water allocation disputes and at the same time a reason why such disputes 
were not pressed in too much detail with domain authorities. 
The intake and main canal • 
Chapter one reviewed the few details known of the origins of the 
Nakagawa Main Canal. Circumstantial evidence suggests canal digging was 
organized by a district deputy of Niizeki, himself the deputy placed by 
Mogami at the rebuilt fortifications at Tsuruoka, in cooperation with 
local peasant cultivator leaders in about 1615. Throughout the domain 
period there is no mention of construction of a gate at the intake cut 
through the river levees (known as ichi-no-kuchi, the "first opening"),  
and I believe it reasonable to assume that the intake remained a temporary 
structure--a simple cut in the levee, with minor reinforcements of the 
earth sides to retard erosion. Indeed, the location of the intake itself 
was apparently subject to some change (Nakagawa Irrig Coop 1935); because 
it was near the bottom of the alluvial fan section of the river, it was 
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Table 22 
Comparative paddy land acreages in selected Nakagawa villages 
village 1867 land 1876 land change
register register (1867=100) 
Karni-aramata 
Aramata-shinden 
Naka-aramata 
Shimo-aramata 
Daihanda 
Higashi-watamae
Higashi-watamae
(shogunate)
Nishi-watamae 
Arayashiki
Matagari-shinden
Hirakata 
Karni-fuj ishirna 
Kami-doguchi
Shirno-doguchi
Sunazuka 
Tsushirna 
Sanbongi
Oshikiri-kamigumi
Oshikiri-nakagurni
Oshikiri-shimogurni 
TOTAL 
30 . 14 hectares} 54.47 hectares 181 
c. 2 . 70 
35.33 
19 .94 
46.53 
24.66 
c. 16 .00 
54.07
35 . 10
c. 2.45 1
32.48
31.51  
70 .20 
6 . 89
}
19.01
42 .75 
19 .30 
37 .64 
36.44 
36.74 
599.88 
45 .46 
31 .84 
63.64 
177.00 
87 .71  
114.71
5 6 . 39 
188.28
29.50 
244 .41 
1093.39 
129
160
137 
187 
234
353
179 
244
155 
141 
182 
Sources: Based on land registry figures in village 
entries in OB 1974 and Naganurna 1965. 
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probably necessary to shift the intake location with small changes in the 
river course that might occur after heavy discharges. As with most of the 
other main canal intakes, a line of triangular log frames was positioned 
across the river to raise the water level and guide river water to the 
intake in the summer months. 
The main canal in the seventeenth century was referred to as Nakagawa 
�seki Tenko seki ("Nakagawa Main Canal/Tenko Canal") suggestingda.
bifurcated main canal; that is, a document from that century refers to the 
Nakagawa oseki, about 9 km long from the river intake down to the 
"Kiyomizu Willow Tree" at Sunazuka Village, and tenko aeki, which branched 
from Nakagawa oseki about 2.2 km downstream of the river intake and itself 
ran about 2.6 km to the village of Mitsubashi (see Map 9). Together they 
constituted the main artery, the first level of water delivery in much the 
same way that the Shoryujigawa Main Canal and the Uchi River composed the 
first level of water delivery in the Shoryujigawa network. 
Little else is known of the earliest form of the Nakagawa network, 
although working back from later elaborations, I would suggest that there 
may have been four branch canals off the Tenko Main Canal and eight branch 
canals from the Nakagawa Main Canal. That is, somewhere along Tenko Main 
Canal was a branch delivering water to Matsuo, Higashi-kawara, and 
Nishi-kawara Villages; at its termination, three branches led to 
Mitsubashi, Karinome, and the Aramata Villages. Along the Nakagawa Main 
Canal were intakes to branch canals to Akagawa Village (#3 on Table 23); 
to Hosoya, Osaeguchi, and Makunouchi Villages (#4); to Daihanda Village 
(#5); to Watamae and Hirakata area villages (#6); to Yokogawa Village 
(#7); to Tsukegawa Village (#8); to Wanagawa Village (#9) ; and from the 
tail-end of the main canal at Sunazuka Village, a large branch canal 
delivering water to Yokoyama area villages and the Kato and Shoshaku area 
villages. 
I would further conjecture that there was downstream elaboration in the 
1620s ; with the development of the Oshikiri villages, the main canal was 
extended as far as Kamenoyama just upstream of Yokogawa-kamigumi. 
Tsuchibashi Village, previously served by a tertiary canal from the 
Yokogawa Branch Canal (#7), was now served by its own branch canal (#11),
and a new branch canal was dug from Kamenoyama to service the new 
Oshikiri, Sanbongi, and Tsushima Villages (#12). Final extension of the 
downstream section took place in the 1700s, with the digging of the 
Hirono-shinden Branch Canal (#13) in 1718 (unpublished source #3). The 
only other branch canal to be added later was the small Ishino-shinden 
Branch Canal, opened in the last half of the 1700s at the very top of the 
service area to irrigate a limited (26 koku) area next to the Aka River. 
Water flowed along the main canal and branch canal levels by gravity, 
and there seems to have been no use of water-lifting devices at these 
levels. There was, however, one difficult stretch in the upstream section 
(known as hako-no-uchi, literally 11within-the-box11),  caused by a 
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Table 23 
Branch canals along the Nakagawa/TenkD Main Canal 
branch number of 1785 intake structure 
canal(l) villages fixed and measuring intake spillway
served lined main pole entrance 
canal 
1 Ishino-shinden(2) 1 non(?) ? ? non(?) 
2 Watamae Shinden(3) 4 no no fixed frame no 
W=2.12 m 
3 Akagawa 1 yes yes fixed frame no 
W=2.43 m 
3A Hirano Supplemental 
Channel(4) 
4 Hosoya 3 yes yes fixed frame no 
W=2.43 m 
5 Daihanda 1 yes yes fixed frame yes
W=2.27 m 
6 Gokamura 7 yes yes fixed frame no 
W=2.73 m 
.,
7 Yokogawa 2 no no W=l.97 m yes 
8A Tsukegawa(S) 1 yes yes W=2. 06 m no 
8B Tsukegawa(S) 1 no no ? no 
9 Wanagawa 4 no no W=l.39 m no 
10 Yokoyama 8 yes no 3. 6 m wide no 
gate
.n
with 
2.7 m opening 
11 Tsuchibashi 1 yes W=l .27 m no 
12 Oshikiri 6 no no W=l .82 m yes 
13 Hirono-shinden 3 no no W=l.21 m yes 
14 Matsuo-kawara(6) 3? ? ?. ? . 
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. 15 Mitsubashi(6) l? • ? 
16 Aramatan(6) 3? • 
17 Kariyanomen(6) 2? ? 
Notes : 
1.  Branch canals #1 through #13 had intakes along the 
Nakagawa Main Canal, while branch canals #14 through #17 
were along the Tenko Main Canal. Branch canals are listed 
in intake order from upstream to downstream; the numbers 
are used to identify the branch canals on Map 9. 
2. Actually, Ishino-shinden Branch Canal was not opened until 
the late 1700s to serve a small area of new paddy land at the top
of the main canal service area next to the Aka River. 
3. Watamae Shinden Branch Canal had no sekine nor measuring
pole but because its intake was only about 18 m above the intake 
to Akagawa Branch canal, it was always affected by adjustments to 
the latter' s  intake dimensions. 
4.  This supplemental channel (mashi-otoshi seki) was 
added in about 1718 at the time of the addition of the Hirono 
Branch Canal in order to increase flow in the main canal. 
Schematically, the supplemental channel was roughly the 
following : 
intake to #3 
branch canal� measuring pole '--,t',-----=�-...;_�-
) • . main canal 
�-....._-3/-
'supplemental channel 
5 .  These were two small, but separate, branch canals 
serving the same paddy fields in the village of Tsukegawa.
6. These four branch canals had intakes along the Tenko 
Main Canal but very little data about them survive . 
. . 
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topographical depression. From an �levation of 24 meters at 
Shimo-mawatari, the land about 1.5 km to the north drops to 15 meters 
{between Matsuo and Mitsubashi Villages) before rising again to about 18.3 
meters near Mitsubashi Village (and then falling steadily through the 
midstream and downstream sections). This depression is probably the 
result of an old river channel that ran west-east or east-west. Canal 
construction required here a raised bed of 3.5 meters above surrounding 
paddy fields, the repair of which we will soon see to have been a constant 
problem. When its condition was allowed to deteriorate, it greatly
constricted the water flow in the main canals, both Nakagawa and Tenko. 
In addition to the thirteen branch canal intakes, there were eight
principal structures along the main canals (see unpublished source #1).
While there was no permanent gate at the intake from the Aka River, the 
log-frame chain weir across the river and the reinforcement to the cut in 
the natural levee required some technical direction and labord. 
coordination. About 1 km along the main canal from the river intake was a 
spillway (Ishino Spillway) back to the Aka River. The third irrigation 
works was a large gate 2 km from the river intake on the edge of 
Shimo-mawatari Village and at the beginning of the main canal service 
area--Takadera d41isuimon (11Takadera Great Water Gate,d11 which I translate 
more freely as Takadera Intake Gate). Then, 0.7 km below the Takadera 
Intake Gate was the intake gate to the Tenko Main Canal and perhaps 
several hundred meters below that along the Nakagawa Main Canal was the 
Genzo Spillway Gate, a wood-frame gate to a channel outlet to the Aka 
River. This was used in conjunction with the Ishino Spillway to divert 
excess water back to the river in times of heavy rains and flooding. 
Along the Tenko Main Canal were three more irrigation works: a spillway, 
an overhead flume (a kakehi, in this case a raised section of the Tenko 
Canal, framed in wood), and an underground siphon section (Tenko
shita-sokodo}. The exact locations of the Tenko works are not known. 
Dimensions of these irrigation works, where known, are shown in Table 
24. Table 25, based on a listing in Nakagawa Irrig Coop ( 1935), 
summarizes reported construction projects in the last 150 years of the 
domain period. Of the five irrigation works, the Takadera Main Intake 
Gate and the Tenko Overhead Flume were domain public works sites, for 
which projects the domain underwrote half of the expenses. The Takadera 
Gate was rebuilt five times in the period 1830-74 (1830, 1842, 1850, 1862, 
1874). A third works, the intake gate to Tenko Main Canal, was also 
designated a domain public works, and one-third of project expenses were 
supplied by the domain (the distinction between one-half and one-third 
support is of unknown significance). Repairs to the Genzo Spillway and to 
the Tenko Siphon were supported through assessments of labor and money or 
rice to the villages in the main canal service area. Presumably this was 
· also true for the two smaller spillways, Tenko and Ishino. 
Although the project list is incomplete, it does provide evidence that 
there was little, if any, technical change in the manner of water delivery 
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Table 24 
Major irrigation works along the Nakagawa/Tenko Main Canals 
irrigation works 
A. Takadera Main 
Intake Gate 
B. Tenko Intake 
Gate 
c. Tenko overhead 
Flume 
D. Genzo Spillway 
E. Tenko Siphon 
F. Tenk8 Spillway 
G. Ishino Spillway 
H. Aka River Intake 
(ichi-no-kuchi) 
· dimensions 
L - 9 . 1  m
W = 5.46 m 
H = 2.12 m 
L = 5.46 m 
W = 2.73 m 
H = 1.52 m 
L = 29.12 m* 
W = 2.73 m 
H = 1.82 m 
L = 9.1 m
W = 1.82 m
H - 1 . 82 m 
unknown 
unknown 
unknown 
unknown 
project support 
domain public works 
project: 1/2 expenses 
from domain 
domain public works 
project: 1/3 expenses
from domain 
domain public works 
project: 1/2 expenses 
from domain 
all expenses from 
service area 
villages 
all expenses from 
service area 
villages 
all expenses from 
service area 
villagesd(?) 
all expenses from 
service area 
villagesd(?) 
all expenses from 
service area 
villagesd(?) 
*The dimensions of Tenko Overhead Flume were 
apparently altered in 1866 to L = 32.76 m, W = 2.12 m. 
Source: Nakagawa Irrig Coop 1935 
. :. : . , . ··:.· . .  
. .. . . . .  . . ... ,.:;;_7· .. ·.· - : ·.}..'·=·•
. 
· 
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Table 25 
Construction and repair projects along the Nakagawa/Tenko Main Canals 
date project 
1715 repair/rebuilding of main canal banks 
1728 rebuilding of Tenko Overhead Flume 
and of Tenko Siphon
1785 readjustment of branch canal intakes 
1795 *rebuilding of Tenko Siphon
1797 readjustment of branch canal intakes 
1803 readjustment of branch canal intakes 
1821 *repair of Ishino Spillway in 3 places
1822 rebuilding of Genzo Spillway Gate 
1823 rebuilding of Tenko Overhead Flume 
1830 rebuilding of Takadera Main Intake Gate,
Tenko Spillway, and Tenko Overhead Flume 
1839 *repair of main canal banks in 12 places
1842 rebuilding of Tenko Siphon
*rebuilding of Takadera Main Intake Gate 
1845 *repair of main canal banks 
1850 rebuilding of rakadera Main Intake Gate 
placement of gravel catchment box 
1854 rebuilding of Genzo Spillway Gate 
rebuilding of Tenko Siphon
1857 repairs to main canal banks at Mawatari 
repairs to main canal banks at Ishino-mata 
1861 rebuilding of intake cut at river 
1862 *rebuilding of Takadera Main Intake Gate 
1866 rebuilding of Tenko Overhead Flume 
1874 rebuilding of Takadera Main Intake Gate 
note 
36,000 worker-days 
1,571 worker-days 
6, 742 worker-days**
11 ryo
126 kan 
33 rye 
18 ryo
13 ryo
40, 000 worker-days
820 worker-days
20, 723 worker-days
29 ryo 
*The reference in these cases is to a petition for the 
project, but I believe it safe to assume here that these 
projects were in fact accomplished.
**This figure was broken down as follows : 5,516 worker-days
were requisitioned by the standard formula of 7 worker-days per
100 koku of registered yield (village unit) and the additional 
1,686 were performed by special reinforcements (termed sekiko). 
Source: This has been adapted from a list appearing in Nakagawa
Irrig Coop 1935 and compiled from documents in the Ogawa
household in Shimo-mawatari Village (former osekimori).
The present Ogawa household head informed me in 1977 that 
the original documents had been thrown out at some time 
previously. I do not believe that the list is exhaustive 
of main canal projects in the period, 1715-1874. 
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through the domain period. There are no quantifiable data on water· flow 
in the main canals, but a flow more insecure and unstable than that in the 
. .
Shoryujigawa Main Canal is suggested not only by the downstream intake 
position of the former but also by the simplicity of the river intake 
works itself. 
Nakagawa • s  ichi-no-kuchi river intake was certainly nothing like 
Shoryujigawa • s  Kumaide intake, as a technical structure or as an 
organizational focus. In the case of Nakagawa, maintenance and repair of 
the river intake was contracted out by the main canal service area 
villages to Mawatari Village, about 1. 2 km upstream of Shimo-mawatari 
Village and near the river intake site. The agreement is detailed in a 
contract dated the third month of 1751 signed by the village headman and 
village elder of Mawatari for the village's forty-six registered peasant 
cultivators and addressed to the Kurogawa Village Group headman. In the 
contract (reproduced in Nakagawa Irrig Coop 1935:28-30), Mawatari villagers 
agreed to (continue to) undertake (a) maintenance and operation of then. 
river intake, (b) maintenance of the main canal from the river intake down 
to the Takadera Main Canal Intake Gate (e. g., dredging, canal bank 
repair), and (c) setting out the log-frame weir across the river in the 
summer dry months. They agreed to work under the direction of the Main 
Canal Guard (see below) and to supply all needed materials as well as 
labor for the maintenance. The contract included a proviso that in case 
of serious flood damage and major repairs, upon inspection, the service 
area villages were to send materials and labor (i.e., Mawatari agreed to 
undertake ordinary maintenance and operation only). They were to receive 
an annual payment of eighty bags of rice (32 koku},  payable in rice 
coupons. The contract was endorsed by the Kurogawa Village Group headman 
and sent to the Aragawa, Yokoyama, and Oshikiri Village Group headmen, 
presumably for circulation to the service area villages. This routing of 
the contract did not necessarily involve the domain authorities in 
specific obligations to insure compliance and/or entertain complaints, but 
it did create a formal and public agreement which assumed the weight of 
precedent. There are, however, no records of disputes concerning this 
arrangement, throughout the domain period. 
There were four maintenance and operation roles specific to the main 
canals (Nakagawa and Tenko). There were two Main Canal Guards 
(osekimori), one at the top end from Shimo-mawatari Village and one at the 
tail-end from Yokoyama (-kamigumi?) Village. The Shimo-mawatari position 
was always held by the head of the Ogawa household, a peasant cultivator 
household in the village. It is not clear whether the Yokoyama position 
was also in fact hereditary. There was also a Tenk·o Main Canal Guard from 
Mitsubashi Villagen73 and a gate guard at the Genzo Spillway. 
73 This role was also referred to as "Tenko Intake Gate Guard." 
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From the references to the Main Canal Guards in the documents discussed 
below, I would characterize their role as one of first-order 
responsibility for water flow and main canal maintenance (thedTakadera 
Intake Gate and main canal channel and banks) and authority to coordinate 
gate rebuilding, canal bank repair, and canal dredging. By "first-order, " 
I mean that their responsibility was not total nor their authority 
complete. In the event of poor channel maintenance, village headmen would 
complain to the Main Canal Guards; if satisfaction was not forthcoming, 
they would address domain authorities through the village group headmen. 
And, an agreement reached at a meeting of service area village officers in 
March of 1832 for that spring' s  main canal dredging implies that the Main 
Canal Guards were delegated the authority to coordinate such maintenance 
under terms specified by the service area villages; the 1832 agreement
stipulates the number of workers and sections of the canal to be cleaned 
by each village (Nakagawa Irrig Coop 1935:42-4). 
Annual maintenance costs for the main canals in the late 1700s and 
1800s totalled 103 bags of rice or 41.2 koku for the following items: 
intake costs (Mawatari Village) 32.0 koku 
Chief Main Canal Guards ( 2  persons) 8.0 koku _(i.e. , @ 4 koku} 
Tenko Main Canal Guard (1  person) 0.6 koku 
Genzo Spillway Guard (1  person) 0 . 6· koku 
Total 41 . 2  koku 
These expenses were assessed to all service area villages as a fixed 
percentage of registered yield.d7 4  By the mid-1800s, when the registered 
yield of paddy land in the service area reached 17,000 koku, each village 
was assessed at the rate of 0. 0242 koku per 10 koku of registered paddy 
land (i.e., 0 .00242%). Collection was at the end of each year at the time 
of domain tax payment accounting and was handled through the village group 
headmen. The assessment by village group was: 
Yokoyama Village Group 27 .4575 koku 
Aragawa Village Group 7.4803 koku 
Oshikiri Village Group 4.4921 koku 
Kurogawa Village Group 1.7700 koku 
Total 41.1999 koku 
(source : Nakagawa Irrig Coop 1935:44-6) 
1 4 Although the 41.2 koku in maintenance expenses were assessed equally
through the service area, the 1832 dredging ag�eement (the only such 
document surviving) divides the Nakagawa Main Canal among 23 villages 
from Daihanda down to Yokoyama. That is, villages upstream from 
Daihanda and downstream from Yokoyama ( including Oshikiri and Hirono 
·with long branch canals to maintain) had noddredging assignments that 
' 
year. 
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In addition ,  the fuain canal was apparently dredged once a year in the 
spring , requiring from five to thirteen workers per village, and for major
repairs, villages would be assessed additional workers and rice or money 
for project expenses. Still, the cost of water, i.e., the burden of 
maintenance on service area villages in the Nakagawa network, would appear 
to be very low: by any standard, 0.00242% of registered yield is paltry. 
Even when branch canal expenses are added, the total maintenance burden 
on water users does not appear to have been onerous. As an example, 
Higashi-watamae in 1845 was a village whose lands were in the service 
areas of at least two large branch canals at a time when materials and 
wages were at high levels. The total village registered yield was 
381.9835 koku. The principal land tax, at 32%, amounted to 122.d2348 koku;
with over twenty miscellaneous taxes and the required leakage and 
inspection surcharges, the total tax.ddue the domain that year was 212.7691 
koku {56% of registered yield). Included among the miscellaneous taxes 
was a 10.3631 koku domain public works { g8fushin) levy (a 2.7% tax rate). 
In  addition, there were other categories of taxes payable by the village 
and itemized on the village-prepared accounts (nengu-wari motokime-ch6) 
but which were collected and distributed by the village group headman and 
district deputy's office and thus kept separate (as toricho gai or toricho 
hazure) from the total going to the main domain accounts. These included 
all the irrigation expenses beyond the public works levy. The following 
items appear on the Higashi-watamae accounts:  
Main canal assessment 0.3726 koku 
Assessment for Gokamura Branch Canal 
Guard salary & benefits* 0.4738 
Assessment for Shinden Branch Canal 
Guard salary 0 . 1969 
Annual indemnity payment for land 
used in Gokamura Branch Canal 0.4037 
Payment in lieu of workers (main canal) 0. 8052 
Payment in lieu of workers (Gokamura) 0 . 1160 
Total 2.3682 koku 
*Salary of the Gokamura Branch Canal Guard was 2 koku; in addition he 
enjoyed at least a partial tax exemption on 1 1 . 875 koku of land (that 
is, the service area villages paid the taxes for him). 
In sum, the total irrigation-related expenses for Higashi-watamae that 
year were 12.7313 koku, representing 5.5% of its total taxes and 3.3% of 
the village total registered yield. Computations for several other 
villages in other years in the nineteenth century yield figures in the 
same range (based on Naganuma 1964:452-6). 
Along the Nakagawa Main Canal, there were at least three revisions of 
branch canal intake dimensions and structures--in 1785, 1797, and 1803 
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(see Table 26). Documents from these and other years shed some light on 
allocation and conflict at the main canal level, and the remainder of this 
section will introduce them briefly. 
On May 31st of 1785, a petition signed jointly by eleven village 
headmen from Hirono-shinden, Doguchi, and Oshikiri area villages was sent 
to the headmen of Yokoyama Village Group and Naganuma Village Group (the 
latter was doubling at the time as Oshikiri Village Group headman). In 
order to give a more concrete sense of Aka River irrigation documents, 
translations of the petition and of related 1785-6 documents are appended
to this chapter. Except for Doguchi Village, at the tail-end of Yokoyama 
Branch Canal, the petitioning villages were attached to the two tail-end 
branch canals, Oshikiri and Hirono-shinden. They complained that water 
shortages in their areas, common in recent years, were especially severe 
this year (it was at the time of transplanting). They had complained to 
the main canal water guards, who replied that these shortages were due to 
the weakened condition of the main canal banks in the hako-no-uchi 
section, the stretch of the canal between Matsuo and Mitsubashi elevated 
above the surrounding land. The canal guards claimed that to let more 
water in through the Ma.in. Intake Gate threatened the collapse of the 
canal banks in that section. 
The petition continued that the petitioners themselves had then 
assembled and conducted their own survey of the main canal, discovering 
that the branch canal intake at Mitsubashi Village (i.e., to #2 Watamae 
Shinden Branch Canal) and those farther down were taking in too much 
water. They believed the spring dredging by each branch canal at its 
intake had deepened the intake and was allowing an excess intake 
volume--such that water reaching their branch canals at the tail-end was 
now 15.2 cm below normal. The petition closed with a request that domain 
officials survey the various branch canal intakes and that construction be 
undertaken to strengthen the hako-no-uchi section. 
Redress was soon forthcoming from the district deputy's office, and 
action was taken on two levels. The following day, June 1st, Tozo, an 
assistant in the district deputy ' s  office (and no relation to the 
Futakuchi Tozo), surveyed the main canal after summoning the main canal 
guards, the village group headmen of Yokoyama and Naganuma, and other 
{unspecified} village officers. Agreeing with the petitioners, he ordered 
changes in intake dimensions and/or structure of seven branch canals, from 
#3 through #9 (see Table 26 and Appendix for details). His written order 
was endorsed the same day by Ueno Wakichi, another official in the 
district deputy ' s  office,d7 5  who sent the order out to be circulated among 
headmen of the upstream villages. The latter were told to send one person 
7 5  My speculation here is that Ueno Wakichi was a warrior-rank assistant 
(tedai) directly under the district deputy while Tozo was an 
assessor-foreman {waritsuke}, a peasant-rank post . 
.
" 
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Table 26 
Adjustments in branch canal intakes ordered by domain officials 
branch canal 
#2 Watamae 
#3 Akagawa 
#3A Hirono 
Supplemental
Channel 
#4 Hosoya 
#5 Daihanda 
#6 Gokamura 
#7 Yokogawa 
#8 Tsukegawa 
#9 Wanagawa 
#10 Yokoyama 
1785 inspection 
adj ustments 
none 
main canal 
widened .09 m 
to 1.3 m 
none 
main canal 
widened .24 m 
to 3. 9 m 
main canal 
widened .09 m 
to 3.7 m 
main canal 
widened . 5 m to 
4.2 m;
makura lowered 
no fixed dimen-
sions; spillway 
widened .6  m to 
1.2 m 
top layer of 
sand bags in main 
canal removed and 
makura leveled 
1797 inspection 
adjustments 
none 
makura lowered 
6.1 cm 
none 
makura lowered 
12.2 m 
makura lowered 
6 . 1  cm 
makura lowered 
9. 1 cm 
none 
makura lowered 
6 . 1  cm 
buried log removed none 
from main canal bed 
none none 
1803 inspection 
adjustments 
none 
intake narrowed 
.4 m to 2.0 m 
widened . 3  m to 
1.6  m 
spillway installed 
1.82 m wide 
main canal 
widened . 3 m to 
4.0 m 
main canal 
widened . 3 m to 
4.5 m; 1.8 m 
spillway installed 
none 
main canal 
widened . 3 m to 
3. 9 m 
none 
none 
#11 Tsuchibashi no fixed none none 
dimensions 
Source: unpublished source #1 
'· 
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each to their respective branch canal intakes on the 3rd to make the 
necessary adjustments. 
As described for the Shoryujigawa network, intakes along the Nakagawa 
Main Canal to branch canals varied widely in the complexity of design and 
permanency of structure, and Tozo and Ueno Wakichi attempted to increase 
.. 
the flow to the tail-end branch canals by means of several kinds of 
adjustments. At those intakes where there was a lined main canal bed 
(sekine) ,  they either ordered it widened (#3, #4, #5 ) ,  ordered the 
"pillow" weir (makura) lowered (#Ba, where the top layer of sand bags was 
to be removed) , or required both adjustments (#6 ) .  76 At intake #7 , where 
the main canal had no fixed and lined sekine , the spillway in the branch 
canal was to be widened 60 .6  cm, and. at #8b and at #9 (both without a 
sekine) a square log was either buried in front of the branch canal mouth 
(#8b) or removed from the main canal (#9)  . 7 7 The officials in their orders 
ignored the petitioners • request to strengthen the hako-no-uchi section of 
the main canal. 
Thus , it would appear that the officials were exercising an authority 
to alter dimensions of structural elements of branch canal intakes where 
they existed, but they either did not choose or did not have the further 
authority to change the intake structures; they could order a sekine to be 
widened but they could not (or at least did not here) order a sekine-­
that is,  order the lining of the main canal at the intake point-- where it 
did not exist. 
In addition to adjustments made along the main canal, the district 
deputy officials also took action on the branch canal level, admonishing 
the petitioning villages for poor maintenance and water stealing. They 
noted that along the Tsuchibashi Drainage Canal78 and along the banks of 
both Oshikiri and Hirono-shinden Branch Canals there were bushes and trees 
growing out into the canal and obstructing water flow; they ordered that 
these be cut and that collapsed sections of the banks be repaired (see 
76 In the case of Gokamura Branch Canal (#6 ) ,  a new measuring pole had 
recently been positioned beside the old one with a minimum main canal 
water level mark 1 2 . 1  . cm lower than the mark on the old pole. The 
officials ordered that the old pole remain, that a makura be laid in 
the main canal, but that the main canal itself be widened. 
7 7  The structure here is obscure . The term su-no-ki I have interpreted as 
a variant of su-no-ko, which itself has several meanings . I here take 
it to mean a square wood log. 
7 8  At some point in the 1700s, Hirono-shinden and Oshikiri area villages 
had built a channel from Tsuchibashi Village to the tail-end of the 
main canal in order to use the drainage of Tsuchibashi (for which they 
paid the latter 2 koku per year) . 
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documents c and D of Appendix). Then they noted that where the 
Hirono-shinden Branch Canal passed through Tsushima, Sanbongi, and the 
Oshikiri Villages, cultivators of the latter villages were digging into it 
and drawing off water for their own fields. They summoned village
officers from both Hirono-shinden and Oshikiri areas; the latter were told 
to have these cuts filled in and the former were told to make sure that 
this was done. 
There were continued problems with Oshikiri Branch Canal in the spring 
of the following year (1786) which directly drew in deputy officials. 
Complaints reached them that within Oshikiri Branch Canal itself, 
cultivators in the upper-end villages (Tsushima, Sanbongi, 
Oshikiri-kamigumi) were drawing in extra water from the branch canal and 
causing shortages in the tail-end section (Oshikiri-shimogumi, Fukuoka, 
Ofuchi). A meeting was held with the Yokoyama and Oshikiri Village Group 
headmen following an inspection by a domain official. Among thed. 
directives to the villages (via the village group headmen) was a charge to 
conduct all new construction and repairs along the branch canal only after 
meetings of officers of all villages (see document E in Appendix). 
The shifting patterns of coordination and contention here are familiar 
from the Shoryujigawa network. Oshikiri area villages joined with 
Hirono-shinden area villages to complain about main canal upstream 
allocation at the same time as Oshikiri area cultivators were taking water 
out of the Hirono-shinden Branch Canal, leading to a series of complaints 
and counter-complaints between Oshikiri and Hirono-shinden Branch Canal 
Villages (the continuation of which we will take up again below). But 
this in turn was simultaneous with problems along Oshikiri Branch Canal 
itself, between upstream Tsushima, Sanbongi, and Oshikiri-kamigumi and 
downstream Oshikiri-shimogumi, Fukuoka, and Ofuchi. 
At least at this point in time, domain officials were responsive to 
each of these problems, though their involvement varied. Along the main 
canal, they exercised limited authority to adjust allocation to the branch 
canals, but in the matters of Hirono-shinden and Oshikiri Branch Canals, 
they intervened only to exhort proper canal maintenance and prescribe 
adherence to standards of proper conduct, preferring to leave details to 
the village group headmen and the village officers. To be sure, their 
order to close improper cuts in the Hirono-shinden Branch Canal by 
Oshikiri cultivators, for example, was no doubt the normative basis for 
subsequent action by the village group headman and the Hirono-shinden 
Branch Canal water guard to close them up, but problems in later years 
imply that such orders were not often effective deterrents to water 
stealing. 
In May of 1797, officials in the district deputy office again responded 
to a petition from main canal service area villages concerning alleged 
water shortages, and the problem again appears to have been associated 
with limitations on flow volume resulting from the rather delicate 
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hako-no-uchi section. The document which survives is the directive issued 
by the district deputy office on May 13, 1797, following a petition and 
survey. This time, the petitioners, apparently from the midstream 
villages, requested that they be permitted to shift upstream the intakes 
to Watamae Shinden (#2), Hosoya (#4), Daihanda (#5), and other branch 
canals; that is , at the time , the intakes were downstream of the 
hako-no-uchi section; if they could be moved upstream of the section, more 
water could be drawn in through the river intake. 
This proposal drew opposition from Akagawa and Matsuo Villages, which 
probably feared loss of paddy land (to move the intakes upstream would 
require extending the branch canals through their paddy lands). The 
domain officials sought a compromise. No changes were allowed in intake 
positions, but rather the makura of five branch canals were to be lowered. 
The branch canals affected were #3, 4, 5, 6 ,  and 8a (see Table 26 for 
details). While this would have the effect of reducing relative intake 
volume to these branch canals, this would be compensated for by an 
increase in the volume of intake to the main canal at the river. 
I suspect the reasoning behind this approach to have been as follows. 
The hako-no-uchi section of the main canal, with banks above the 
surrounding land, was the weakest stretch in the main canal, and the 
volume it could handle set an upper limit on potential main canal volume. 
The problem was aggravated by the fact that several of the majord·dbranch 
canal intakes were just downstream of this section. Each would set out a 
makura in the main canal to improve the flow to its intake, the effect of 
which would be to slow the velocity in the main canal and raise the water 
level. When done at four or five consecutive points, the cumulative 
effect would be that water would back up into the hako-no-uchi section. 
If all of these branch canals would lower their makura height, main canal 
velocity would increase and a greater total volume could be accommodated 
through the hako-no-uchi section. If all the makura were lowered in 
coordinated fashion, none would suffer a proportional loss of intake 
volume. Nor, with an increased total volume, would any suffer an absolute 
loss of intake volume. 
Such were the measures taken by the district deputy officials. It is 
not known how happily they were received by the service area villages, but 
the next surviving documents--from six years later, in 1803--again raised 
problems attributed to the hako-no-uchi section. The year before, perhaps 
after harvest, a considerable number of workers from the villages in the 
service area7 9  had made repairs and reinforcements to the hako-no-uchi 
· 7 9 The number is not specified, nor does the project appear on the list 
reproduced as Table 25, but the directive refers to the need not only 
for the regular assessments of workers (i . e . , 7 per 100 koku of 
registered yield) but also for supplemental·dworkers (here , termed 
sunshi-ninsoku). 
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section, and as noted in a directive from a domain official (in the 
district deputy office) of April 16, 1803 to the village group headmen of 
Yokoyama and Aragawa, it would now be possible to increase the spring flow 
volume in the main canal. Indeed, a survey by Ueno Wakichi of the office 
on the 18th had determined that water was now flowing in the main canal at 
18 cm higher than the spring measuring pole mark. The directive went on 
to order further adjustments-�namely, a widening of the main canal 
(sekine) at five branch canald- intakes (#3, 4, 5, 6, and 8a).d8 0  
Three times, then, in 1785, 1796, and 1803, domain officials surveyed 
and adjusted the intake structures along the main canal, primarily by
widening the main canal at the point of intake and only occasionally by
narrowing the intake entrances themselves or widening the spillways back 
to the main canal. In each case, the precipitating problem--water 
shortages in the downstream areas during rice transplanting (when the 
maximum volume was required)--was linked to the constrictions on main 
canal volume of the hako-no-uchi section just above the #2 branch canal 
intake. Only in 1803 was this addressed directly; later documentary
evidence--concerning an altercation in 1857--implies that the resolution 
had not been of lasting satisfaction to downstream cultivators. 
On July 4, 1857, heavy flooding caused considerable damage to the west 
bank of the main canal from the Takadera Main Intake Gate to an 
unspecified point downsteam. This necessitated repair which received 
domain support as a public works project (see Table 25) and which was 
completed within a few weeks. By late July, canal volume was back to 
normal, but the Oshikiri area villagers found that no water was reaching
them. So on July 23rd, a group of them, with straw mats and bags, went up 
along the main canal to the site of recent repairs and made further 
improvements around the Matsuo Village area, returning the same day to 
their villages. 
so In the case of Akagawa Branch Canal (#3), the widening was of the 
Hirono-shinden Supplemental Channel; in addition, the Akagawa Branch 
Canal intake itself was narrowed by 0.39 m, and at Hosoya Branch Canal, . .
spillways were dug back to the main canal below the intake. These 
changes did not meet with universal satisfaction. Two years later, at 
the end of 1805, village officers of Higashi-watamae complained 
bitterly to an unknown domain official that the adjustments of 1797 and 
1803 had caused continual water shortages and poor harvests iri their 
area. While Watamae Shinden Branch Canal was not itself subject to the 
adjustments, the changes in main canal width and makura height at 
Akagawa Branch Canal intake (just below the Watamae Shinden Branch 
Canal intake) had greatly affected the latter's intake volume as well. 
They asked for a return to the old dimensions and were refused (Kelly 
1980 :431-434) .  
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.Jhis is recounted in a written reply to an official investigation, .signed by headmen of Oshikiri ·area villages and sent to three village
group headmen on July 25th.d8 1  On the previous day (the 24th, the day 
following the repairs), Oshikiri cultivators discovered that water still 
was not reaching them and a "large crowd" assembled and went up along the 
main canal to the Chief Main Canal Guard at Shimo-mawatari. They demanded 
to speak to him but were unable to, either through his absence or 
unwillingness. As evening came, they were alleged by other officials8 2  to 
have created a disturbance of sufficient proportions to cause a report to 
higher officials. The village group headmen were charged with 
investigating the incident, and the only document now available is a reply 
by Oshikiri area village headmen. In it, they claimed that the water 
shortage even following the domain-sponsored repairs was quite real and 
admitted that a large number of villagers did go up to talk to the main 
canal guard, but they protested that their villagers had not displayed any 
of the unruly or disorderly behavior reported. As with most such cases, 
the incomplete documentary record precludes knowledge of the outcome, 
although even this fragment demonstrated the continuing problem at the 
main canal level of maintaining a volume sufficient to supply the tail-end 
branch canals. The next section details one of the consequences of that, 
friction between Oshikiri and Hirono-shinden Branch Canals. 
A critical but unfortunately missing piece of evidence in interpreting 
domain officials• actions at the main canal level is a clear statement of 
the principle of allo.cation used to determine the adjustments in intake 
dimensions. There are no documents or references to documents comparable 
to the 1658 registry of the Shoryujigawa Main Canal, for example. 
However ,  a reference by Ueno Wakichi in a matter concerning Oshikiri 
Branch Canal to customary allocation by registered village yield
(mura-daka) and the use in the 1785 .. documents (#C in the Appendix) of the 
phrase "allocation according to proportion" (wariai no bunsui) and in the 
1797 document to "allocation according to the master proportions11 (owariai
no bunsui) recommend the proposition that there was an official norm of 
allocation of main canal water proportional to registered paddy land 
yields by village unit. This is also implied in the use of the phrase
11mutual adjustments of the branch canal intakes" (mido awase) by district 
deputy assistants in both 1797 and 1803. 
One must, however, entertain considerable doubt about the application 
of this norm. It did not operate easily and unambiguously, and it is 
safer to assume that actual allocation varied widely from that norm rather 
8 1  This document (unpublished source #4) was copied for me by Maeta 
Teruhiko from the original in Oshikiri Village. 
,
The reference is to 11officialsll deployed near there at a public works 
project site--probably labor foremen andd.other lower assistants of the 
district deputy' s  office at the site of a canal repair project. 
82 
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than corresponded closely. This is because one must see the norm 
operating in conjunction with at least three other circt.J11lstances. 
There was first of all the technical difficulty of translating such a 
principle of proportional allocation into concrete adjustments of 
dimensions and structures, compounded by the apparent fact that while 
expertise in making such structures lay with the main canal guards, su.ch 
authority lay with the district deputy officials. (a conclusion I draw from 
the hereditary nature of the main canal guard post and the transiency of 
domain official posting--Ueno Wakichi is the only district deputy official 
whose name reoccurs). Acceptance of the adjustments (the translating job) 
depended on both domain certification and peasant satisfaction. 
Application of the norm was further complicated by a conservative 
regard for customary form and precedent--the obverse of a healthy 
skepticism toward disturbances to the status quo. The reluctance of the 
domain officials to attack directly the problem of the hako-no-uchi 
section reflected a reluctance to involve domain authority and finances in 
what might become a continuing and burdensome precedent; it might also 
have reflected a reluctance by the individual official to attach his name 
to an order of such consequences. As a result, the physical system tended 
to be modified by accretion rather than replacement, which in turn had the 
effect of further complicating the network. The supplemental channel dug 
at the Akagawa Branch intake for Hirono-shinden and the channel dug from 
Yokoyama Branch Canal back over to the Hirono-shinden Branch Canal intake 
to supplement water for Okui-shinden both illustrate this characteristic 
accretion. 
Finally, the context of any allocation adjustment included certain 
features of land tenure in the domain, notably the widespread, though 
differentially occurring, under-registration of paddy lands in the service 
area. Distribution of water was not unrelated to distribution. of land, 
and it would not be surprising to find the fervor and explicitness with 
which allocation petitions were presented to be colored by an 
unwillingness to risk attention to one's land rights for uncertain, 
tenuous success in improving one's water rights. 
These considerations remind us that rather than simply compute the 
. .
divergence of actual water allocation from announced norms as a variant 
feature of water delivery systems, it is more instructive to see such a 
norm operating in conjunction with other factors to account for the 
pattern of allocation. For the Nakagawa network, these other factors of 
course were the same we have seen operating in the Shoryujigawa delivery 
network. They constitute, I believe, basic features of Aka River 
irrigation in the Tokugawa period. 
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Irrigation matters along the branch canals 
By the eighteenth century, there were seventeen branch canals in the 
Nakagawa service area, thirteen with intakes along the Nakagawa Main Canal 
and four with intakes along the Tenko Main Canal. Without a listing 
comparable to the Shoryujigawa 1658 registry, exact figures for branch 
canal service areas cannot be determined, but they ranged from small 
branch canals such as Akagawa, Tsuchibashi, Daihanda, and Tsukegawa, · · 
serving lands in one or twod_villages with registered yields of 400-600 
koku (i.e., 60-80 hectares), to large branch canals such as Gokamura and 
Yokoyama, serving six to eight villages with registered yields totalling 
perhaps 2000 koku (about 400 hectares). This section analyzes several 
sets of documents for the data they may yield on irrigationtasks at this 
branch canal level. 
We have already had some sense of the problems faced by the two 
tail-end branch canals, Oshikiri and Hirono-shinden, in the events of 
1785-6 discussed above. Their joint petition for increased water flow in 
the main canal was entertained by the district deputy ' s  office; the 
response included not only a readjustment of intakes along the main canal 
but also orders to improve maintenance along the petitioners• canals and 
to cease improper water diversions from the other's canal. 
As Map 10 shows, both Oshikiri and Hirono-shinden began at the end of 
the Nakagawa Main Canal, at a place just above Yokoyama-kamigumi known as 
Kamenoyama. Oshikiri Branch Canal was the earlier, dug as an extension of 
the main canal in the 1620s or 1630s (YKS 1980:546) to deliver water to 
the paddy lands of the new settlements of Tsushima, Sanbongi, and 
Oshikiri. The settlements themselves were built along the Aka River bank 
and the paddy lands opened up in the low wetlands to the east, between the 
Aka and Fujishima Rivers. Oshikiri Branch Canal ran through the villages, 
with most tertiary laterals extending east into the paddy lands and 
drainage eventually flowing north into the Fujishima River. In 1662, the 
former Yokoyama Village Group headman, Sato San'demon, received domain 
permission to extend the line of development north from Oshikiri (which, 
like Yokoyama, divided into three separate administrative villages,
Kamigumi, Nakagumi, and Shimogumi). The result was Fukuoka and Ofuchi at 
the tail-end of Oshikiri Branch Canal. 
Hirono-shinden Branch Canal was constructed about fifty years after 
this, when the last remaining extensive tract of wetlands in the drainage 
basin was developed (see chapter two above). Hirono-shinden Village was 
founded in 1714, and by 1718, the villagers had completed a canal from 
Kamenoyama at the tail-end of the main canal (the canal project cost about 
100 ryo or 50 koku of rice, 3.3% of the total expenses of 3000 ryo). They
installed an intake gate and a spillway to the river and also built a 
small hut there. A villager was paid 2. 8 koku of rice per year to live in 
the hut during the cultivation season; his job was to regulate water flow, 
supervise maintenance, and prevent disruptions of flow by Oshikiri area 
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villagers (see Map 9).n83 
To maintain a high elevation and avoid the already developed paddy
lands, the Hirono-shinden Branch Canal was run along a close parallel to 
the Oshikiri Branch Canal, between it and the Aka River. As such it 
passed through the Oshikiri area villages. The strained relations 
generated by such a layout are illustrated in events of 1811-12. On May
13th and 14th, 1811, Hirono-shinden Branch Canal irrigators dredged their 
canal from the intake down to Koya-shinden (from which various tertiaries 
took off). They discovered a number of transgressions by Oshikiri area
villagers and appealed to the district deputy's office. In a directive 
dated the 14th from Ueno Wakichi and the Yokoyama Village Group headman ton . 
four headmen of Oshikiri area villages, the following were ordered: 
a) the bridges in front of Oshikiri area houses across the 
Hirono-shinden Branch Canal were too low .nand were to be raised to 
1.82 m;
b) Oshikiri villagers had been putting freshly cut logs in the canal 
to soak and cure--these were all to be removed; 
c) the villagers were digging small channels from the branch canal 
around their houses for domestic uses--this was to cease; and 
d) tree and brush growth along the canal banks and in the canal 
bottom was to be cut out (unpublished source #1). 
Ueno and Sato had based these on a survey they had just made. They noted 
that essentially the same orders had been handed down in 1797 and that 
apparently people had become negligent again. The village headmen were to 
transmit these to all villagers. 
Another source of friction was the intake area at Kamenoyama and in 
April of the following year (1812), Hirono-shinden villagers, on the 
occasion of rebuilding their intake gate, accused Oshikiri Branch Canal 
irrigators of over-dredging the channel leading past their intake to the 
Oshikiri Branch Canal. This again led to the intervention of Ueno Wakichi 
8 3  Development of the downstream Hirano area proceeded in stages 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; indeed, paddy lands 
were still being developed in this century. Retarding development was 
not only the difficulty of draining the low-lying marshlands but the 
frequent flooding of the Aka and Kyoden Rivers. Where development was 
possible, paddy lands were either attached to the Hirono-shinden Branch 
Canal by tertiary laterals or, in the very downstream section, 
irrigated from one of the two remaining swamps in the center of the 
area (around which earth embankments had been constructed to impound 
water). Okui-shinden, founded in 1788 with domain permission by a 
Tsuruoka merchant, was attached to Hirono-shinden Branch Canal. To 
supplement water supply, a channel was dug from Yokoyama Branch Canal 
over to Hirono-shinden Branch Canal. 
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of the district deputye•s  office and the village group headmen. Based on a 
survey by a person who appears to be of the district deputy's office (but 
not Ueno), a meeting was held with village officers of both branch canals, 
and a written summary of the agreement--in the form of ·a directive from 
Ueno and the two village group headmen to Hirono-shinden and Oshikiri area 
village headmen--was drawn up that day (unpublished source #1; see map 9). 
The result was (a) the construction of a more permanent, stone-lined 
channel (an ishi sekidai) at the diveergence of the two branch canals, (b) 
the installation of a measuring pole at that point, and (c) establishment 
of procedures for maintenance and repair of the two intakes. The last 
included admonitions against dredging along the new sekidai section (i.e., 
below the stone lining) and the order that all repairs to the one intake 
should be undertaken with the consent and agreement of village officers 
from the other intakee1 s service area. 
The difficulties between Oshikiri and Hirono-shinden Branch Canals are 
but another example of the ways in which the physical network of delivery, 
the pattern of land tenure and the general administrative framework 
constrained coordination and conflict on the local level and limited the 
effectiveness of intervention by domain officials . Although evidence has 
not been located yet for post-1812 disputes between the two branch canals, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the 1812 directive did not constitute a 
final resolution. Given the canal configuration, some disruption of flow 
in Hirono-shinden Branch Canal was always likely, although the necessity 
for coordination between irrigators of the two branch canals vise� vis the 
main canal problems could impel village officers and canal guards to try 
to contain the extent of transgressions. At the same time, there was a 
limit to what action a minor official such as Ueno Wakichi might take when 
trouble led one side or the other to petition for redress. More active 
involvement in the form of investment in facility improvement (e.g., a 
widening and lining of sections of the branch canals) or in the form of 
direct and vigilant enforcement of the directives would find little or no 
support form higher officials (lacking financial and personnel resources 
and the disposition to so use them) or cultivators themselves (for their 
repercussions on other water delivery levels and on other administrative 
and land tenure relations). As in most cases, his involvement was 
reflexive and cosmetic. 
The events in 1797 discussed in the main canal section also s.uggested 
potential friction within Oshikiri Branch Canal itself, and .this finds 
further illustration in an incident towards the end of the domain period, 
in the summer of 1850. There were seven villages along the Oshikiri 
Branch Canal, and within the territory of each there were many small 
. . 
laterals running to the paddy lands (generally east of the branch canal). 
From a fragment of a branch canal rotation schedule (OB 1974:157), it 
would appear that in the summer dry months, tertiaries along the branche· 
canal were divided into three sections and allocation was made to each 
section on a time rotation basis. The rotation went from upstream 
Tsushima and Sanbongi area tertiaries to the three Oshikiri Villages' 
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tertiaries and then to the downstream section of Fukuoka and Ofuchi 
Village tertiaries. &4  
The incident in 1850 concerned an apparent violation of this dry season 
rotation along lines rather easy to anticipate (see the document in OB 
1974:162-3). On a day in early August, the upper section (i.e., the 
Tsushima and Sanbongi tertiaries) received its allocation. The following 
day was to be the turn of the three Oshikiri Villages, but there was no 
water reaching them. At this, Taroemon, an Oshikiri-shimogumi cultivator 
who was serving as rotation coordinator (mizu-ban), went up along the 
canal and discovered two places in Sanbongi where the flow was stopped up 
and diverted. As he broke down the weir, a "large crowd" (ozei) of 
Sanbongi villagers descended upon him, took hold of him, and demanded 
payment for the boards, straw rope, etc. he had 11destroyed11 in breaking up 
the weir. He was brought before the village headman and roughed up a bit, 
though not beaten. At last he was released and started back down the 
canal, only to be apprehended again by three men who chased after him from 
Sanbongi. 
They claimed that they were ordered to lead him back to the village, 
allowing him to stop off at a kinsman' s  house in Tsushima to have the 
latter inform Oshikiri-shimogumi villagers of his problem. They then 
continued their return up the canal to Sanbongi, but before reaching the 
village, the three proposed to Taroemon that they would release him at 
that point and save him the rough treatment in the village if he would pay 
them 500 mon in copper coins; when he refused, they suggested 400 mon. 
Taroemon replied that he had no such money, whereupon they led him back to 
his relative•s house and demanded of the latter that he pay the 400 mon or 
at least guarantee its payment by the next day. The kinsman refused, but 
Taroemon, afraid of being led back to Sanbongi, prevailed upon him to pay 
the money. 
Upon his return to his village, Taroemon reported the events, and a 
large crowd of fellow villagers went up to the Sanbongi Village headman's 
house to confirm the truth of the story. The headman did so confirm it,
arguing that the money was in payment for materials destroyed. In 
subsequent discussion among themselves, the Oshikiri-shimogumi villagers 
decided that the matter did not warrant the attention of higher 
authorities. The following day, therefore, village officers, together 
with Taroemon, returned to Sanbongi to negotiate a settlement. They were 
told, however, that the headman was absent and that there were no village 
officers who would see them. 
84 This was a bansui rotation, but without the entire schedule, it cannot 
be confirmed whether time allotments were proportional to registered 
yields. 
- --- - -- --- ----
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All of this is recounted in a petition .from Oshikiri Village officers 
to the village group headman later in the summer (ibid.). The altercation 
with Taroemon had been dropped but repeatedly during the dry summer, the 
petition alleged, other rotation coordinators had been similarly treated 
and the Oshikiri allocation disrupted by Sanbongi villagers. Thus they 
were driven to request assistance of domain officials. 
The response of the district deputy's office, if indeed it reached that 
f. One may speculate, though, that as with similarar, is unknown. 
incidents around Kakuda-futakuchi, it would have been no more than an 
order that Sanbongi pay some modest damages and an admonition that such 
breaches of the rotation cease. Sanbongi may even have lost a turn in the 
rotation (if the petition was handled with dispatch and it was still the 
irrigating season) but there is no case on any level of the delivery 
networks where an offending party lost the right to a turn. A higher 
value was placed on restoration of the status quo than on the retribution 
for wrongdoing, where both parties were peasant cultivators. 
Field and ditch patterns of Watamae: water use in the canal networks 
Thus far, we have dealt with how the various tasks of water delivery
and water drainage were handled within the two canal networks. It remains 
to consider the organization of water use at the terminal level, the tens 
of thousands of small field parcels that constituted the networksd' service 
areas. Unfortunately, water use is the phase of irrigation for which we 
have the least evidence; at this point, I can only offer a few inferences 
from limited data and hope to improve upon them with further archival 
research. 
In the Aka River basin, indeed throughout Japan, the japonica rice 
varieties have always been cultivated in check basins (suiden, ta, tanbo). 
In the Tokugawa period, these were small, irregular parcels of land, 
averaging one or two hundred square meters, encircled by a low earth ridge 
(a bund), with a hard pan soil layer about 30 cm below the soil surface. 
Each had a miniscule grade of several millimeters to allow water flow from 
an intake cut in one bund to an outlet cut in the opposite bund. 
The cultivator growing rice in such a check basin parcel faced a 
dilemma in using water. On the one hand, given the nature of water demand 
and cultivation methods, optimal water use entailed a high degree of 
freedom of intake and outlet for each parcel; yet the field and ditching 
patterns that developed in the basin necessitated close coordination of 
water use among blocks of parcels. I will illustrate this dilemma here 
· with details of field and ditching in an area of Watamae before turning to 
the implied question of what forms such coordination might have taken. 
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As we saw in chapter three, the amount of water used in the paddy 
parcels was a function of both natural and human factors. The type of 
soil strongly affected water percolation rates but of equal importance was 
the way the check basin was constructed and maintained. The tunneling of 
field mice, untended plant growth, and their use as footpaths among the 
_parcels all damaged the bunds ; tilling too deeply and inadequate drainage 
could weaken the hard pan soil base. Thus, diligent upkeep of the bunds 
and hard pan was essential in reducing water losses through leakage. 
Moreover, while there was a minimal water requirement for direct 
cultigen growth, water was equally critical in the check basin parcels for 
a wide range of uses: to prepare the soil, to regulate temperatures 
around the plants, to replenish soil fertility, to promote rooting, and so 
forth. These multiple functions meant that water use was highly elastic. 
It was also variable through the growing season. Chapter three has 
shown that for the spring "planting water,e" large but relativel.y fixed 
volumes were needed; applying the correct amount to each parcel was 
important in wet tilling for proper soil consistency and in transplanting 
for supporting (but not drowning) the seedling and for protecting it 
against low temperatures. The water in both periods was ponded on the 
fields so drainage was not of much importance. Timing, though, was 
critical to coordinate seedling growth in the nurseries, field 
preparation, and available labor. 
For the summer "nurture water,"  much smaller but more variable volumes 
of water were consumed; the timing and extent of water level adjustments 
were coordinated not with labor but with the weather and the rice plant 
cycle. Good drainage was a requisite for optimum "nurture water" 
applications. 
To the degree, then, that water could be manipulated in such elastic 
and strategic ways, yields improved and, perhaps more importantly, 
stabilized. Yet such procedures entailed a high degree of freedom to take 
in and discharge water from individual parcels. This was the difficulty 
for the cultivator, because the actual geography of fields and ditches 
suggests limits to the freedom a water user might enjoy and a need to 
coordinate intake and outlet on an inter-parcel level. The ways in which 
parcels and ditching interlocked is illustrated in two maps of a section 
of fields in the Watamae area of Nakagawa (Maps 1 1  and 12). These are 
based on on-site mapping done in 1894 to a scale of 1 :600, prior to a 
major field adjustment project. Because this was after the 1875 land tax 
surveys, the maps are probably fairly accurate; there is no evidence of 
land alterations between the end of the Tokugawa period and 1894 (and Map 
11 agrees broadly with the delivery map drawn up in 1806), so I assume 
they approximate field conditions in the late Tokugawa period. 
As Map 11 demonstrates and as was discussed above , paddy lands within 
the boundaries of the two Watamae villages were connected to three 
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separate branch canals of the Nakagawa Maine· Canal; we can see clearly th .e 
joint delivery-drainage functions of the canals and the interlocking of 
tertiary canals and terminal ditches of separate branch canals. Map 12 
details one section of these lands, bordered by channels from two of the 
branch canals. Channel B2 is the tail end of Oki Tertiary Canal from 
Watamae-shinden Branch Canal; channel Al is the tail end of a tertiary 
from Aramata Branch Canal. Topographic lines and water flow directions 
are not indicated on the original maps, but it. appears that this section 
was irrigated from water from channel B2; channel Al carried discharge 
from fields above this section to the river just below it. Channel X 
seems to have been a drainage canal collecting water from the fields in 
the top half of the section on the map and discharging it into the 
Fujishima River to the east. The channels were all about 0.9 to 1.2 
meters wide with approximately 1 meter banks (dote) on either side. There 
were 'public' paths of a standard 1.82 meters width. 
The thin lines of the map are the bunds between field parcels. Here we 
must distinguish between the hitsu and the osa, both of which meant 
"parcele. "  The map shows the borders of the hitsu, which were parcels 
surveyed by a domain official, registered in the cadastral registry, and 
assigned to a single cultivator. The map suggests that even in a single 
section of fields, the size of hitsu parcels varied widely, from less than 
.01 ha to .7 ha. We are probably correct in assuming that at least some 
of the small parcels were seed beds. The largest parcels were quite big 
even by present-day standards, and for cultivation, it was necessary to 
sub-divide them (i.e., in such a large area, it was impossible to grade 
the soil level enough for water application)e. These sub-divisions were 
known as osa, and while the bunds which bounded the hitsu parcel (the aze 
or kuro) were fixed by domain directive, the cultivator was free to adjust 
the smaller inner bunds (nakaguro). Thuse, the hitsu was the unit of land 
ownership (and tenancy) ;  the osa was the unit of actual cultivation. 
It is difficult to tell from the 1894 maps just how the hitsu parcels 
were connected to one another in terms of water flow. In Map 12, channel 
B2 divides at several points and many of the parcels seem to front on a 
ditch; if so, they may have drawn water directly from the ditch. Some 
might also have been graded to use the opposite channel for drainage; for 
example, the 0.7 ha parcel may have had an intake from the channel in its 
south-east corner and an outlet in its north-west corner into channel Al. 
But many of the other parcels appear from the map layout to have had to 
receive and/or discharge water from/to adjacent parcels (takoshi kangai or 
"parcel to parcel irrigation"). 
. . 
Parcel to parcel flow is a feature common to irrigated rice cultivation 
in many societies (e.g., Booth 1977:45ff., Spencer 1974), and it is 
· perhaps the technical feature to which the need for coordinated (communal) 
action is most often attributed. The arrangement is sometimes simplified 
and schematized as a discrete, nesting hierarchy of main canal--branch 
canal--tertiary canal--field ditch--parcel block. The Watamae area fields 
,.. 
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do not appear to yield to such a neat spatial geometry. Some parcels were 
directly connected to branch canals, others to tertiary canals, others to 
field ditchese, and still others to no water channel; parcels might drain 
into a separate branch canal network, into a special drainage canal, or 
into other parcels. Even parcel size varied widely. Under such 
conditions, one wonders to what extent it was possible and desirable to 
generate general formulas and schedules for intake and outlet below the 
tertiary canal level. The continuous, unplanned elaboration of the parcel 
construction and ditching that characterized at least the Watamae area may 
have reduced the coordination possible to a very local scope. 
And yet coordination among water users was surely called for. Within 
what framework did it take place? Was it enjoined and enforced by the 
domain, whose claims to the land and its produce superceded those of the 
cultivator? By an irrigation group formed along water delivery lines? By 
the landlord under whom the cultivator might be a tenant? By the village 
in which cultivator households (and/or its lands) were located? 
It appears unlikely from available evidence that the domain officials, 
landlords, and network roles exercised much direct authority in 
coordinating water use at the field level. It is true that, in a broad 
sense, the paramount position of rice in domain taxation and in the 
definition of wealth and relative status in the political economy created 
an irresistable biase. towards expansion of rice acreage; the domain did, of 
course, retain formal control over paddy field development. But there are 
no examples of domain directives on the subject of water use--detailing, 
for example, field construction techniques or ordering certain intake and 
drainage schedules. The only particular domain constraint on water use 
was an indirect one: the rigidity of land registration. There were no 
formal procedures by which the boundaries of.eland once surveyed and 
registered could be redesigned. The osa within a single hitsu could be 
adjusted by the cultivator, but the hitsu boundaries were fixed. No doubt 
such adjustments were occasionally made unofficially, but the domain 
controls of land registration locked cultivators into field and ditch 
patterns that could not be easily altered. As was seen in the Watamae 
area, with the expansion of arable lands, ditching patterns and thus water 
flow became more elaborate, but any major efforts to realign and simplify 
water flow were blocked by the rigid domain controls (on land, not water). 
I have found no evidence of landlord direction over tenants• water use. 
In most cases, it seems that land was let out in simple tenancy rather 
than sharecropping. Holdings of the large owners were dispersed among a 
number of vill�ges and households might rent land. from several owners in 
addition to cultivating their own holdings. 
Common to both the Nakagawa and Shoryfijigawa networks was an 
underdevelopment of water user organization at the several levels of 
canals. Even where effective roles and procedures were to be found, as 
may have been the case in the Oshikiri Branch Canal service area, this 
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organization of delivery did not directly constrain in-field water use. 
Its jurisdiction extended to the tertiary canal level, and it was 
structured by the participation of village units, however imperfectly 
these units may have fit sevice area boundaries. 
Indeed, it is the extent of village control of households' access to 
and use of water in their paddy fields that is the crux of water use. As 
discussed in the first chapter, village controls over water use approaches
axiomatic status in the literature of rural Japan, but the paucity of 
detailed evidence and the investment which many researchers have in 
finding 11community11 in the countryside should warn us that it cannot be 
easily assumed. For the case at hand, given that so little is known as 
yet about irrigation affairs within basin villages, I can only hazard some 
tentative observations about the nature of village control. 
To be sure, there were ways in which the basin villages (that is, the 
administrative village coincident with the named and spatially discrete 
settlement) did manage water at the most local delivery and drainage level 
and so constrain water use in individual paddy fields. Much of the 
construction of ditching and paddy fields occurred in domain-approved 
projects organized by a village but nbt necessarily involving all 
households (or even all full-status honbyakusho). Subsequent maintenance 
of the check basin parcels was the responsibility of cultivators but in 
many cases, village officers probably coordinated an annual clean-up and 
dredging of the field ditches prior to spring field preparation. 
In some villages there were named and salaried roles for intra-village 
irrigation matters, but the extent of their authority is unclear. In 
Kami-oshikiri Village , it was known as uchi-sekimori ( "intra-village canal 
guard11 ) .  The 1771 Kakuda-futakuchi Village report listed a shinden 
sekimori for the new paddy lands across the Oyama River but no role for 
the older lands around the village settlement; the salary, only 0.4 koku 
of rice per year, was 12% of the headman's salary (OB 1974:50-1). On the 
other hand, Nishi-watamae and Higashi-watamae Village accounts included a 
contribution to the salaries of the canal watchmen of both Watamae-shinden 
and Gokamura Branch Canals but mentioned no salary for any intra-village 
irrigation roles. 
Perhaps most important were the tasks of allocation and conflict 
resolution, particularly during the spring wet tilling and periods of low 
delivery volumes in the summer months. At such times , how was it decided 
which parcels could take in how much water when? Where allocation 
schedules were used at the branch canal level of water delivery, the units 
in rotation were villages, as for example the rotation cycle along 
Oshikiri Branch Canal. However, it is remarkable that we have yet to 
uncover any examples of water allocation or drainage schedules drawn up 
and administered by these or any other basin villages to distribute water 
so delivered within their boundaries. 
.. 
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In fact, the effectiveness of village control over such allocation and 
over management of water use conflicts would appear to have been 
undermined by two factors. The first was the frequency of land transfers,e. 
especially because parcels often changed hands without respect to village 
residency. Even where the household composition of villages remained 
rather constant, the changing fortunes of households resulted in losses 
and gains in land that disrupted the ideal congruence of residency, 
cultivation, and ownership. How strong might be "the habit of obedience 
to community opinion where water was concerned" (Smith 1959:209) in 
Arayashiki Village, where ten of the forty cultivators of village lands 
were non-residents, or in Kakuda-futakuchi Village, where over half of the 
land registered in the village books was cultivated by non-resident 
households? In such cases where non-resident cultivation was widespread, 
what force would have remained to "village ostracism" (mura-hachibu), the 
ultimate sanction of the village as closed corporate community (see Befu 
1965e:309-11)? 
A second factor, as we have just seen, derives from the physical layout 
of fields and ditches. The apparent piecemeal expansion of the physical 
network in at least some areas like Watamae created there a literal maze 
of channeling. The terminal ditching of three different branch canal 
networks inter-locked elaborately, and even within sections of village 
fields there was wide variation in field parcel size and flow patterns. 
It is difficult to imagine how uniform procedures could be applied over 
the village lands. To the extent, then, that principles and schedules 
could not be drawn up which were applicable over a large part of a 
villagee's  lands, was not village control of allocation thereby weakened? 
Given the difficulties of village-wide allocation, would not the necessary 
coordination have been of an even more local and informal nature among 
adjacent cultivators, perhaps as Vandermeer (1968 :729-35) has described 
for an area of Taiwan? 
This lack of evidence of village involvement in water use tasks, the 
accelerating land transfers in some parts of the basin, and the highly 
irregular parcel and ditching layouts that may have been found in much of 
the basin invite speculation that village roles and procedures were 
increasingly ineffective in irrigation tasks of the water use phase. I am 
inclined not to accept this speculation pending further research. On the 
contrary, I find it plausible that under precisely those conditions, 
village roles and procedures might have proven necessary for at least some 
taskse. Disputes, for example, had stil,l to be resolved, often we might 
presume between adjacent cultivators of different villages; given a 
traditional preference for third-party conciliation (Henderson 1965), 
disputants might have turned to village officers, either 
irrigation-specific roles such as sekimoti or general roles such as 
· headman or village elder. 
Moreover, we must remember that in other irrigation contexts the 
village unit persisted in the face of land transfers and their attendant 
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disruptions--for example, as the petitioning unit in branch canal and main 
canal disputes.  Indeed, here too, it is very likely that the village unit 
persisted because of such disruptions . That is to say, a b'reakdown in the 
ideal congruence of residency, cultivation, and ownership would have made 
social order more problematical. Even if such a breakdown would have 
diluted the effectiveness of such sanctions as village ostracism and 
denial of work assistance (by which village 11 solidarity1 1  and 
1 1corporateness1 1  is usually held to be manifested) , it would at the same 
time have made it all the more imperative to both peasants and domain 
officials alike to maintain some framework by which certain tasks might be 
accomplished. By this reasoning, an increasingly fluid tenure and 
residence pattern would have only heightened the determination of domain 
officials to continue the village format as a means of political and 
economic control. At the same time , the village as a structure of roles 
and set of procedures would have been maintained by peasants to be 
activated in certain contexts such as conciliation of disputes among water 
users at the local field level and presentation of grievances in water 
delivery matters . 
Nonetheless, considering the mutual constraints that operated through 
the four phases of basin irrigation, even finding areas of strong village 
control over household water use would not greatly alter the assessment 
that basin irrigation organization was, overall, decentralized. Even 
where water use was coordinated by a structure of village roles and 
procedures ,  the village and its cultivators were in turn con.strained by 
the physical network, volume, and timing of water delivery and drainage. 
To note that water use was very much determined by patterns of source 
control, delivery, and drainage is but to raise an obvious point; however,  
in this case, where task performance in the other three phases was 
decentralized, it is also to imply that some areas of strong village 
control over water use would only represent local exceptions in this 
fourth phase to the general pattern . . 
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Appendix 
This appendix presents five documents relating to inspections by 
officials of the district deputy's office in 1785-6 concerning allocation 
�long the Nakagawa Main Canal. All are my translations from unpublished
source #1. 
a. A petition from headmen of eleven downstream villages to their village 
group headmem. 
A Humble Request by Means of this Petition 
In  recent years, the lower villages have been suffering from a water 
shortage. It is especially severe this year, and it is thought that 
the rice transplanting is in serious jeopardy. We brought this problem 
to the canal guards {sekimori). We were told that the canal banks 
along the hako-no-uchi section above Matsuo Village are not strong and 
thus a large volume of water cannot be drawn into the canal through the 
top water gate [for fear of breaking the canal banks along that 
section] .  
We ourselves then assembled and inspected the water flow and 
allocation conditions along the main canal. We discovered that the 
channels of all the villages from Mitsubashi Village to the bottom of 
the main canal [where the petitioners' branch canals began] are drawing 
more water than in the past. Because the main canal dimensions are 
fixed by the domain officials [at all points where branch canals 
diverge] ,  this cannot be the problem. However, it appears as a natural 
consequence [of annual branch canal cleaning] that the entrances to 
various branch canals have been deepened to the point where the water 
level at the end of the main canal is 15.2 cm lower than normal. 
Because of these conditions, we very humbly and respectfully request 
the following: that construction be carried out to raise the canal 
banks along the hako-no-uchi section and that a survey be conducted by
domain officials of the allocation points along the main canal so that 
sufficient water in quantities equal to past years can rea.ch our 
canals. We would be extremely grateful if we could receive your 
attention in these matters. 
(seals of) village headmen from Oshikiri Village Group {8 signatories) 
headmen of Hirono-shinden Village {2 signatories) 
headman of Doguchi Village (1 signatory) 
{dated) Tenmei 5, Year of Snake, Fourth Month [23rd Day] 
{addressed to) �ta Kisoji-donod. (Naganuma Village Group headman)
Sato Saemon-dono (Yokoyama Village Group headman) 
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b. Directive sent by Tozo, a subordinate official in the district deputy's 
office, to headm�n of upstream and midstream villages. 
In the fourth month of Tenmei 5, a petition was received from the 
six villages of Oshikiri, Sanbongi, Fukuoka, Ofuchi, Doguchi, and 
Hirono-shinden reporting that the water in the main canal reaching 
Yokoyama [the terminal point of the main canal] was 15 .2  cm below 
normal level and rice planting was in serious jeopardy. They requested 
a canal survey because it appeared that the intakes of the branch 
canals of the upstream villages had been deepened to improve flow into 
the branch canals but with the consequence that volume reaching 
downstream villages has been greatly reduced. 
On the 24th day of the fourth month, I summoned the main canal guard 
(osekimori), Ota Kisoji, Sato Yaota, and other [unspecified] village 
officials and conducted a survey of the canal from above Mitsubashi 
Village to below Yokoyama Village. As a result, I am ordering the 
following dimensions [for branch canal intakes]: 
1. Aramata-Akagawa Branch Canals' intake: the main canal sekine is to 
be widened 9 .1  cm. 
2. Hosoya Branch Canal intake: the main canal sekine is to be widened 
24.2 cm. 
3 .  Daihanda Branch Canal intake: the main canal sekine is to be 
widened 9.1 cm. 
4. Watamae-Hirakata Branch Canal intake: (a) using the old measuring 
pole, a trial makura is to be constructed and (b) to improve the 
flow to the downstream canals, the main canal sekine is to be 
widened 45.5 cm. 
5. Yokogawa Branch Canal intake: there are no fixed dimensions for 
this intake, so the spillway is to be widened by 60.6 cm. 
6. Tsukegawa Branch Canal intake #1: there are sand bags buried here 
in the main canal [to raise the water level and increase flow to 
branch canal]; the top layer is to be removed and the top line 
levelled. 
7. Tsukegawa Branch Canal intake #2: a 45.5 cm wide, squared log is to 
be placed at the entrance of the branch canal. 
8 .  Wanagawa Branch Canal intake: the 1.5 m squared log is to be 
removed from the main canal. 
In order to deal with the water shortages in the Yokoyama, Oshikiri, 
and Hirono-shinden areas, I am ordering the above on the basis of my 
recent investigation. 
(seal of) office of Tozo 
(dated) Year of Snake, Fourth Month 
[the document continues with the following endorsement on the back] 
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I agree �ith each of the above directions, and the work will be done 
on the day after· tomorrow, the 26th. You are ordered to send one 
person each to the above places along the main canal on that day. This 
document is to be circulated in order among you and the last to receive 
it shall return it to this office. 
(seal of) Ueno Wakichi 
(dated) Fourth Month, 24th Day
(addressed to) headmen of the following villages: Wanagawa, Tsukegawa, 
Yokogawa, Hirakata, Watamae, Daihanda, Hosoya, Akagawa, 
Aramata 
c. A memorandum, probably written by Tozo or Ueno Wakichi of the district 
deputyd' s  office summarizing their actions. 
1. On the 23rd day of the fourth month, a petition was received 
concerning a water shortage in Oshikiri, Hirono-shinden, and Doguchi. 
On the 24th, an inspection was made of the main canal from above Matsuo 
Village to below Yokoyama Village. On this inspection round, Ota 
Kisoji, .Sato Yaota, the main canal guards, and relevant village 
officers accompanied [the district deputy officials]. 
2. On that day [the 24th] ,  the conditions of and directions for the 
main canal sekine from Aramata-Akagawa Branch Canals intake to Wanagawa 
Branch Canal intake were written down and the document circulated. 
3. Concerning the sekine at the Hirakata Branch Canal intake. During
the recent construction along the main canal, it was reported by 
Heisaburo, a representative of the construction foremen, that there 
were two measuring poles in the main canal in front of the Hirakata 
Branch canal intake. The old pole was 12.1 cm higher than the new 
pole. Using the old pole, he had a makura put in, and then adjusted a 
single measuring pole to half the distance between the old and new 
poles. Because water was still backing up [in the main canal] in front 
of the intake, he had the sekine widened by 36.3 cm. Next spring, 
during the annual canal inspection, this section must be very carefully 
checked. 
4. The other points along the main canal were fixed according to the 
directives. 
5. The drainage canal of Tsuchibashi Village is used by Oshikiri and 
Hirono-shinden [Branch Canals to supplement water from the main canal] .  
Custom has not been followed, however, and the canal has not been 
cleaned and dredged properly. During the spring canal cleaning, it 
must be carefully dredged and grasses and bushes in the canal must be 
cut out. 
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6. On the 26th, the main canal sekine adjeustments were madee: this was 
checked on the same day. Because the various canals drawing water from 
Oshikiri Branch Canal are within the jurisdiction of Ota Kisoji, he was 
directed to see that water was flowing smoothly into all those canals. 
7. Along the section of Hirono-shinden Canal where it passes through 
Tsushima and Oshikiri Villages, villagers of the latter two have dug 
small chartnels and without authorization have been drawing water in 
from the Hirono-shinden Canal. This must cease, and officers of both 
villages were summoned and ordered to make sure that all such channels 
are filled in. Officers and canal watchmen from Hirono-shinden Village 
were told to check to see that they have in fact been filled in. 
(dated) Tenmei 5, Year of Snake, Fourth Month 
d. Other entries of uncertain authorship and date which appear to be 
fragments of 'intra-office' or 'inter-office' memoranda from the 
district deputy's office. 
--It is hereby reported that construction was carried out along the 
main canal from Aramata-Akagawa Branch Canals [intake] to Wanagawa 
Branch Canal intake in line with the directive [of the 24th]e. 
--Concerning the matter of Hirono-shinden. Because the cultivators in 
Tsushima and Oshikiri Villages had dug small channels to take .water 
from Hirono-shinden Canal [as it passes through those villages],  
officers of both villages were summoned and ordered to see that the 
channels were filled in; Hirono-shinden officers and canal watchmen 
were ordered to check. However, the channels were not filled in as 
ordered, and so because Ota Kisoji [Oshikiri Village Group headman] 
handles matters regarding channels in that area, he was summoned and 
ordered to do what is necessary to insure water flow to 
Hirono-shinden. 
--On the occasion of inspecting Hirono-shinden Branch Canal, it was 
observed that along the east bank of Tsuchibashi [Drainage] Canal and 
along both banks of Oshikiri and Hirono-shinden Branch Canals, there 
were many trees and bushes growing out into the canal [ thus 
obstructing the water flow] ;  they were ordered removed and the canal 
banks cut [that is, where the inside of the bank has collapsed]. 
--Last year (Year of Snake, Fourth Month), the.re were difficulties in 
water reaching Lower Oshikiri, Ofuchi, and Fukuoka Villages; because 
they heard that this was because villagers in Sanbongi [upstream 
along the same Oshikiri Branch Canal] were freely taking in water, 
these villages sent a petition [toe? ] ,  on the basis of which Harada 
Kanazuke made an inspection. Following this, there was a meeting 
between [or "with"?] Ota Kisoji and Sato Saemon, which resulted in 
the following decisions : ..••..• [ the passage does not continue] 
. . 
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--There is m1:1ch growth from both banks of Tsuchibashi Drainage Canal 
extending into the channel and obstructing the flow; this is to be 
cut and removed. 
e. A memorandum, probably of the district deputy's office, concerning a 
meeting held with the Oshikiri Village Group headman, �ta Kisoji. 
Last year the main canal was surveyed and construction were 
conducted between Mitsubashi and Yokoyama Villages to alleviate a water 
shortage in the Oshikiri Village Group area. At that time, it was 
heard that Shimo-oshikiri, �fuchi, and Fukuoka Villages were having 
difficulties getting water because cultivators in Sanbongi Village had 
dug channels and were freely drawing out extra water from the 
[Oshikiri] Branch Canal. Harada Kanazuke was sent to inspect the 
conditions in the fourth month of this year [Tenrnei 6, 1786 ] ,  and there 
was a meeting with the village group headman. 
1. There is a considerable growth from both banks of the Tsuchibashi 
Drainage Canal which extends into the canal and obstructs the flow; 
this must be cut. 
2. The seed bed channel [for irrigating the rice seedling beds] within 
Yokoyama Village which is no longer being used is to be filled in. 
3. Concerning the_dconstruction of the intake to the tertiary canal 
drawing water from Oshikiri Branch Canal to approximately 200 koku 
of Sanbongi Village paddy lands: the Oshikiri Branch Canal is to be 
widened by 60.6 cm to 1.82 m at that point. 
4. To the east of the intake to the Tsushima Village Canal, cultivators 
have cut an opening to draw water into a pond they maintain for fire 
prevention. This is not permitted and must be closed up [the pond 
is probably fed by a shallow well] .  
5. Generally, the upstream villages [along Oshikiri Branch Canal] have 
come to take in water freely [without regarding the needs of the 
downstream villages] .  To prevent this, any new projects and repairs 
must be preceded by a meeting with the officers of the lower 
villages.
6. From Oshikiri Village downstream, cultivators have dug small 
channels from the branch canal and are freely taking in water. 
However, with each passing year, attention to canal cleaning and 
. .
repairs grows more lax. We take this occasion to remind cultivators 
strongly that such cleaning and repair work must be done. 
The above was transmitted to Ota Kisoji at a meeting. 
(dated) Year of Horse, Fourth Month [Tenmei 6, 1786] 
Chapter VII 
INTERPRETATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The preceding chapters have presented a description of Aka River .basin 
irrigation, conceived broadly to include water source control, delivery, 
use in the paddy fields, and drainage; Further, they have offered a 
characterization and analysis of basin irrigation roles and the 
distribution of authority among them. Investigators of agrarian regions 
in Japan and elsewhere have tended to neglect the social patterns of use 
and management of water resources, focusing instead on the disposition of 
land and labor. This study was undertaken to illustrate how one might 
formulate with analytic rigor a longitudinal case study of irrigation 
organization in a setting where water was both critical to cultivation and 
problematical to cultivators. It is further based on the premise that 
understanding the dynamics of irrigation in the Tokugawa countryside is
essential to our full appreciation of the political economy of that 
agrarian state. 
The geomorphology of the Aka River basin is a common one in Japan, with 
a steep, forested headwaters, an arable alluvial fan, and a flat 
downstream plain (Koide 1975). Like many of the thousands of 
delivery-drainage networks in Tokugawa Japan, the Aka River networks were 
gravity-flow, multi-level canals, branching across the plain from separate 
intakes along the alluvial fan and serving paddy fields in several to many 
villages (Tamaki & Hatate 1974:240-298). Yet if the drainage basin 
topography and physical network design were representative, even a cursory
glance at other areas of Tokugawa Japan (Kitamura 1973a) reminds us • Of 
substantial variation in organizational patterns, an issue that demands 
future comparative research beyond the more modest goals of the present 
study. Rather, in this final chapter, it remains to bring together a 
summary description of Aka River irrigation with an interpretation of why 
such a decentralized form persisted through the period. Following that I 
will consider some of the implications of this argument for the political 
economy of Shonai Domain and for the broader anthropological study of 
"irrigation's impact on society" (Downing and Gibson 1974). 
Construction. The basic physical facilities of basin irrigation were
the levees along the river, the weirs and river intakes to the eleven main 
canalse, the branching earth canals with their spillways, water gates, 
flumes, and intakes, and the bunded paddy fields themselves. The original 
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impetus to this technologically simple but intricately interlocking 
network was the small embankment construction project in the alluvial fan 
section by the Mogami retainer, Niizeki, in 1605-06. The resulting river 
stabilization allowed canal and paddy field construction, typically by 
local initiative and direction with formal domain approval. The digging 
of the Shoryuj igawa Main Canal, for. example, was organized by the 
household of the headman of a midstream village; like other main canals it 
was largely a modification of an old river course. In the next fifty 
years, a total of thirty-seven branch canals were dug; after the 1658 
registry that came to define canal network boundaries, there was only
. . . 
elaboration and extension of branch and tertiary canals. How perfunctory 
was domain approval is problematical. In Sh�ryOjigawa, there is no 
evidence that requests to build branch canals were rejected, but then 
neither is there evidence of such requests being made after 1658. Domain 
approval was valued because it was a basis on which to seek later 
financial support for reconstruction and major repairs to the works from 
the public works fund (e.g., Narita's drainage gates). 
Because wood, earth, and straw rope and matting were the principal 
building materials, reconstruction was periodically required. The 
distinction between (re)construction and normal maintenance was 
financial--public works money could often be expected for the former, but 
not the latter. The largest reconstruction project in the basin was that. 
of the Kumaide intake, done in principle every twelve years. Dimensions, 
design, and materials were carefully replicated. Although complex, the 
project was probably not technically demanding; the most crucial 
managerial skill was requisitioning, recruiting, and directing the 
necessary labor, a task handled by the two Kumaide osekimori. In this 
way, they were able to manipulate labor needs for personal profit. The 
rural magistrate's office exercised only a passive oversight. None of the 
structures along the Nakagawa Main Canal approached the Kumaide intake in 
scale, though they too were reconstructed with subsidies from public works 
monies, apparently under the direction of the main canal osekimori, with 
support from peasant-stratum technical assistants in the district deputy's 
office. 
There was little, if any, perceptible technological change in either 
river works or canal structures throughout the period, despite the 
expansion of paddy lands and recurrent flooding. Domain officials 
rejected almost all proposals for improved river training and channel 
straightening, restricting domain tax monies to repair of damaged levees. 
The canal networks tended to expand through accretion rather than 
replacement, the effect of which was to complicate an already complex 
dendritic pattern with elaborate overlapping (e.g., the channel patterns 
around Watamae and the water arrangements made for Hirono-shinden). 
Operation-maintenance. The strategic importance of the ShBryujigawa 
Main Canal in supplying the castle moat led the domain to assign 
responsibility for maintaining the intake works to the six surrounding 
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villages (only a minority of whose lands were within the Shoryujigawa 
service area). They were exempted from all miscellaneous taxes and corvee 
in return for providing all needed labor and materials for ordinary 
maintenance and limited labor duties in the gate reconstruction. Two 
osekimori were appointed and supervised by the rural magistrate's office; 
the positions were generally hereditary, although one was removed in 1774 
in favor of a branch household head after complaints from service area 
villages about poor performance. At least one of the osekimori households 
had sizeable land holdings in the six-village area by the mid�1880s, but 
the relation between the position and land accumulation cannot be traced 
with present evidence. 
In 1840, despite domain opposition, the village assemblies of the six 
villages did revise their delegated maintenance responsibilities to limit 
the increasing demands on their labor and materials by installing a 
contractor system. The osekimori then asserted some degree of control 
over the contractors and in 1863 replaced them with themselves in the 
redefined position of contractor. 
· These procedures concerned the intake works only. Along the unlined 
main canal itself, the annual spring dredging was divided among service 
area villages by a corvee formula, with the main burden falling on the 
downstream villages. The duties of the Kyoden area osekimori were 
unclear, but I suspect that they supervised the dredging, inspected the 
canal banks regularly for breaks, slides and channel growth, and organized
bank repairs. They probably reported to the Kyoden Village Group headman, 
but they could not initiate any requests to the domain. Channel bank 
repairs appear to have qualified for some public works monies. 
The principal works along the main canal, the intakes to the . branch 
canals, were generally maintained and operated by the branch canals--that 
is, by a canal guard (sekimori) appointed and supervised by officers of 
villages in the branch canal service area or, in the event of a long
branch canal, by a special gate guard serving under the sekimori. The 
intakes themselves were simple structures, although some of the 
water-raising and drainage gates along the canal were sizeable enough to 
receive public works support for repairs. 
Along the Nakagawa Main Canal, ordinary maintenance was handled by two 
Main Canal Guards (osekimori), hereditary positions held by households, 
one at the top of the canal and the other at the tail-end. There were 
also gate guards responsible for maintaining and operating the main canal 
intake gates and the spillways under osekimori supervision. Matters 
concerning the river intake and the top two kilometers of the main canal 
were contracted to Mawatari Village in a much simpler and less costly 
arrangement than that with the Kumaide six villages. The osekimori 
oversaw Mawatari ' s  performance and also organized the annual main canal 
dredging. Generally, though, the osekimori position was limited both in 
rights and duties. They appear, for example, to have had little authority 
204 
over branch canal intakes--and thus, allocation. There is no example of 
an osekimori petition or report to domain officials, and they may best be 
characterized as a specialized irrigation role intermediate between 
village headmen and village group headmen. 
As in the Shoryujigawa area, there were no formal irrigation 
organizations on either the main canal or branch canal levels. There were 
for most branch canals one or two water guards, appointed and overseen by 
the village assemblies or officers of service area villages. Main canal 
and branch canal expenses were assessed to all villages in proportion to 
registered yield; an analysis of several village accounts suggested that 
total irrigation expense burdens were light. Even in 1845 in 
Higashi-watamae, irrigation expenses represented only 5.5% of all village 
taxes and 3.3% of its total registered yield. 
Allocation. Intake volume from the Aka River to the main canals was 
determined by the positioning of the weirs and by the "customary" 
dimensions of the intake gates. The maximum opening of the Sh�ryfijigawa 
gate, for example, was fixed at 7.88 m wide and 1.06 m high (that is, 8.35 
square meters). 
The 1658 registry defined in effect the official service area of the 
Shoryujigawa Main Canal to the extent that it enumerated those branch 
canals and, within the branch canals, those villages entitled to its 
r111 1irrigation wate' (yosui) and responsible for its maintenance .  However 
useful in bounding the service area, the registry did little to define 
relations among these villages and branch canals with yosui rights. Paddy 
land acreage yields were listed for each village and branch canal, but 
these figures soon came to vary widely with actual conditions. Branch 
canal intake dimensions were not specified, and the register contained no 
statement of the principle by which main canal yosui water was to be 
allocated among the branch canals. 
Later documents indicate there were two allocation states along the 
main canale: normal allocation of a continuous flow to open branch canal 
intakes of fixed dimensions and three types of special allocation. Thee · 
extant examples of special allocation were all instituted by village group 
headmen or rural magistrates upon petitioning by village units. 
Although on several occasions there were adjustments of branch canal 
intakes by order and under the direction of rural magistrate officials and 
village group headmen, they generally affected only those branch canals 
immediately involved in a dispute and were inconsistent and ad hoc. The 
first evidence of measureable, consistent written standards was not until 
1824. By these, the main canal width was fixed at the point of intake and 
· the minimum height of water flow in the main canal below the intake was 
specified. Even so, these were normal allocation state standards, not 
special state standards, and there was no unambeiguous statement of the 
allocation principle used to establish these dimensions. This remained 
true for the entire period. 
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Complicating allocation of Sh5ryujigawa water was the issue of 
morai-mizu. These morai-mizu agreements were typically between midstream 
or downstream service area villages and new paddy lands on the west bank 
of the Oyama River. Disagreements arose among main canal irrigators about 
whether the granting of morai-mizu rights was a perogative of a village or 
a single branch canal and whether other branch canals might veto such 
negotiations. In all cases, it was an issue in which domain officials 
were reluctant to intervene, as demonstrated by the example of Hayashizaki 
Branch Canal and the new paddy lands across the Oyama River. Extension of 
such rights generally brought trouble, as the recipients came to expect a 
regular share of branch canal water and to attempt to convert morai-mizu 
to yosui rights, e.g., by obtaining domain support for gate and flume 
construction. 
For the Nakagawa Main Canal service area, there was no listing 
equivalent to the 1658 registry of ShoryOjigawa that formally defined the 
service area boundaries, branch canals, and villages. However, the master 
stream to the west and the Hirose-Fujishima River to the east effectively 
limited the reach of the Nakagawa Main Canal; because the Fujishima River 
was wider than the Oyama River and because the opposite bank lands were 
irrigated by the Inaba Main Canal, there were none of the pressures for 
extension of morai-mizu rights like those posed by the Oyama left bank 
villages. 
As with Shoryujigawa, there was no clear statement of the principles by 
which main canal or branch canal water was allocated, but in the 1785 and
1797 inspections and adjustments by the district deputy official Ueno 
Wakichi, a proportional allocation norm was enunciated--proportional, that 
is, to village paddy land registered yields. This was also cited when 
Ueno intervened in the Watamae area tertiary laterals dispute in 1805, and
there is further evidence of its application in the Inaba service area in
1797, when Ueno and the village group headmen inspected deteriorating 
branch canal intakes along the Inaba Main Canal and adjusted dimensions in 
accordance with the previous year's registered yields.e8 5  It is 
problematical, of course, how often the principle was cited in years 
before and after Ueno's term in the district deputy's office, though I 
believe it fair to suppose that allocation proportional to registered 
yield represented what water users might commonly expect when petitioning 
domain authorities (if in fact hearing was granted the petitions). 
The existence of such a principle was .one matter; its application to 
actual situations presented further difficulties. We have seen that by
1785, there was a variety of structures by which Nakagawa Main Canal water 
was taken in by the branch canals. How this variation originated is not 
clear but as with Shoryujigawa branch canals, these intake structures had 
8 5  The precise wording in the Inaba document was kyonenchu takawari o 
mot te bunsui ai tachi soro (Naganuma 1978:56) .• ·· 
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the force of precedent. It was apparently difficult for Ueno and the 
village group headmen to design concrete measures to effect proportionale. 
allocation. If a sekine existed at an intake, its dimensions might be 
adjusted, but if none existed, they seem to have lacked the authority to 
order its construction. At the branch canal level, Ueno did order changes 
in the division point between Hirono-shinden and Oshikiri Branch Canals 
and in the tertiary lateral divisions in the Watamae area, but even in 
these cases, we must remain skeptic�! of whether consensus was reached 
about what concrete measures constituted fair application of proportional 
allocation. 
There is no extant evidence of rotational allocation among the branch 
canals as was organized on at least two occasions--and probably 
more--along the Shoryujigawa Main Canal. There were rotational allocation 
schedules for the summer low water months along at least some of the 
branch canals and tertiary laterals. There are brief, occasional 
references to roles in some villages which may have.ehad duties connected 
to intra-village water allocation among parcels, but curiously no examples 
of allocation and drainage schedules within basin villages have been 
discovered. 
Conflict resolution. Irrigation conflicts arise over issues of all of 
the above tasks--construction, operation-maintenance, and allocation. 
Their resolution may be handled by irrigation-specific roles or groups 
such as water judges and water courts, but this. was not the case in the 
Aka River basin. As with other tasks, there was a formal articulation to 
domain administrative roles, but a predisposition to handle conflicts at 
the lowest possible level. This was more conducive to endemic quarreling 
than quick resolution and undermined potential collaboration and 
coordination. For example, a majore.eobstacle to river control and drainage 
improvements in the lower basin was continued friction among the injured 
parties themselves, such as the long-standing dispute between 
Narita-shinden and Obana Villages. 
Elsewhere in Shoryujigawa, there were at least occasional disagreements 
between the service area villages and the intake osekimori over procedures 
at the intake works; the osekimori were accused in petitions to domain 
officials of laxity in protecting the works against high water and poor 
maintenance of the works in times of low water. The Osekimori found 
themselves in the middle of another dispute be�ween domain officials and 
the six villages over rising maintenance costs, with the latter eventually 
initiating a new contractor system in 1840. 
Along the main canal, it was shown that the familiar 
upstream-downstream disputes occurred here in the context of a tripartite, 
up-middle-down division of branch canals. The small upstream branch 
canals seldom appear in extant cases, most of which refer to disputes 
between the midstream canals and the tail-end four. The majority of cases 
date from 1750-1820 in the form of petitions from various combinations of 
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villages from the tail-end four branch canals complaining of water 
shortages and consequent crop losses. While a range of reasons were 
cited--the condition of the river, water guard negligence, poor main canal 
maintenance, and excess intake by midstream branch canals� it was the last 
that was most consistently advanced. These multi-village petitions were 
typically passed through the Kyoden Village Group headman and/or the Oyama 
shogunate office to the domain rural magistrate's office. After 
discussion within the office and/or between officials and village group 
headmen, the matter was dropped, some action was taken by the officials, 
or it was referred back to the village group headman for conciliation or 
action. The three inspections and adjustments of the midstream and 
tail-end branch canal intakes in 1723, 1794, and 1824 were examples of 
joint official-village group headman action. A more frequent resolution 
was a one-time special allocation of t·oshi-mizu to the tail-end canals, 
organized by the Kyoden Village Group headman and probably actually done 
by the Kyoden osekimori. 
In assessing the claims of villages in the tail-end branch canal area, 
it was concluded that while it is reasonable to assume there were in fact 
shortages, whether midstream branch canals willfully violated intake 
procedures is much more problematical. Appeal to a respect for 11custome11 
was a common petitioning device, but there do not seem to have been any 
unambiguous standards or guides to main canal allocation before 1824.
There was paddy land expansion in both the middle and lower service areas 
which increased demand universally though not uniformly. One can 
appreciate the wariness w;th which domain officials approached the 
problem. They vacillated not only because the past was an uncertain guide 
but also because the future was unpredictable; adjusting for expanding 
acreage would leave them open to future claims. There was also a certain 
delicacy to the petitioners• claims because there was much leniently 
surveyed and some unsurveyed land for which they were now claiming 
shortagese. 
Branch canal level conflicts also typically revolved around (a) alleged 
or actual disruption of water flow to downstream villages by those more 
upstream along a branch canal and (b) the use of excess and drainage water 
outside of a branch canal service area. Upstream disruptions of flow 
included simply cutting off the canal water flow (e.g., Naka-kyoden and 
Futakuchi), digging extra offtakes from the branch canal (e . g . ,  Inoko and 
Narita-shinden), and operating gates along the canal to upstream advantage 
( e . g. , Kakuda-shinden and Nishi-nonuma). Problems of Futakuchi, Zennami, 
and Higashi-nonuma with Nishi-nonuma and those between Hayashizaki Branch 
Canal villages and Yonede-shinden were illustrative of the difficulties 
arising from use of branch canal water by Oyama left bank areas. 
In these disputes, usually one or more villages made allegations 
against one or more other villages in a peition to the domain through the 
village group headman. Occasionally, district-level officials intervened 
to arrange a settlement, but more typically, t_he village group headman, 
.. 
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upon receipt of the petition, delegated conciliation responsibility to 
headmen of neighboring villages. 
In the various conflict cases that were discussed for the Nakagawa 
service area, there were two recurring complaints. First, there were 
allegations brought by villages in the Oshikiri and Hirono areas of 
shortages during spring transplanting and the summer dry period due to 
midstream branch canals' altering their intakes (by deep dredging, for 
example) to let in "too much" water. Another frequent complaint by 
irrigators in all branch canals along the Nakagawa Main Canal below the 
Tenko Intake was poor maintenance and .structural weakness in the 
hako-no-uchi section of the main canal, which limited the flow volume 
below what was necessary for spring tilling and transplanting. 
As with Shoryujigawa, evidence of dissatisfaction began in the 
mid-1700s. The 1785 petition by Hirono and Oshikiri area villages voiced 
both these complaints. Ueno ' s  response, to inspect the main canal with 
the village group headmen and to order adjustments of some of the branch 
canal intakes, brought no lasting relief. His criticisms of the 
petitioners themselves, the poor maintenance of their branch canals and 
the disruptions of Hirono flow by Oshikiri cultivators, amounted only to 
admonishment and exhortation. 
No action was tak�n about the hako-no-uchi section, which was the 
subj ect of complaints again in 1797 by most of the branch canals. The 
midstream branch canals wanted permission to move their intake locations 
upstream of the hako-no-uchi section, but this was opposed by villages 
whose lands would be used for channels and it was turned down by Ueno. 
There was some shoring up of the canal banks and another adjustment of 
intakes. The weir-like makuras in the main canal below the branch canal 
intakes were lowered to increase the water velocity and thus the volume in 
the main canal, but there were no fundamental improvements in the 
hako-no-uchi section itself. It  remained a source of friction and 
complaint throughout the period. 
Problems along the main canal had repercussions on the branch canal 
levels, as for instance the frequent conflicts between Oshikiri and 
Hirono-shinden Branch Canals. The situation was reminiscent of Aoyama 
Branch Canal and the Narita-shinden Tertiary Lateral .d. Hirono-shinden 
Branch Canal, running through the villages in the Oshikiri service area, 
was vulnerable to all manner of use and abuse by Oshikiri residents. Its 
complaints brought occasional intervention by domain officials, usually 
directing the two village group headmen (Yokoyama and Oshikiri) to see 
that Oshikiri area residents cease and desist such behavior, but there are 
no records of punishments meted out. The one constructive action was the 
stone lining and definition of intake procedures at the place where the 
two branch canals began. 
209 
Main canal conditions also exacerbated relations along a single branch 
canal, as illustrated by the problems in Watamae in 1806 and the case of 
Taroemon along Oshikiri Branch Canal in 1850. Here, too, was demonstrated 
the shifting pattern of cooperation and conflict. Villages along Oshikiri 
Branch Canal, for example, were simultaneously absorbed in an 
upstream-downstream conflict amongst themselves, shared common abuses 
against Hirono-shinden Branch Canal, and joined together with Hirono area 
villages to protest intake ' violations' of midstream branch canals. · ·  
In sum, the conflict resolution pathway for both main canal and branch 
canal matters was the familiar domain administrative hierarchy: 
complaint--(water guard)e--village headman--village group headman--domain 
office (either district deputy or rural magistrate). Those disputes that 
reached the district officials in the form of petitions were those riot 
able to be settled at lower levels, although this was no assurance that 
the petitions would be entertained. Even when they were, there were few 
permanent solutionse. As with the performance of other irrigation tasks, 
the domain officials' attitude was passive and reflexive and intervention 
was reluctant. 
Indeed, such a circumscribed posture was so pervasive and persisting 
that I have argued that it described the overall configuration of basin 
irrigation roles throughout the Tokugawa centuries. I have been unable to 
find any patterned concentrations of active authority in irrigation tasks 
that might be identified as local autonomy or elite control. There 
emerged no strong organization of water users nor did either the domain 
official or large landholder elite assume key roles through which they 
consistently exercised decisive control .e. This is not to say, it bears 
emphasizing, that the basin was in a state of ' water anarchy.• Water was 
delivered from river to paddy fields, albeit without much efficiency or 
equity. Conflicts were endemic in the physical design and social 
procedures but not epidemic; the same features that bred conflict tended 
to keep it from becoming debilitating. And, as repeatedly demonstrated, 
peasant cultivators, domain officials, and (to a lesser degree) large 
landholders all assumed roles in the management of basin irrigation. But 
what is analytically important is that none of the three categories of 
persons came to exercise a decisive and effective authority over the 
others in all or any of the four phases of Aka River irrigation. 
Why was there such a clear pattern of dispersed authority, of 
decentralized irrigation organization in the basin, especially in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? By the mid-1700s, thousands of 
hectares of basin paddy lands were served by a ramified, inter-locking 
network of river and canals; the river water supply was variable and 
unpredictable and proving inadequate to satisfy demand in critical months 
of the growing season; and the limited technology of delivery and drainage 
resulted in a low water efficiency (e.g., leakages) and localized 
breakdowns (e . g . e, collapse of unlined canal banks). There were, moreover, 
several potential lines of authority around which irrigation roles might 
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have been effectively centralized :  the formal hierarchy of domain 
administration, land tenure relations of landlord and tenant, upstream and 
downstream areas, or the authority inherent in the specialized knowledge 
and often hereditary recruitment of canal guards. In light of 
dislocations and shortages of such a critical resource, why did none of 
• these become the basis of a centralized irrigation? The reasons, I would 
suggest, lay in the changes in the domain political economy that were 
sketched out in chapter two: the particular forms of land promotion and 
expansion, of commercialization of rice cultivation, and of large land 
holdings that emerged in the basin by the mid-1700s. These developments 
worked in various ways to inhibit and disincline officials, cultivators, 
and large landholders from moving towards effective, centralized control 
of irrigation tasks. 
There were, to begin with domain recalcitrance, real limits to what 
middle-level domain officials could do and might want to do beyond the 
temporary and reflexive measures they characteristically adopted. One 
suspects that more active intervention in the form of investments in 
physical network improvements and/or direct and vigilant enforcement of 
directives would have found little support from higher officials, for 
several reasonse. 
First, by the late 1700s·, the basic branching canal networks had 
elaborated through accretion to a degree where it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to make fundamental changes at one point without 
reverberations elsewhere. In the Nakagawa network, for example, a drastic 
solution to Oshikiri area residents' disruptions of Hirono Branch Canal 
flow would have required increasing the flow in the Oshikiri Branch Canal. 
To do this without adversely affecting other branch canals would have 
necessitated costly structural changes to the hako-no-uchi section of the 
main canal; this in turn would not only have committed the domain to 
future support of the hako-no-uchi section with public works funds but 
might also have opened up requests for reallocation of Aka River water for 
a widened Nakagawa Main Canal.e8 6  
A lack of financial incentive was probably a second reason why 
officials were ill-disposed to use domain resources and personnel to 
fundamentally address irrigation problems. Water shortages and poor 
drainage most severely affected the newer downstream areas, where 
under-registration (and thus under-taxation) of paddy lands was 
widespread. We have seen that by 1860, the domain tax base (that is, the 
taxable, registered paddy land yields) in the Nakagawa service area was a 
mere one-third of estimated actual productivity. With mounting domain 
8 6  Simply the complexity of each local problem could defy understanding 
and discourage intervention; a water flow dispute, as we have seen, 
often also involved matters of yachi use, grass cutting rights, and/or 
embankment maintenance, to name only irrigation-related issuese. 
' 
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fiscal insolvency and without the draconian measure of another cadastre, 
there would have been little to gain to the ·edomain in major improvements 
that would benefit these lands.87 
Finally, there was what one might call the administrative ethos of the 
domain. There were precedents for cautious, limited action but not for 
bold initiatives. There was a disposition towards ' cellular 
administration,e' in which thee- horizontal status strata were segmented into 
local groups, "containers" (Hall 1974), to which self-regulating 
responsibility was delegated. Petitions and complaints were taken up not 
from a commitment to adjudicating grievances but from a concern for the 
maintenance of order. Village group headmen, rural magistrates, and 
district deputies looked up, not down, taking care that there were no 
disruptions for which they might be held responsible that would draw the 
attention of superiors. A first order tactic was to minimize onee' s  scope 
of responsibility; only when conflicts and problems did not ' go away' and 
threatened to draw wider attention were they addressed. 
A conceivable organizational alternative to the domain administrative 
hierarchy could have been extensive self-regulation by peasant 
cultivators, for example, forming network cooperatives. In at least some 
other basins of similar geomorphology, there was a fairly high level of 
water-user organization; the Takahashi River basin in present-day Okayama 
was one such examplee_ (Fujii & Kahara 1976). _ But we have seen that in 
neither the Shoryujigawa nor the Nakagawa networks (nor Inaba: Naganuma 
1978) was there any evidence of formal irrigation organization at the 
branch canal, main canal, or river levels--no Junikag8, no Nikaryo (Waters 
1981), no Balinese ."wet villages" (Geertz 1973), no Valencian "irrigation 
communities" (Glick 1970). 
It is easy to imagine lines around which substantial, autonomous 
organization might have developed. On the river level in matters of 
source control and drainage, there were potential lines of conflict 
between lower basin irrigators and alluvial fan irrigators over high water 
discharges and drainage and between Shoryujigawa Main Canal irrigators and 
downstream main canal irrigators over low water river allocation. Within 
the main canals, we have identified other lines of identical and competing 
interests. But there were in fact no such broad coalescences of any 
duration and impact. 
87 The pressures against a new cadastre were outlined in chapter two, 
including the domain ' s  dependence on vital transfusions of loans and 
forced contributions by town mechants, many of whom had land holdings. 
A further deterrent to sponsoring major physical improvements may have 
been the public works procedures themselves, by which initial support 
would have incurred long-term commitmentsefor future upkeep..e
. . . . . 
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To be sure, there was water user participation in irrigation tasks in 
a-11 phases, as illustrated by the sekimori roles at the main• canal and 
branch canal levels. And the administrative village, the 
domain-designated local grouping of peasant cultivators, remained the 
primary unit in many irrigation contexts, as the petitioning party in 
disputes and as a first-order unit in the all_ocation of branch canal water 
and of irrigation-related expenses and labor duties. But equally 
conspicuous was the absence of supra-village mobilization of peasant 
cultivators, along either administrative or hydrological lines. 
Certainly, by the late 1700s, such efforts must have been frustrated by 
the accretive, piecemeal elaboration of canal networks and by the 
shifting, situational pattern of common and conflicting interests at the 
several levels of each network. But it must then be explained why these 
conditions came to operate as obstacles rather than as stimuli to greater 
water user organization. Here, frankly, my interpretation is at its most 
speculative. I would suggest, though, that despite the persistence of the 
administrative village in certain irrigation contexts (e.g., in presenting 
petitions, in organizing maintenance at the most local level), it proved 
an increasingly inadequate framework in wider associations because 
continual land transfers had disrupted the ideal congruence of ownership, 
cultivation, and residence intended by the early cadastres. Compounding 
this, though I have as yet no evidence, may have been an active domain 
discouragement of supra-village associations perceived as threats to the 
domain political order. Could the dissonance between administrative and 
hydrological boundaries, for example, have been deliberate? There were 
apparently several redrawings of village group boundaries in the Nakagawa 
area with paddy land expansion, but except for the small Oshikiri Village 
Group, there was no closer coincidence of administrative and hydrological 
lines at the end of the period than at the beginning. It might appear 
curious to propose that the domain was preventing water user organization
at the same time as domain officials were themselves avoiding active 
intervention in irrigation tasks. But domain economic and political 
interests need not have been complementary; whatever improvements in water 
delivery a user organization might have achieved, it might also have been 
perceived as a threat to domain political order. 
Even if it became more difficult for water users to form broad 
associations by the 1800s, one might wonder if, alternatively and 
individually, some of the large landholders such as the Kamo merchant 
Akino or the wealthy peasants like Toz� in Futakuchi and Abe in Sanbongi, 
did not come to exert considerable influence in irrigation matters. Did 
they not, for example, become major forces behind both conflict and 
conciliation--influencing the outcome of conflicts in favor of their . 
private interests or providing a conciliation alternative to the reluctant 
· officials? Th.e evidence is largely negative, even for Akino, whose 
holdings were the largest in the basin and were concentrated along the 
west bank of the Oyama. The single exception was Tozo, who was both one 
of the smallest 'large landholders' and headman of Futakuchi; Futakuchie' s  
> 
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continual difficulties suggest his influence to have been somewhat 
limited. 
Still, the possibility cannot be dismissed. To be sure, the lack of 
improvements to the physical network and of changes in construction, 
operation-maintenance� and allocation procedures imply that even if these 
large holders had supported or attempted major irrigation changes, they 
w�re unsuccessful. But in conflict resolution, even if they were 
influential (or perhaps, because they were influential), one would not 
expect the formal petitions and directives to evince their private and 
behind-the-scenes roles. Because such formal documents are all that are 
left to us, the extent of such private influence remains incalculable, at 
least directly. On the other hand, there are several circumstantial but 
compelling reasons which militate against expecting a decisive role for 
these large landholders in irrigation affairs. The first was the 
dispersion of their holdings among a number of different branch canal and 
main canal service areas. We have seen that Abe by the end bf the 
eighteenth century held paddy lands in all seven villages along Oshikiri 
Branch Canal, in Hirono-shinden, and in villages of five other, upstream 
branch canals in the Nakagawa Main Canal network; at the same time he also 
had lands in four villages of Aoyama Branch Canal (tail-end of 
Shoryujigawa Main Canal), in villages in the Inaba Main Canal service 
area, and in villages on the west bank of the Oyama River. Thus, the 
water interests of h�s various holdings were more competitive than 
complementary at the several levels of the networks. 
Furthermore, these large landholders generally enjoyed highly favorable 
land tenure conditions. Holdings accumulated by Akino, Tozo, and Abe were 
all concentrated in the downstream plain section of the Aka River basin; 
they were the first to feel water shortages, they suffered river flood 
damage, and they had serious drainage problems in the fall which kept the 
soils water-logged through the winter and had deleterious effects on plant 
growth. These same lands, however, were greatly undertaxed; Abe received 
a total of 1000 koku in rent rice from his tenanted lands in 1797, of 
which only 15% (150 koku) was due as domain taxes. It is not unreasonable 
to expect Abe and other large landholders to have balanced involvement in 
irrigation matters in a way decisive enough and on a scale extensive 
enough to effect significant improvements in their water situation against
possible costs of such intervention--not only the costs of physical system
improvements but also possible adverse changes in land tenure and 
taxation. This is especially true when one considers how tenuous and 
uncertain were the prospects of improving one's water rights and when one 
remembers that the best they might expect from formal domain action was a 
share of water proportional to registered yield--hardly worth agitation
under the circumstances. For these and perhaps other reasons,d8 8  then, the 
B B  Both Sato in his work on Tozo holdings (1965) and Igawa in his work on 
Honma holdings (1967) assert that in the late domain period, it was 
214 
large landholders tolerated water problems and were unwilling to become 
more actively involved in irrigation affairs. 
Continued research on Shonai Domain is necessary to further test what 
remains a somewhat speculative interpretation of basin irrigation. 
Modifications are inevitablee, but I believe the general lines of the 
argument will hold. Certain aspects of the basin environment and the 
domain political economy appear to have initially favored some form of 
centralized water management. Instead, however , the ecological and 
political features of paddy land development in the 1600s and its economic 
and social consequences in the 1700s led to a persisting stand-off between 
domain officials,  large landholders, and peasant cultivators in irrigation 
affairs. The result was the shared, decentralized management form this 
study has detailed. 
Implications. 
Irrigation was the disposition of a most critical--sometimes the most 
critical--resource in the Tokugawa countryside. I observed at the outset 
of this study that water control and use has usually been investigated 
within single villages but that this overlooks the fact that irrigation 
more broadly conceived was generally a supra-village level of 
organization. The configurations of roles that operated most of the 
thousands of irrigation networks were regional in scalee, intermediate 
between village and domain. Herein lies irrigation's significance to our 
understanding of the dynamics of the Tokugawa agrarian state. The ways in 
which peasant cultivators and state and non-state elite interacted in 
irrigation tasks should tell us much about the distribution of authority, 
wealth, and status through the countryside. 
We now have some sophisticated, general models of the Tokugawa state 
and economy, most notably, in English, in the work of Hall, crawcour, 
Yamamura, and Hanley. We also have excellent analyses of relations among 
the state elite {e.g., Bolitho 1974 , Totman 1967)e, detailed studies of 
formal and informal judicial processes {Henderson 1965, 1975)e, 
institutional studies of several domains {e.g., a number of papers in Hall 
and Jansen 1968)e, and an increasing number of village and household 
studies. What we know less about are the actual connections between the 
elite and peasants and the activities of and relations among peasants at 
very difficult for the landholder to alter the terms of the tenancy 
agreement and increase the rent due from the tenant. They do not offer 
evidence of this assertion, but if it was generally the case in the 
basin, it would have been another factor discouraging landholder 
intervention in irrigation affairs; they could not personally profit 
from improvements in yield stability and productivity that the 
downstream areas might gain from reform of physical facilities and 
procedures. 
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the supra-village level--in short, about the structure of local regions.d8 9  
How was political authority exercised at this level? How were 
rice-growing regions organized? In what ways and to what extent was the 
countryside integrated, both vertically and horizontally, politically and 
economically? 
This investigation of Aka River irrigation suggests a rather loose 
political integration of the basin. As frequently remarked, the exercise 
of domain authority in basin irrigation was passive and circumspect. 
Large landholders, too, remained for the most part uninvolved, and control 
of irrigation never became an issue of contention between them and 
irrigation officials. Nor did peasant cultivators organize into 
supra-village associations. In sum, vertically there was less elite 
coercion than one might expect from an area controlled by a single domain,
and, horizontally, there was less peasant cooperation than one might 
expect from the topography and physical network layout. It appears that 
the more the domain political economy changed, the more Aka River 
irrigation remained the same. This organizational and technological 
stasis is also remarkable in light of the generally rising productivity of 
the Tokugawa rural economy (Hanley and Yamamura 1977). Was Shonai an 
exceptional area? Was water control, even in this rice region, not as 
important to political authority or agricultural productivity as one might 
expect? These questions demand both comparative study of other river 
basins and more comprehensive research on Shonai Domain political economy.
Only then can we fully explain the economic and political importance of 
basin irrigation.d9 D 
89 Exceptions in English include the fine study by Hauser (1974) on Osaka 
area cotton growing and marketing and the recent work of Waters (1981). 
go This study suggests another contribution that a ' local region• 
perspective can offer. Hanley and Yamamura (1977), expanding on the 
work of Hayami, have proposed that the rural economy was steadily 
improving through the Tokugawa centuries and that with a decline in 
population growth rate in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
there was a general rise in the rural per capita standard of living in 
this second half. Smith (1977), working on the village level, has 
emphasized that within this generally rising curve there was constant 
fluctuation in the fortunes of individual households, indicative of the 
intense competitiveness of household unit farming and resulting in 
continual land transfers as households attempted to maintain a 
precarious balance between household labor and land. 
This proposition about the competitiveness of Tokugawa farming can 
be pushed even farther if considered in a wider, supra-village context. 
We have seen how in the Aka River basin the domain, {ndits promotion of 
paddy land expansion into the lower basin, created sizeable differences 
in relative tax burdens within and across _villages. We have seen, too, 
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However this issue is resolved, the study has already made clear the 
converse--the importance of local political and economic structures in 
shaping the forms of irrigation organization. As such, it stands as a 
useful corrective to an unfortunate style of explanation in much of the 
social science literature on irrigation. This is the tendency to posit 
certain hydrological conditions or a certain 'scalee' of physical 
facilities as operating directly and mechanically to determine the form of 
irrigation organization. This owes much to the tone of Wittfogel's 
hypothesis; his postulated developmental sequence leading to a general 
state despotism by hydrobureaucrats was triggered by the wat�r scarcity 
and control difficulties of certain arid and semi-arid environments. In 
similar fashion, the conclusions of Maass and Anderson's study (1978) of 
six irrigated areas in Spain and the United States rest on the rather 
direct line of reasoning that the unpredictability of water flow creates 
psychological insecurity and social conflict (or at least the threat of 
conflict) among those who would use it; for successful irrigation, water 
users must overcome this insecurity and insure predictability by working 
cooperatively to form and maintain a strong collective water user 
organization: 
Why is water so conducive to this conflict? Principally because 
it flows, its unregulated flows are likely to be erratic, and in 
arid country the consequences for any user unable to capture 
water the moment it is needed are likely to be dire. The 
location of a farmer's headgate on a water distribution channel 
very largely determines his social relationships with members of 
the irrigation community, as well as those outside the community 
who use the same water source ; and these relationships are 
potentially disruptive. Also, the unpredictable character of 
stream flow can create a tense environment of uncertainty that 
is disruptive of social relations. In more formal language, 
certain features of the technological or production function of 
water use such as the flow and stochasticity give rise to social 
conflict and to the objective of controlling it. (Maass & 
Anderson 1978:2; see also pp. 9-10, 366, 399-400) 
how land transfer patterns and land holding concentrations followed 
upon this differential attractiveness of land. Although mean yields in 
these newer paddy lands improved over time, they remained unstable 
because of water and soil conditions; small holders were left 
vulnerable to wide harvest fluctuations. But because of their minimal 
tax burdens, these parcels came to form the basis of large holdings. 
Poverty and prosperity were differentially experienced among households 
and by households over time. Fluctuation may have been, as Smith 
(1977) and others argue, a function of the balance of household labor 
and land, but this calculus must also include variations through the 
basin in the valuation of paddy land. 
' ..
'· 
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Leach, perhaps characteristically overstating his case in introducing 
his study of the Sri Lanka village, Pul Eliya, alludes to the primacy of 
11topography11 : 
But the Pul Eliya community does not only operate within an 
established framework of legal rules, it also exists within a 
particular man-made ecological environment. It is the 
inflexibility of topography--of water and land and 
climate--which most of all determines what people shall do. The 
interpretation of ideal legal rules is at all times limited by 
such crude nursery facts as that water evaporates and flows 
downhill. It is in this sense that I want to insist that the 
student of social structure must never forget that the 
constraints of economics are prior to the constraints of 
morality and law. (1961:9) 
Netting adds another variable as an alternative stimulus to centralized 
irrigation organization, the scale of physical facilities: 
Hierarchical authority may be a necessity only when (a) the 
scope of irrigation works requires for its construction and 
maintenance greater capital investment or technological skill 
than can be provided by individual cultivators or local 
associations, or (b) when a growing scarcity of water threatens 
disorder and conflict which will seriously reduce the utility of 
the system. (1974 :33) 
Spooner (1974), in a comparison of two Iranian oases, concludes that 
centralization in irrigation organization results from physical system 
complexity; Bennett (1976 :399) and Lees (1973) in rather different 
formulations imply an essentially similar proposition. 
Such proposals as these do not go unchallenged in the literature; there 
is much debate, for instance, on the proper meaning and explanatory power
of physical facility scale (see Millon 1963, Adams 1966, Pasternak 
1972:194, Kappel 1974). But they do illustrate the tendency to construct 
explanations from 'pured' hydrological and engineering variables. In 
questioning the causal primacy of such facts of water and engineering in 
determining forms of irrigation orgainzation, I do not deny the play of 
natural forces on human behavior. I would not turn Leach on his head and 
claim, for example, that land tenure is more determinative than rainfall. 
The error in this style of explanation that begins with the scarcity, 
flow, and unpredictabilty of water or the scale of hydraulic engineering 
is more insidious; it lies in its implicit but false opposition of nature 
and culture. ' Scarcity,d' 'stochasticity,' and 'scale' qre not variables 
that operate directly and uniformly on water users. They do not by 
themselves pose "organizational requirements of irrigation" (Netting op. 
cit.). They are not prime movers, cannot themselves explain anything, as 
Cowgill (1975) has cogently demonstrated for population pressure, often 
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elevated to a similar explanatory status. Rather, these natural 
conditions and physical features motivate human action and association 
only in terms of the historical moment at which they are experienced, the 
cultural presuppositions by which they are experienced, and the social 
position of those who experience them. 
It is undeniable that precipitation patternse·ein the Aka River basin 
were 'uncertain,' and that water in the basin exhibited a marked (and to 
those at the tail-end, distressing) tendency to flow downhill. By the 
mid-1700s, acreage expansion had pushed demand rather tightly against the 
available supply, and there is clear evidence of uneven distribution and 
considerable in-transit losses. The records of complaints and allegations 
that began in the second half of the eighteenth century demonstrate that 
some, at least, found the situation inequitable and intolerable. Yet 
these 'shortages' and 'dislocations' were experienced in terms of the 
domain political economy. 
Let us assume, hypothetically but not unreasonably, that there was a 
0.5 hectare paddy land parcel in the upstream village of Minde that was 
receiving 0.0008 cubic meters of water per second, a 0.5 hectare parcel in 
the downstream plain village of Futakuchi that was receiving 0.0004 cubic 
meters per second, and a 0.5 hectare parcel in the Oyama west-bank village 
of Nishi-nonuma that was receiving 0.0002 cubic meters per second. The 
conclusion that the Futakuchi and Nishi-nonuma parcels were suffering from 
'shortages' of water (or even that they were receiving one-half and 
one-quarter of the water volume of the Minde parcel) does not follow 
directly upon these figures. It would depend, first, to the analyst as 
well as to the cultivators and officials, on agronomic and agricultural 
considerations--soil types, water permeation rate, and the often variable 
watering strategies of cultivators. It would also depend on a 
political-economic evaluation of water needs and paddy land rights. As 
land which was (1) registered as (2) paddy land in (3) an administrative 
village that was within (4) the official service area of a branch canal 
which had a formally acknowledged intake along (S) a main canal, both the 
Hinde and Kakuda parcels would be entitled to yosui, "irrigation water,e" 
Aka River water delivered through that canal network; water from the 
parcels could also be drained back into the canal network. In contrast, 
the Nishi-nonuma might only expect morai-mizu, "received water,e" the 
surplus or drainage water received through private negotiations with y�sui 
units for paddy lands which were either unregistered and within a service 
area or else, as Nishi-nonuma, outside the service area. The Nishi-nonuma 
cultivator might still feel a 'shortage,' but only through his 
presuppositions about water needs, watering strategies, and paddy land 
rights. 
It is no easier to judge relative volumes between the Minde and Kakuda 
parcels because we have seen that a right to Shorynjigawa "irrigation 
water" and actual water distribution principles within the network were 
separate issues. There were two standards of allocation, by customary 
..• 
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intake dimensions and in proportion to registered yield. Both could be 
interpreted as • equitable,• but neither yielded an unambiguous judgment 
about a 'shortage• in the Kakuda parcel. 
Thus, water was certainly scarce and unpredictable in the Aka River 
basin, but these environmental conditions were experienced in political 
and economic terms and were interpreted differentially by various ·· 
actors--only as such were they the basis of social action. It was for 
political and economic reasons that throughout the Tokugawa period, 
neither water shortages nor frequent stretches of drought nor the low 
efficiency of the physical network resulted in active elite intervention 
or water user cooperation. It was only after 1870, when the basis of land 
taxation was substantially revised, when legislation was passed by the new
Meij i state, and when the structure of the rice market was significantly 
altered that there was agitation by downstream landholders and 
mobilization into effective irrigation cooperatives. The same difficult 
water conditions, the same weak river levees, the same leaking canals were 
now seen in very different terms.e9 1  
Thus we learn once again that the constraints of nature are just that :  
broad constraints, a range of tolerance, within which specific instances 
of social organization are given form by the matrix of culture. As there 
are no territorial imperatives, so there are no hydrological imperatives. 
We can only explain irrigation organization as a social response to 
culturally defined water resource needs and characteristics. This is the 
premise on which this study rests and the lesson it seeks to demonstrate. 
9 1  See Kelly 1980:e508-520 for a brief sketch of irrigation in the Meiji 
period, which is the subject of current res·earch.' 
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Map 5 :  River systems of Shoriai Plain 
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Map 6 :  The Shoryujigawa network 
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Map 7 :  The Kumaide six village area 
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Map 8i Sketch map of the Kakuda-futakuchi area 
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Map 9 :  The Nakagawa network 
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Map 9 (Detail Map #A) : The Nakagawa network (upper half) 
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Map 9 (Detail Map IIB) : 
The Nakagawa network (lower half) 
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Map 10: Kamenoyama and the intakes of Hirono-shinden and 
Oshikiri Branch Canals 
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Map 11: A schematic map of the water channel pat tern in the 
Watamae area, late Tokugawa per· d 
N 
Map 12 
Note: A
1
, A
2
: tertiaries of Aramata Branch Canal 
tertiaries of Watamae Shinden Branch Canal
B1,B2: c
1
,c
2
, c
3
: tertiaries of Gokamura Branch Canal 
- -
--
� 
� 
' , ,  ___ _ 
\� 
\. 40 
: ha 
237 
Map 12: Field and ditch layout in a section of Watamae, late 
Tokugawa period 
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(A notebook compiled by the village headman in 1822 of 
miscellaneous documents relating to Hirono-shinden Village in the 
period, 1713-1822. Now kept at the Historical Materials Archives, 
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Watamae Village. Presently kept at Watamae Village shrine, 
Fujishima Town.) 
B. Published Sources in Japanese 
Akagawa futsu suiri kumiai [Aka River Irrigation Cooperative] 
1902 Akagawa enkaku shi [A History of the Aka River] (Tsuruoka: 
Akagawa futsu suiri kumiai). 
Aki Koichi 
1972 1 1Gogen suisei gaisetsu1 1  [An Outline of River Training Works] .  
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